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California Supreme Court Survey
November 1988-January 1989
The California Supreme Court Survey is a brief synopsis of recent decisions
by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the readerof the
issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to serve as a
startingpointfor researchingany of the topical areas. The decisions are analyzed in accordancewith the importance of the court's holding and the extent
to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline and
judicial misconduct cases have been omitted from the survey.
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I.

ANTI-TRUST LAW
The CartwrightAct was not intended to apply to a bona
fide merger. The Unfair PracticesAct applies to ongoing
conduct, not to only one merger: California ex rel. Van de
Kamp v. Texaco, Inc.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Californiaex rel. Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc.,1 the California
Supreme Court, in a narrowly-divided opinion, 2 held that the legislature did not intend the Cartwright Act (Act) 3 to apply to a merger
when one company purchases another and they lose their independent identities. The court relied extensively on its analysis of the legislative history of the Act and similar acts in other states, as well as
cases interpreting these early acts. Further, the entire court agreed
that because the Unfair Practices Act 4 applied to continuing practices
and not one action, such as the Texaco, Inc. (Texaco) and Getty Oil
Co. (Getty Oil) merger, the attorney general failed to state a cause of
action.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The attorney general's cause of action 5 against Texaco arose out of
one of the largest merger agreements in history:6 Texaco's 1984 acquisition of Getty Oil. Upon entering the agreement, Texaco and
Getty Oil notified the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the
United States Justice Department of the proposed merger. 7 After
finding possible federal antitrust violations which could result from
the merger, the FTC issued a proposed complaint alleging violations
of the Clayton8 and Federal Trade Commission Acts 9, as well as de1. 46 Cal. 3d 1147, 762 P.2d 385, 252 Cal. Rptr. 221 (1988).
2. Chief Justice Lucas authored the majority opinion in which Justices Panelli,
Arguelles, and Eagleson concurred. Justice Mosk wrote a concurring and dissenting
opinion in which Justices Broussard and Kaufman concurred.
3. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16700 (West 1987).
4. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17000 (West 1987).
5. See generally 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts §§ 582-583
(9th ed. 1987).
6. Hager, State Supreme Court Foils Van de Kamp's Challenge to Getty's Merger
With Texaco, L.A. Times, Oct. 21, 1988, (Business) at 1, col. 4; Carrizosa, Justices Rule
State Can't Block Merger of Texaco, Getty, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 21, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
7. Texaco, 46 Cal. 3d at 1151, 762 P.2d at 386, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 22. Premerger notification is required under section 18 of title 15 of the United States Code.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 18 of the Clayton Act states in
pertinent part:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other
share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or any activity affecting commerce, where in
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tailing

the

potential

anticompetitive

effects

of

the
1

Although the merger would have a nationwide impact,"

merger.10
one of the

FTC's primary concerns was "the sale, pipeline transportation, and

refining into petroleum products of heavy crude oil in the state of
California."12 However, concurrent with the issuance of the proposed

complaint, the FTC settled the complaint by entering into a proposed
consent order agreement with Texaco. 1 3 Six days after the FTC entered the final complaint and consent order,14 the attorney general
filed a complaint against Texaco and Getty Oil.
The attorney general had alleged in his complaint that Texaco and

Getty Oil had violated both the Cartwrightl 5 and the Unfair Compeany line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of
the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
Id.;
see generally 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts §§ 544, 559,
561 (9th ed. 1987); 3 WEST'S FEDERAL PRACTICE Manual § 3049 (M. Volz 2d ed. 1970 &
Supp. 1987); Bermingham, Legal Aspects of Petroleum Marketing Under Federal and
California Laws, 7 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 161, 185-86 (1960); Bradley, Oligopoly Power
Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts-From Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19
STAN. L. REV. 313 (1967).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). Section 45(a)(1) states: "Unfair methods of competition
in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." Id. § 45(a)(1). See generally 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts §§ 544, 558 (9th ed. 1987).
10. Texaco, 46 Cal. 3d at 1171-72, 762 P.2d at 400, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 236 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (quoting FTC, Texaco, Inc. and Getty Oil Co.; Proposed Consent Agreement with Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 49 Fed. Reg. 8550, 8558 (Mar. 7,
1984) [hereinafter FTC, Proposed Consent Agreement]).
11. Id. at 1172, 762 P.2d at 400, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 236 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting FTC, Proposed Consent Agreement, supra note 10, at 8558).
12. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting FTC, Proposed Consent
Agreement, supra note 10, at 8561-62). The FTC staff detailed potential anticompetitive effects in California. Id. at 1174-76, 762 P.2d at 402-03, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 238-39
(Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting FTC, Proposed Consent Agreement,
supra note 10, at 8562-64 ) (Commissioner Pertschuk dissenting from decision to settle
with Texaco and expressing further potential anticompetitive effects of merger)).
13. Texaco, 46 Cal. 3d at 1174, 762 P.2d at 402, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 238 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). Under the terms of the agreement, the merger would not be
challenged for antitrust violations, but Texaco was required to:
divest itself of certain Getty assets located throughout the country; offer pipeline access to former Getty customers; and refrain from acquiring wholesale
distribution firms in various states. Regarding California assets, the order required Texaco to sell crude oil of a specified grade to certain former Getty
customers for five years.
Id. at 1151-52, 762 P.2d at 386, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
14. Id at 1176-77, 762 P.2d at 403-04, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
15. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16726 (West 1987). Section 16726 states that
"[e]xcept as provided in this chapter, every trust is unlawful, against public policy and
void." Id. § 16726. A trust is defined as:

1147

titionl6 Acts.17 This would be the first, and now probably the last,
8
time that the Cartwright Act would be used to prevent a merger.'
19
The attorney general began by defining the "relevant markets"'
which would be affected by the Texaco-Getty Oil merger. 20 He then
alleged:
The effect of the acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition in
each of the specified relevant markets in California in violation of the Cartwright Act in the following ways, among others: (a) actual competition will
be eliminated between Texaco and Getty in the marketing of California crude
oil; (b) actual competition between competitors in general in the relevant
product markets in California will be lessened; (c) California independent refiners may be denied access to California crude oil that is currently supplied
by Getty and is necessary to the profitable operation of their refineries; (d) for
reasons unrelated to the efficient use of resources, Texaco may have the incentive and ability to deny, and may in fact deny, independent refiners access
to California crude oil and proprietary pipeline transportation, thereby increasing the difficulty of entry into California refining and decreasing the
competitive significance of independent California refiners; (e) Texaco's acquisition of Getty will result in significantly higher concentration ratios in the
relevant markets; (f) already high barriers to entry in the California crude oil,
refining, pipeline transmission systems, and retail product markets will be
substantially raised; (g) actual competition between Texaco and Getty for the
transportation in California of crude oil and refined products by pipelines will
be eliminated; (h) competition in the marketing of motor gasoline and other
refined products may be substantially lessened in California such that the
prices of these commodities might be affected; (i) competition in the market
for California crude oil may be substantially lessened such that its price may
be affected; and (j) competition in the transportation of California crude oil by
pipelines may be substantially lessened such that the price of the crude oil
a combination of capital, skill or acts by two or more persons ... [t]o create or
carry out restrictions in trade or commerce .. . [t]o make or enter into or execute or carry out contracts, obligations or agreements of any kind or description, by which they ... [a]gree to pool, combine or directly or indirectly unite
any interests that they may have connected with the sale or transportation of
any ... article or commodity, that its price might in any manner be affected.
Id. §§ 16720(a), 16720(e)(4); see generally 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Contracts §§ 575-576, 580 (9th ed. 1987); 44 CAL. JUR. 3D Monopolies and Restraints of
Trade §§ 39-40 (1976); Bermingham, supra note 8, at 243-47; Barron, California'sAntitrust-Legislative Schizophrenia, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 393 (1962); Von Kalinowski &
Hanson, The California Antitrust Laws: A Comparison with the Federal Antitrust
Laws, 6 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 533 (1959); Comment, The Cartwright Act-California's
Sleeping Beauty, 2 STAN. L. REV. 200 (1949).
16. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1987). Violations include "unlawful,
unfair or fraudulent business practice ...." Id.; see generally 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts §§ 591-593 (9th ed. 1987).
17. Texaco, 46 Cal. 3d at 1177, 762 P.2d at 404, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 240 (Mosk J., concurring and dissenting).
18. Carrizosa, supra note 6, at 1, col. 1.
19. "Relevant market," in an antitrust context, is the geographic and product area
where anticompetitive activities are alleged to occur or impact. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 874-75, 1160 (5th ed. 1979).
20. 46 Cal. 3d at 1177-80, 762 P.2d at 404-06, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 240-42 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). The relevant product markets included crude oil, refining of
crude oil, marketing of petroleum products, and transportation of crude oil through
pipelines. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). Relevant geographic markets included California and submarkets within California. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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might be affected.

21

After alleging facts to support a Cartwright Act violation, the attorney general incorporated these facts into his contention that the
merger also violated the Unfair Practices Act. 22 The attorney general's requested relief for both violations was Texaco's divestment of
23
Getty Oil's California assets.
Texaco and Getty Oil demurred to the attorney general's complaint, and the trial court held that the scope of the Cartwright Act
did not encompass mergers, and insufficient facts were alleged for an
Unfair Competition Act violation.24 Moreover, the trial court stated
that even though they did not rule on the issue of whether the FTC
consent order preempted the attorney general's complaint, "[t]he
Court could find that the relief sought in the complaint is therefore
barred by the doctrine of preemption." 25 Affirming the trial court's
opinion, the court of appeal "concluded that the consent order preempted the action and [therefore] did not reach the other issues." 2 6
The attorney general petitioned the California Supreme Court for review, reiterating the contentions made in his original complaint: the
Texaco-Getty Oil merger violated the Cartwright and Unfair Competition Acts and the cause of action was not preempted by the FTC's
consent order.27
III.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

The majority addressed two major questions regarding the attorney
general's contentions: (a) whether the Cartwright Act applies to
mergers, and (b) whether the Unfair Practices Act applies to
mergers.
A.

The CartwrightAct and Mergers
The court addressed the attorney general's contention that the

21. Id. at 1179-80, 762 P.2d at 405-06, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 241-42 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting) (emphasis added). The attorney general was reiterating the concerns
of the FTC staff. See supra note 12. "In other words, the complaint claimed the merge
posed an incipient threat to competition." 46 Cal. 3d at 1152, 762 P.2d at 386, 252 Cal.
Rptr. at 222 (emphasis added).
22. 46 Cal. 3d at 1180, 762 P.2d at 406, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 242 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
23. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting); Carrizosa, supra note 6, at 2, col. 2.
24. 46 Cal. 3d at 1181, 762 P.2d at 406, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 242 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
25. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
26. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
27. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Cartwright Act applied to mergers by first setting forth the specific
language of the Act. 28 The court questioned the attorney general's
interpretation that "a combination of capital"29 was broad enough to
be applied to a "bona fide merger ... [wherein] the entities lose forever their separate identities, and become a new, independent entity."30

However, to resolve the conflicting interpretations, and

thereby discover the intent of the Act's drafters, the court looked at
three possible derivations of the Act: (1) the progeny of Senator Reagan's proposed bill that was an alternative to Senator Sherman's bill;
(2) the Sherman Act; and (3) the common law. The court found that
Senator Reagan's proposed bill, and those acts which evolved from it,
were the most historically accurate derivations of the Cartwright Act,
and therefore provided the best articulation of the probable intent of
31
the drafters of the Act.
1.

The Evolution of Senator Reagan's Bill

The court's discussion of the most probable precursor to the Cartwright Act began with Texas Senator Reagan's introduction of a "bill
to define trusts" in 1888. The court noted that although the United
States Senate did not debate the antitrust subject until 1890, several
states began enacting their own antitrust statutes.3 2 By 1890, two
types of state antitrust legislation had developed: broadly worded
statutes such as those enacted in Kansas and Maine which made all
combinations for improper purposes illegal, and narrowly worded
statutes such as the Texas Act which made "trusts" illegal and defined trusts as combinations for specific improper purposes. 33 The
court concluded that the Texas act followed the original Reagan bill,
and that Reagan's amended bill, which was debated in 1890 with
34
Sherman's bill, was based on the Texas act.
Although the United States Senate adopted Sherman's bill instead
of Reagan's bill, the court noted that several states had enacted antitrust statues similar to the Texas act. 35 Concurrent with this increased antitrust legislation, several cases interpreting the new
statutes arose. The court analyzed several cases which held that the
purchase of one company by another participating in the same busi28. See supra note 15.
29. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16720 (West 1987).

30. Texaco, 46 Cal. 3d at 1152-53, 762 P.2d at 387, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 223. Merger was
contrasted to those combinations which combine and then "perdure, i.e., continue to
maintain separate identities and interests." Id. at 1152, 762 P.2d at 387, 252 Cal. Rptr.
at 223 (footnote omitted).'
31. Id. at 1153, 762 P.2d at 387, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
32. Id. at 1154-55, 762 P.2d at 388-89, 252 Cal.Rptr. at 224-25.
33. Id. at 1155, 762 P.2d at 389, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1155-56, 762 P.2d at 389, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
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ness did not constitute a "combination" for purposes of the antitrust
statutes because they did not maintain separate relationships. 36 The
court concluded that "at the time the Cartwright Act was enacted
there was a recognizable body of case law construing the word 'combination' (in both Kansas-Maine and Texas-type acts) as not applying
to the purchase of one business by another entity engaged in the
37
same business."
At the same time the antitrust legislation was being enacted, and
cases were narrowly interpreting the term "combination," several
states amended their antitrust acts in order to regulate corporate
mergers. 38 During this time period, in 1907, the California legislature
enacted the Cartwright Act.3 9 After detailing the Act's striking similarity to the Reagan bills and several bills which evolved,40 the court
noted:
The Act embraced by our Legislature contained the well-known limitations
on combinations in restraint of trade, but it (i) failed to include the latest invention of the evolving antitrust statutes--an antimerger provision-and (ii)
embraced the term "combination," without attempting to modify the
language
41
in order to avoid the prevailing narrow construction of that term.

Further, the court opined that the legislature intended a similar
"narrow" construction of "combination," as presumed from the
evolution of similar language in other state statutes of the time, and
the developing case law which had narrowly interpreted "combination."42 The court added that other legislatures had acknowledged
the potential problems of mergers and had enacted legislation to
combat the problem, but California did not amend accordingly; suggesting that the legislature intended a "limited scope" which did not
36. Id at 1157-59, 762 P.2d at 390-91, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27; see Gates v. Hooper,
90 Tex. 563, 39 S.W. 1079 (1897) (purchase of one mercantile company by another not a
combination because did not maintain separate relationship); Hitchcock v. Anthony, 83
F. 779 (6th Cir. 1897) (purchase of one dockyard company by another not a combination because Michigan antitrust act did not apply to person who conveys business to
another); A. Booth & Co. v. Davis, 131 F. 31 (1904) (Michigan act did not apply to
purchase of one fishing company by another because act not intended to cover sale
where seller retained no interest in property and no intent for its subsequent use).
37. Id. at 1159, 762 P.2d at 391, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
38. Id. at 1159-60, 762 P.2d at 391-92, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 227-28 (noting 1899 TEX. GEN
LAWS ch. 94, § 2(1), (2); 1905 ARK. AcTs No. 1, § 5).
39. Id. at 1160, 762 P.2d at 392, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
40. Id. at 1160-62 n.14, 762 P.2d at 392-93 n.14, 252 Cal.Rptr. at 228-29 n.14. The
court quoted relevant parts of the original Cartwright Act, the Reagan Bill of 1888, the
Texas Act of 1889, the Reagan Bill of 1890, and the Michigan Act of 1800 to illustrate
the nearly identical language and minor differences in each. Id.
41. Id. at 1160-61, 762 P.2d at 392-93, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 228-29.
42. Id. at 1162, 762 P.2d at 393-94, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 229-30.
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apply to mergers. 43 Moreover, the court noted that "although it has
amended the Cartwright Act at least 26 times between 1909 and the
present, [the legislature] has never enacted a merger provision."44
Finally, the court concluded that based on its analysis of the most
probable evolution of the Cartwright Act, the legislature intended
the Act to apply to those who perdure and not "to regulate the bona
45
fide purchase and sale of one firm by another."
2.

The Sherman Act's Applicability

The court next addressed the possibility that the Cartwright Act
derived from the Sherman Act,46 since the Sherman Act applied to
mergers. Based on its prior analysis of the legislative history of the
Act, the court held that the Sherman Act "[was] not directly probative of the Cartwright drafters' intent, given the different genesis of
the provision under review."47 However, the court noted that even if
it accepted the attorney general's contention that the Cartwright Act
derived from the Sherman Act, the argument of its applicability to
48
the merger in the present case would fail because the Sherman Act
requires proof of an "actual" restraint of trade, not just an "incipi49
ent" threat to competition as alleged by the attorney general.
Therefore, the court held that neither the Cartwright Act nor the
Sherman Act would apply to the Texaco-Getty Oil merger based on
50
the facts alleged by the attorney general.
3.

Pre-Cartwright Act Common Law

The court addressed Texaco and Getty Oil's contention that the
Cartwright Act codified the existing common law, and that the common law did not restrict mergers. The court noted that "the clear
'majority view' at common law was that certain forms of mergers or
acquisitions were 'illegal.' "51 However, "common law cases condemning mergers all involved clear, actual threats to competition, not
merely incipient threats to competition."52 Further, the increased severity of punishment under the Cartwright Act, as opposed to that at
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1162-63, 762 P.2d at 394, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 230 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 1163, 762 P.2d at 395, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982); see generally 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAWS, Contracts §§ 544, 553-554 (9th ed. 1987); 58 C.J.S. Monopolies §§ 17-26 (1949 &

Supp. 1988); Bermingham, supra note 8, at 162-67; Bradley, supra note 8; Von Kalinowski & Hanson, supra note 15.
47. Id. at 1164, 762 P.2d at 395, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
48. See supra note 46.
49. Texaco, 46 Cal. 3d at 1164-65, 762 P.2d at 395-96, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 231-32.
50. Id. at 1165, 762 P.2d at 396, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
51. Id. at 1167, 762 P.2d at 397, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 233 (emphasis added).
52. Id. (emphasis added).
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common law,53 led the court to reiterate its earlier finding that:
the drafters of the Cartwright Act intended to make their law applicable only
to situations in which the parties improperly collude and continue as separate,
independent entities, and not to situations in which, by virtue of purchase and
sale, or merger, one or more of the entities ceases to exist.5 4

Therefore, based on a thorough legislative analysis, the court concluded that the Cartwright Act did not apply to mergers or
acquisitions.
B.

55

The Unfair PracticesAct and Mergers

The court quickly dismissed the attorney general's claim that the
Texaco-Getty Oil merger violated the Unfair Practices Act. "Unfair

competition" under the Unfair Practices Act is defined as an "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice." 5 6 Since the attorney general attacked only the merger, and did not allege a specific "pattern
of behavior" or "course of conduct"57 sufficient to constitute a "practice," the court held that the Unfair Practices Act did not apply to
the Texaco-Getty Oil merger. 58

Because the court decided that the

Cartwright Act and Unfair Practices Act did not apply to the merger,
the court did not discuss whether the action was preempted by either
60
9
the Supremacy Clause5 or the Commerce Clause.
IV.

JUSTICE MOSK'S CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

61
Justice Mosk, in his extensive concurring and dissenting opinion,

concurred with the majority in its holding that the Unfair Practices

Act did not apply to the merger, but strongly attacked the majority's
holding that the Cartwright Act does not apply to mergers. Further,
because he found that the attorney general stated a meritorious claim
under the Cartwright Act, Justice Mosk spent several pages discuss53. Under the common law, punishment was simply to declare the agreement void
and unenforceable. Id. (citing United States v. Addyson Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271,
279 (6th Cir. 1898)). However, under the Cartwright Act, punishment includes both
civil awards and criminal punishment. Texaco, 46 Cal. 3d at 1167, 762 P.2d at 397, 252
Cal. Rptr. at 233.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1169, 762 P.2d at 399, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
56. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1987).
57. Id. at 1170, 762 P.2d at 399, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 235 (quoting Barquis v. Merchant's
Collection Ass'n, 7 Cal. 3d 94, 113, 496 P.2d 817, 831, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745, 759 (1972)).
58. Id
59. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
60. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
61. Texaco, 46 Cal. 3d at 1170-1217, 762 P.2d at 399-430, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 235-66
(Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
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ing the preemption issues that the majority did not address. 62
Justice Mosk's primary attack on the majority's opinion related to
the almost nonexistent federal antitrust enforcement and the resultant obligation of states affected by threats of anticompetitive conduct to vigorously enforce their state antitrust laws for the protection
of their citizens. 6 3 Accordingly, if the Cartwright Act is interpreted
"in accordance with the plain meaning of its express terms and with
an eye on the object it seeks to achieve and the evil it aims to prevent,"64 Justice Mosk would have found a clear legislative intent to
65
apply the Act to the Texaco-Getty Oil merger.
Further, Justice Mosk attacked the majority's discussion of the
derivation of the Cartwright Act and the application of other state's
66
acts and case law to the interpretation of the California legislation.
He concluded that the Cartwright Act not only applied to mergers,
but applied to mergers with probable, as opposed to actual, restriction
on competition. 67 Due to the potential anticompetitive effects alleged
by the attorney general, Justice Mosk would have allowed the claim
68
to proceed under the Cartwright Act.
After finding a probable violation of the Cartwright Act, Justice
Mosk discussed the possible preemption of the action by the federal
antitrust complaint, the subsequent consent order, and the Commerce Clause. 69 He found that the attorney general's claim was not
71
preempted by either the consent order 70 or the Commerce Clause.
V.

CONCLUSION

The majority's well-reasoned opinion will be viewed favorably by
companies in California and across the nation who are in the midst
of, or contemplating, a merger or acquisition. States with acts similar
62. Id. at 1194-215, 762 P.2d at 415-30, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 251-66 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
63. Id. at 1170-71, 762 P.2d at 399-400, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 235-36 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
64. Id. at 1170, 762 P.2d at 399, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 235 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
65. Id. at 1182-83, 762 P.2d at 407, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 243 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
66. Id. at 1184-92, 762 P.2d at 408-i4, 252 Cal.Rptr. at 244-50 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
67. Id. at 1192, 762 P.2d at 414, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 250 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
68. Id. at 1194, 762 P.2d at 415, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 251 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
69. Id. at 1194-216, 762 P.2d at 415-30, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 251-66 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
70. Id. at 1209, 762 P.2d at 425, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 261 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
71. Id. at 1216, 762 P.2d at 430, 252 Cal.Rptr. at 266 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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to the Cartwright Act, but which do not have specific antimerger provisions, may find the majority's analysis of the legislative intent of
these acts persuasive enough to follow California's interpretation.
Hopefully, for the protection of consumers, these states will heed the
policy concerns of Justice Mosk and enact specific antimerger provisions which would allow their respective attorneys general to reduce
anticompetitive behavior.
Consumers in California may feel the full effect of the majority's
72
decision beginning in April, when the FTC consent order expires.
However, the attorney general has said that he will continue to monitor any anticompetitive effects and actual harm suffered by Californians, especially independent refiners, and possibly file a new
complaint against Texaco in federal court. 73 The most promising solution to the restraints of trade problem in California, during an era
of nominal federal antitrust prosecution, will be the attorney general's promise to keep fighting mergers through federal antitrust legislation in federal courts, and his pledge to pursue an antimerger
amendment to the Cartwright Act.74
MICHAEL

II.

J.

GAINER

CIVIL PROCEDURE
The statute of limitations in section 3122.5 of the Civil
Code for actions against lien release bonds is inoperative
when the bond is recorded after suit to foreclose a
mechanics' lien has been filed: Hutnick v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co.

In Hutnick v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty. Co., 47 Cal. 3d
456, 763 P.2d 1326, 253 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1988), the court considered the
relationship between actions to foreclose a mechanics' lien and those
to foreclose a lien release bond. Although Civil Code section 3144.5
specifies that actions against the lien release bond must be instituted
within six months after recording the bond, the court held this section applicable only when the release bond is obtained prior to a
plaintiff taking any action to foreclose the mechanics' lien. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3144.5 (West Supp. 1989).
Hutnick improved certain property of Murieta Village Develop72. Carrizosa, supra note 6, at 1, col. 4.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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ment Company pursuant to a contract. After the services were rendered and only partial payment was received, Hutnick recorded a
mechanics' lien against the property. Hutnick subsequently filed suit
to foreclose the lien. After the suit was filed, a release bond was
purchased from United States Fidelity & Guaranty (USF&G) and recorded. However, over six months passed between the recording of
the bond and the surety being joined as a party to the suit. Although
the principal was named, he was never served with the complaint.
Additionally, the complaint was not amended to assert a cause of action against the bond within the six-month period required by section
3144.5, and USF&G successfully demurred to the amended complaint.
The court began its analysis by discussing the nature of the
mechanics' lien as provided both by constitutional and legislative enactment. See CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3110-3154
(West 1974 & Supp. 1989); see generally 13 W. BIEL & C. SENEKER,
CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE LAW & PRACTICE ch. 451 (1988 & Supp.
1988); 2 A. BOWMAN, OGDEN'S REVISED CALIFORNIA REAL PROPERTY
LAW § 20 (1975 & Supp. 1987); 44 CAL. JUR. 3D Mechanics' Liens
§§ 1-177 (1978 & Supp. 1988). The court reasoned that the legislature
enacted the lien release bond provisions to ensure that workers receive the protection provided by the mechanics' lien procedure while
also allowing for the alienability of real property. See M. MARSH,
CALIFORNIA MECHANICS' LIEN LAW HANDBOOK § 8.28 (3d rev. ed.
1988). Because the bond is merely a replacement for the improved
property, the court determined that an action against the bond or the
property was essentially the same.
However, sections 3144 and 3144.5 of the Civil Code provide differing statutes of limitations for actions against the property and the
bond. CAL. CIv. CODE

§§

3144, 3144.5 (West Supp. 1989). Section 3144

specifies that a mechanics' lien is valid only for ninety days, unless
suit to foreclose the lien is filed during this time. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3144 (West Supp. 1988). Section 3144.5 requires that actions against
a lien release bond be instituted within six months of the recording
of the bond. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3144.5 (West Supp. 1989). The court
declared that the legislature could not have intended to require a
plaintiff to meet two statutes of limitation to obtain a single remedy;
therefore, the periods must be considered as alternatives. If the defendant records a bond prior to the plaintiff's filing suit to foreclose
the mechanics' lien, the plaintiff must institute proceedings against
the bond within the six months required by section 3144.5. If the
bond is not recorded prior to the filing of suit to foreclose the
mechanics' lien, the suit must be filed within ninety days as required
by section 3144. The court maintained that the existence of the bond
did not alter the nature of the remedy and that the recording of the

1156

[Vol. 16: 1143, 1989]

California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

bond did not impose any new time requirements on the plaintiff, provided the action to foreclose the mechanics' lien was timely filed.
The court likewise rejected USF&G's contention that, as surety, it
was not made a party to the action in a timely manner. The court
asserted that a surety was a successor in interest to the original parties against whom the action was timely filed; therefore, the surety
could not assert a statute of limitations defense. See CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 385, 1908 (West 1973 & Supp. 1989).
The court also discussed the liability of the surety when the principal is not made a party to the action, and whether a principal has a
right to be dismissed from the action after a bond is recorded. First,
the court declared that a principal has no right to be dismissed when
it was also the landowner, because the landowner is fully liable for
the amount of the bond. See Borello v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 221 Cal.
App. 2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1963). The court declared that a
surety could be liable even though the principal is not a party, provided the principal is notified of the proceeding by the surety. See
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1912 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989). The court
reasoned that because the principal is equally liable after such notification, this liability would motivate the principal to assist in the defense of the action.
In holding that the time requirements of section 3144.5 of the Civil
Code are inapplicable when a plaintiff has already brought suit to
foreclose a mechanics' lien, the court protected an important remedy
for contractors and other improvers of property. Interpreting section
3144.5 as an additional, rather than as an alternative requirement
would have interfered with the right to a quick and efficient enforcement procedure.
MARK G. KISICKI
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III.

CRIMINAL LAW
A parent who provides an ill child with prayer treatment
instead of medical treatment may be prosecuted for
involuntary manslaughterandfelony child
endangermentif the treatment denied can be shown to
be necessary to the well-being of the child: Walker v.
Superior Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Walker v. Superior Court,1 the supreme court decided that a
parent may not claim protection of the first or fourteenth amendments or section 270 of the Penal Code when, based on strong religious beliefs, a parent solicits prayer treatment instead of medical
treatment for a seriously ill child who subsequently dies as a result of
the failure to obtain medical treatment. The court held that this denial of medical treatment may subject the parent to criminal prosecu2
tion for involuntary manslaughter and felony child endangerment.
The court rejected all statutory defenses presented by the defendant
parent, 3 and further held that the prosecution of the defendant did
not violate constitutional principles of free exercise of religion,4 or
5
due process.
II.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

The defendant's four-year-old daughter contracted a "flu-like" illness that was later diagnosed as acute purulent meningitis. The defendant, a Christian Scientist, believed that prayer was the sole
appropriate healing method. 6 She hired both a Christian Science
"prayer practitioner" 7 and a Christian Science nurse to attend to the
sick child, but the defendant's daughter died seventeen days after initially exhibiting symptoms of the disease. At no time did the child
1. 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988). Justice Mosk wrote the
majority opinion, with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Arguelles, Eagelson
and Kaufman concurring. Justice Mosk also filed a separate concurring opinion. Justice Broussard filed a separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
2. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 144, 763 P.2d at 873, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
3. Id. at 120-34, 763 P.2d at 856-66, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 5-15.
4. Id. at 138-41, 763 P.2d at 869-71, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 18-20.
5. Id. at 141-44, 763 P.2d at 871-73, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 20-22.
6. Christian Scientists believe that "disease exists only because the mind, believing itself diseased, inflicts the illness on the body." Schneider, Christian Science and
the Law: Room for Compromise?,1 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBs. 81, 81 (1965). A cure is
not effectuated through traditional medical care, but rather through "remov[ing] the
error of thinking that the disease exists." Id.
7. Church-approved "prayer practitioners" assist Church members in banishing
illness. These practitioners must have a documented history of past "healings," must
have "attend[ed] class instruction in Christian Science," and must "devote full time to
healing." Id.
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receive any traditional medical care. 8

Relying on a criminal negligence theory, the state accused the defendant of felony child endangerment under section 273a of the Penal Code 9 and involuntary manslaughter under section 192 of the
Penal Code.10 After the court of appeal denied the defendant's petition for writ of prohibition and stay, the supreme court granted review to examine

the defendant's

contention

that, based on five

theories, her prosecution was invalid. The defendant alternatively
asserted that 1) section 270 of the Penal Code barred her prosecution;
2) certain other relevant statutes excused her actions; 3) sufficient

culpable conduct for prosecution did not exist; 4) the right of free exercise of religion gave her absolute protection; and 5) the presence of
a lack of fair notice of the illegality of her conduct violated her due
process rights.

III.
A.

MAJORITY OPINION

Defendant's Statutory Arguments
The court first examined the defendant's allegation that she is

completely protected from prosecution based on the language of a
1976 amendment to section 270 of the Penal Code. Section 270 pro-

vides a misdemeanor penalty for parents who fail to provide their
children with "certain necessities" of care. Section 270 states in part:
If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish
necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care
for his or her child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor ....
If a parent provides a minor with treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious
denomination, by a duly accredited practitioner thereof, such treatment shall
8. It is important to note that while medical treatment for illness is strongly discouraged by the Christian Science Church, members using traditional medical care are
not "'stigmatized or expelled'" from the Church. Note, California's Prayer Healing
Dilemma, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 395, 410 (1987) (quoting a Christian Science
spokesperson). See also Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 139, 763 P.2d at 870, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a (West 1988) [hereinafter section 273a]. Subsection (1)
states in part: "Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce
great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts
thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering.., is punishable by imprisonment ... for 2, 4, or 6 years." Id.
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 1988) [hereinafter section 192]. This section
states in part: "Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice ....
(b) Involuntary - in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act, which might produce death, in an unlawful
manner, or without due caution and circumspection." Id.
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constitute "other remedial care," as used in this section. 1 1

The defendant asserted that her prayer treatment fulfilled this
"other remedial care" standard as a fully sufficient alternative to
traditional medical treatment.
The court began its analysis by reexamining People v. Arnold, 12 a
1967 California Supreme Court case that is factually analogous to the
instant case. 13 The court recognized that the Arnold opinion noted in
dictum: "The phrase 'other remedial care'. . . does not sanction unorthodox substitutes for 'medical attendance'. . ."14 In light of this
statement, the court analyzed both the plain language of section 270
and the legislative intent of the 1976 amendment, and concluded that
the dictum in Arnold must be overruled. 15 The court focused on the
"or" that proceeded the phrase "other remedial care" within section
270, and held that "other remedial care" such as prayer treatment
"represents an alternativeto medical attendance under the terms of
section 270."16 The court further noted that the legislative history of
the 1976 amendment clearly indicated a legislative intent to protect
parents who wished to use prayer as a substitute for standard medical treatment.17
However, the court rejected the defendant's contention that this
exemption from liability under section 270 will also bar prosecution
for involuntary manslaughter within section 192 of the Penal Code
and felony child endangerment within section 273(a) of the Penal
Code. Stating that "[c]onduct that is legal in one statutory context
...may be actionable under separate statutes created for different
legislative purposes,"' 8 the court refused to extend an "unqualified
defense" to the defendant based on section 270.19 The court concluded that there was no common legislative goal linking section 270
to either section 192 or 273(a), since section 270 was not a punitive or
a physically protective law, but one primarily concerned with assuring that solvent parents financially support a child's needs to reduce
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988) (emphasis added) [hereinafter section

270]. The italicized portion of this text represents the 1976 amendment.
12. 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967).
13. Arnold involved a mother who was a member of the "Church of the First
Born," a denomination that used faith healing instead of medical treatment. She used
enemas, compresses, and prayer treatment when her thirteen-year-old daughter became seriously ill with an intestinal blockage. The child died eighteen days after becoming ill. The Arnold court however, reversed the manslaughter charge against the
mother on grounds unrelated to the lack of medical care. Id. at 441, 426 P.2d at 517, 58
Cal. Rptr. at 117.
14.. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 121, 763 P.2d at 856-57, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 5-6 (quoting Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d at 452, 426 P.2d at 524, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 124) (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 120-23, 763 P.2d at 856-58, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 5-7.
16. Id. at 122, 763 P.2d at 857, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 6 (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 122, 763 P.2d at 857-58, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 6-7.
18. Id. at 124, 763 P.2d at 858-59, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 7-8.
19. Id. at 126, 763 P.2d at 860, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
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state aid.20 Additionally, since the legislative history of section 270
did not specifically articulate an opinion on the issue of a possible
section 270 defense to manslaughter and child endangerment, the
court refused to "exempt prayer treatment, as a matter of law, from
the reach of... [section 192 and section 273]."21
The court next examined the defendant's contention that her prosecution is barred by certain prayer-related statutes involving California's child welfare services program, 22 the Office of Child Abuse
Prevention, 23 and laws covering the reporting of alleged child
abuses.24 The court interpreted these three categories in light of section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code,25 and determined that
the child dependency provision and its upcoming revision show a
clear intent that "when a child's health is seriously jeopardized, the
right of a parent to rely exclusively on prayer must yield."26 While
recognizing both the important state interest in the protection of
children and the important parental interest in child custody, the
court stressed that a prayer-related exemption from felony prosecution would not apply once the child reaches a level of serious
illness.27
B.

Defendant's Culpability Under the Criminal Negligence
Standard

The defendant next asserted that her conduct did not reach the
level of criminal negligence, the standard of culpability necessary for
conviction under sections 192 and 273(a). The court first quoted People v. Penny28 to clarify that criminally negligent conduct "'must be
such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinary prudent or careful man under the same circumstances as to be incompat20. Id. at 124-26, 763 P.2d at 859-60, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 8-9. See People v. Sorensen,
68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968) (section 270 serves to "supplement"
existing child support statutes). See generally Note, Criminal Nonsupport and a Proposal for an Effective Felony-MisdemeanorDistinction, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1075 (1986).
21. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 129, 763 P.2d at 862, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
22. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 16500-16515 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989).
23. Id. §§ 18950-18964.
24. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11164-11174 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989).
25. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1989) (lists ten categories of children, any of which may be "adjudge[d] ... a dependent child of the court").
26. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 133, 763 P.2d at 866, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
27. Id. at 134, 763 P.2d at 866, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
28. 44 Cal. 2d 861, 285 P.2d 926 (1955).
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ible with the proper regard for human life.' "29 The court then
summarily dismissed the defendant's reliance on two 19th century
English common law cases, 30 and focused on an analysis of the defendant's course. of action in attempting to cure her ill daughter.
The defendant stressed that she wholly believed her use of prayer
treatment was in her daughter's best interest, and compatible with
curing the sick child. In examining the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct however, the court noted that the appropriate standard
was an objective one, and refused to emphasize the good faith aspect
of the defendant's conduct. 3 1 The court held that providing only
prayer treatment to a seriously ill child, and depriving the child medical care, gives rise to a question of fact.32
C. Defendant's ConstitutionalArguments
The first constitutional issue discussed by the court concerned the
defendant's assertion that her prosecution was completely barred by
the first amendment to the United States Constitution 33 and article I,
section 4, of the California Constitution,3 4 both of which state that
federal and state governments cannot "prohibito the free exercise" of
religion. 35 The court first asserted the well-settled rule that religious
conduct is "subject to regulation for the protection of society," 36 and
is not absolutely constitutionally protected. The court further clarified that a regulation must be analyzed by balancing "the gravity of
the state's interest .

.

. against the severity of the religious imposi-

tion," 37 and then guaranteeing that the regulation is the "least restrictive alternative available to adequately advance the state's
objectives."38
Noting that the strong state interest in child protection is unquestionable, 39 and that Christian Scientists who fall back on traditional
29. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 135, 763 P.2d at 866-67, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 15-16 (quoting
People v. Penny, 44 Cal. 2d at 879-880, 285 P.2d at 937).
30. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 135-36, 763 P.2d at 867-68, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 16-17.
31. Id. at 137, 763 P.2d at 868, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 17. See People v. Bouroughs, 35
Cal. 3d 824, 678 P.2d 894, 201 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1984) (involuntary manslaughter prosecution of faith healer allowed even though the defendant did not intend to harm the
patient).
32. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 138, 763 P.2d at 869, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
34. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
35. Id.
36. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 139, 763 P.2d at 869, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 18 (quoting
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940)).
37. Id. at 139, 763 P.2d at 869, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 18 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 221 (1972)).
38. Id. at 139, 763 P.2d at 869, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 18 (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of
Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)).
39. Id. at 139, 763 P.2d at 869, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
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medicine are not looked upon as "sinners,"40 the court emphasized
that "parents have no right to free exercise of religion at the price of
a child's life." 41 The court then held that the threat of prosecution
of a parent who solely relies on prayer treatment was not an overly
42
restrictive means of preventing a threat to the child's life.
Lastly, the court examined the defendant's contention that the
combination of sections 270, 192, and 273(a) of the Penal Code resulted in a lack of fair notice of the illegality of her conduct, thus
constituting a violation of her due process rights under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, and article I,
section 7 of the California Constitution. 43 The court held that persons must be deemed aware of the language, intent, and history of
certain statutes. 44 The court cited its previous analysis of the three
statutes at issue, 45 and held that these laws "provide constitutionally
sufficient notice to defendant that the provision of prayer alone ...
would be accommodated only [if]... the child was not threatened with
serious physical harm or illness."46
IV.

JUSTICE MOSK'S CONCURRING OPINION

Justice Mosk filed a detailed concurring opinion stating that the
prayer-only parental exemption within section 270 violates the establishment clause within the first amendment to the United States and
California Constitutions. 47 Stressing that the downfall of this exemption is through its selective preference of one religion over others,
Justice Mosk emphasized that through the legislative history of section 270, Christian Science Church members are illegally favored "in
the face of indistinguishable religious conduct." 48 Justice Mosk fur40. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
41. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 140, 763 P.2d at 870, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 19 (citing Prince v.
Massachusetts, 32 U.S. 158, 168 (1944)) (emphasis in original).
42. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 141, 763 P.2d at 871, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7. Both emphasize that laws
may not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
44. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 143, 763 P.2d at 872, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
45. See supra notes 9-27 and accompanying text.
46. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 144, 763 P.2d at 873, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 22; but see Note,
supra note 8, at 415-16 (California's statutory scheme does not sufficiently warn parents that sole use of prayer treatment alone may subject them to felony prosecution).
47. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 145, 763 P.2d at 873, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 22 (Mosk, J., concurring). Both constitutions emphasize that no laws shall be made "respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
48. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 148, 763 P.2d at 876, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (Mosk, J., concurring). Not coincidentally, the Christian Science Church sponsored the 1976 amendment to section 270.
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ther noted his concern that section 270 requires an unacceptable level
of subjective analysis regarding whether religious groups are "recognized" within the language of the statute. 49
V.

JUSTICE BROUSSARD'S CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

Justice Broussard specifically rejected the majority's holding that
the defendant may be prosecuted for felony child endangerment
under section 273a. Justice Broussard maintained that a parent who
fulfilled the prayer-only exemption of section 270 may also escape liability under section 273a, since the legislative intent of both provisions have a common goal - the protection of children's health.50
Justice Broussard criticized the majority's view of section 270 as a
purely fiscal law, and instead stressed that prosecution under section
273a should only lie when the parent's conduct "willfully caus[es] or
permit[s] child endangerment."51 Since section 270 does not prohibit
a parent from using prayer treatment, Justice Broussard concluded
that the prayer-only exemption must apply "where the failure to provide necessary medical attendance endangers the child's health but
does not result in harm."s2
VI.

CONCLUSION

The court's decision to reject all statutory and constitutional defense and prosecute a parent who, because of deep religious conviction, denied an ill child medical treatment, now effectively shuts off
any possibility that these parents may escape criminal liability for
their good faith actions.5 3 The court realized that modern medicine
has come too far to sanction its denial to seriously ill children, regardless of the sincerity of the religious belief of the parents. But
when faith fails and a child dies, prosecution is a harsh result indeed
for a parent who has already suffered the loss of a child.
MARGARET LISA WILSON
49. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 150, 763 P.2d at 877, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 26 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
50. Id. at 153-55, 763 P.2d at 880, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 29 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
51. Id. at 155, 763 P.2d at 881, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 30 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
52. Id.
53. For an earlier historical perspective of the criminal liability of parents who
deny their children medical care because of religious beliefs, see Trescher & O'Neill,
Medical Carefor Dependent Children: ManslaughterLiability of the Christian Scientist, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 203 (1960). Over the past ninety years, numerous cases in numerous jurisdictions have been litigated on this issue, see, e.g., In re Sampson, 65 Misc.
2d 658, 317 N.Y.S. 2d 641 (1970); Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959); Mitchellv. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Bradley v. State, 79 Fla. 651, 84 So.
677 (1920); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
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iv.

DEATH PENALTY LAW
This survey provides an analysis of the California
Supreme Court's automatic review of cases imposing the
death penalty. Rather than a case-by-case approach, this
section focuses on the key issues under review by the
court and identifies trends and shifts in the court's
rationale.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Between July and December of 1988, the California Supreme
Court decided twenty-six death penalty cases.' The court reversed
the death sentences in approximately thirty percent of these decisions. 2 Although this represents a twenty percent increase over the
1. People v. Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d 207, 763 P.2d 906, 253 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1988); People v.
Bean, 46 Cal. 3d 919, 760 P.2d 996, 251 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1988), petitionfor cert.filed Mar.
23, 1989; People v. Bonin, 46 Cal. 3d 659, 758 P.2d 1217, 250 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1988), cert.
denied sub nom. Bonin v. California, 109 S. Ct. 1561 (1989); People v. Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d
212, 758 P.2d 25, 250 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1988), cert. granted sub. nom. Boyde v. California, 57
U.S.L.W. 3792 (1989); People v. Brown, 46 Cal. 3d 432, 758 P.2d 1135, 250 Cal. Rptr. 604
(1988), cert. denied sub. nom. Brown v. California, 109 S. Ct. 1326 (1989); People v.
Brown, 45 Cal. 3d 1247, 756 P.2d 204, 248 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1988); People v. Bunyard, 45
Cal. 3d 1189, 756 P.2d 795, 249 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1988); People v. Caro, 46 Cal. 3d 1035, 761
P.2d 680, 251 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1988), cert. denied sub. nom. Caro v. California, 57
U.S.L.W. 3705 (1989); People v. Coleman, 46 Cal. 3d 749, 759 P.2d 1260, 251 Cal. Rptr. 83
(1988), cert. denied sub nom. Coleman v. California, 109 S. Ct. 1578 (1989); People v.
Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d 833, 760 P.2d 423, 251 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1988), cert. denied sub. nom
Crandall v. Californa, 57 U.S.L.W. 3705 (1989); People v. Easley, 46 Cal. 3d 712, 759
P.2d 490, 250 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1988); People v. Griffin, 46 Cal. 3d 1011, 761 P.2d 103, 251
Cal. Rptr. 643 (1988); People v. Hamilton, 46 Cal. 3d 123, 756 P.2d 1348, 249 Cal. Rptr.
320 (1988), cert. denied sub nom. Hamilton v. California, 109 S. Ct. 1176 (1989); People
v. Hernandez, 47 Cal. 3d 315, 763 P.2d 1289, 253 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1988); People v. Jennings, 46 Cal. 3d 963, 760 P.2d 475, 251 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1988), cert. denied sub nom. Jennings v. California, 109 S. Ct. 1559 (1989); People v. Johnson, 47 Cal. 3d 576, 764 P.2d
1087, 253 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1988); People v. Karis, 46 Cal. 3d 612, 758 P.2d 1189, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 659 (1988), cert. denied sub. nom. Karis v. California, 57 U.S.L.W. 3654 (1989);
People v. Keenan, 46 Cal. 3d 478, 758 P.2d 1081, 250 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1988), cert. denied
sub nom. Keenan v. California 57 U.S.L.W. 3652 (1989); People v. Malone, 47 Cal. 3d 1,
762 P.2d 1249, 252 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1988), petition for cert. filed Apr. 5, 1989; People v.
Marks, 45 Cal. 3d 1335, 756 P.2d 260, 248 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1988); People v. McDowell, 46
Cal. 3d 551, 758 P.2d 1060, 250 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1988), cert. denied sub. nom. Nevius v.
Sumner, 57 U.S.L.W. 3722 (1989); People v. McLain, 46 Cal. 3d 97, 757 P.2d 569, 249 Cal.
Rptr. 630 (1988), cert denied sub nom. McLain v. California, 109 S. Ct. 1356 (1989); People v. Moore, 47 Cal. 3d 63, 762 P.2d 1218, 252 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1988); People v. Morris, 46
Cal. 3d 1, 756 P.2d 843, 249 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1988); People v. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d 605, 765
P.2d 70, 253 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1988); People v. Williams, 45 Cal. 3d 1268, 756 P.2d 221, 248
Cal. Rptr. 834 (1988), cert denied sub nom. Williams v. California, 109 S. Ct. 883 (1989).
2. The court reversed the death penalty in eight cases. See Brown, 45 Cal. 3d at
1247, 756 P.2d at 204, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 817; Bunyard, 45 Cal. 3d at 1189, 756 P.2d at 795,
249 Cal. Rptr. at 71; Crandell,46 Cal. 3d at 833, 760 P.2d at 424, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 227;
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preceding three months, 3 it does not seem to signify a major change
in the Lucas court's conservative treatment of death penalty cases. 4
None of the reversals represents a substantial departure from established principles of criminal law. Four of the eight reversals were for
common instructional errors,5 while the others were reversed for insufficient evidence, 6 conflict of interest,7 improper consideration of
the automatic motion for modification of death penalty,8 or the trial
court's failure to determine the defendant's competency to stand
trial.9
In addition to addressing reversible errors, this survey discusses a
number of other arguments raised by the defendants. These include:
additional instructional errors;10 jury selection and misconduct issues;"' evidentiary issues; 12 prosecutorial misconduct; 13 ineffective
assistance and conflict of interest of counsel;14 the court's failure to
permit both defense counsel to argue at the penalty trial;15 the denial
of the defendant's request for advisory counsel;6 improper waiver of
the accused's right to counsel;17 and intercase and intracase proporEasley, 46 Cal. 3d at 712, 759 P.2d at 490, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 855; Griffin, 46 Cal. 3d at
1011, 761 P.2d at 103, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 643; Johnson, 47 Cal. 3d at 576, 764 P.2d at'1087,
253 Cal. Rptr. at 710; Marks, 45 Cal. 3d at 1335, 756 P.2d at 261, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 874;
Morris, 46 Cal. 3d at 1, 756 P.2d at 843, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
3. See Comment, Survey of the Death Penalty Law, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 451,
(1988) [hereinafter Death Penalty Survey]. Between the months of April and June,
1988, the court reversed only two of the nineteen death penalty cases it decided. Id.
This represents a reversal rate of approximately ten percent.
4. The present court reviews death penalty cases conservatively, and unlike the
preceding Bird court, the Lucas court now avoids reversing on the basis of error by
employing the "harmless error doctrine." Id. at 451-52. This allows the court to uphold cases in which the error could not have affected the result. Id. at 452; see infra
note 30 and accompanying text.
5. Bunyard, 45 Cal. 3d at 1189, 756 P.2d at 795, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 71; Crandell, 46
Cal. 3d at 833, 760 P.2d at 423, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 227; Griffin, 46 Cal. 3d at 1011, 761 P.2d
at 103, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 643; Johnson, 47 Cal. 3d at 576, 764 P.2d at 1087, 253 Cal. Rptr.
at 710. Crandell also contained reversible error for prosecutorial misconduct. Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d at 877, 760 P.2d at 447, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 251. For further discussion of
these cases, see infra notes 22-37, 48-49, 58, 162-69 and accompanying text.
6. Morris, 46 Cal. 3d at 1, 756 P.2d at 843, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 119; see infra notes
126-31 and accompanying text.
7. Easley, 46 Cal. 3d at 733, 759 P.2d at 503, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 868; see infra notes
184-91 and accompanying text.
8. Brown, 45 Cal. 3d at 1263-64, 756 P.2d at 214, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 827; see in fra
notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
9. Marks, 45 Cal. 3d at 1338-39, 756 P.2d at 263-64, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 876-77; see
infra notes 225-33 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 60-101 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 102-21 and accompanying text.
12. See irfra notes 122-57 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 158-80 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 181-91 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 197-204 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 205-16 and accompanying text.
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tionality of the death sentence.18 Although these arguments were
unsuccessful, they merit discussion because of their novelty or their
careful consideration in a majority or separate opinion.
II.

INSTRUCTIONAL ERRORS

Instructional error predicated the reversal of four of the cases reviewed in this survey.' 9 Although only claims of Ramos or Brown error were ultimately successful, capital defendants argued a variety of
other instructional errors which also will be explored in this section.
A.

Ramos Error

Defendants claimed Ramos error in nine of the twenty-six cases in
this survey. 20 Three death penalties were reversed because the court
2
found prejudicial Ramos error. '
18. See infra notes 217-52 and accompanying text.
19. These four penalty reversals amounted to half of the total number of reversals
for the time period reviewed herein. See Bunyard, 45 Cal. 3d at 1245, 756 P.2d at 833,
249 Cal. Rptr. at 109 (reversing on Ramos grounds); Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d at 885, 760
P.2d at 453, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 256 (reversing on Brown grounds); Grffin, 46 Cal. 3d at
1032-33, 761 P.2d at 115-16, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 655-56 (reversing on Ramos grounds);
Johnson, 47 Cal. 3d at 602, 764 P.2d at 1102, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 724 (reversing on Ramos
grounds).
20. See Error Charts in the appendix of this article. See also Bean, 46 Cal. 3d at
955, 760 P.2d at 1019, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 490; Bunyard,45 Cal. 3d at 1242, 756 P.2d at 831,
249 Cal. Rptr. at 107; Caro, 46 Cal. 3d at 1064-65, 761 P.2d at 698-99, 251 Cal. Rptr. at
775-76; Coleman, 46 Cal. 3d at 780-82, 759 P.2d at 1281-82, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 104-05; Gri fin, 46 Cal. 3d at 1032-33, 761 P.2d at 115-16, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 655-56; Johnson, 47 Cal.
3d at 602-03, 764 P.2d at 1101-02, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 724-25; Keenan, 46 Cal. 3d at 507-08,
758 P.2d at 1099-2000, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 568-69; McLain, 46 Cal. 3d at 118, 757 P.2d at
581, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 642; Williams, 45 Cal. 3d at 1323, 756 P.2d at 253-54, 248 Cal.
Rptr. at 867.
21. See supra note 18. In 1984, People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 689 P.2d 430, 207
Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984), was remanded back to the California Supreme Court from the
United States Supreme Court after the latter's finding that the Briggs instruction was
not violative of the Federal Constitution. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1003, 100506 (1983). The entire procedural history of this case was as follows: People v. Ramos,
30 Cal. 3d 553, 639 P.2d 908, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1982), cert. granted, California v. Ramos, 459 U.S. 821 (1982), stay granted, California v. Ramos, 459 U.S. 1302 (1982), rev'd,
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983), on remand, People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136,
689 P.2d 430, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984), cert. denied, California v. Ramos, 471 U.S. 1119
(1985). This instruction, imported from Section 190.3 of the California Penal Code,
originated in 1978 as the result of the voter initiative process, and was part of a sweeping effort to revise the death penalty law in California. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3
(West 1988). The paragraph known as the Briggs instruction reads as follows:
The trier of fact shall be instructed that a sentence of confinement to state
prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole may in the future
after sentence is imposed, be commuted or modified to a sentence that includes the possibility of parole by the Governor of the State of California.
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In People v. Bunyard,22 the court agreed that the jury received an
unadorned Briggs instruction.2 3 The instruction read as follows:
You are instructed that under the [s]tate Constitution, a governor is empowered to grant a reprieve, a pardon or commutation after sentence following
conviction of a crime. Under this power a governor may in the future commute or modify a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of pa24
role to a lesser sentence that would include the possibility of parole.

In opposition, the Attorney General made three arguments. First,
the Attorney General argued that the court should have abrogated its
holding in People v. Ramos and followed the directive of the United
States Supreme Court in California v. Ramos.25 However, the court
previously rejected this line of argument when People v. Ramos was
reheard on remand from the United States Supreme Court. Moreover, the court remains unreceptive to this claim.26
Second, the Attorney General asserted that the court's decision in
People v. Ramos is erroneous because the majority failed to articulate
"persuasive reasons" which would have justified resolving the case on
adequate and independent state grounds. 27 The court held that the
Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d at 150, 689 P.2d at 438, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 808. The Bird court, in a sixto-one majority, held that the Briggs instruction was sufficiently misleading on its face
to constitute a due process violation. Id. at 155, 689 P.2d at 441, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
The court found further support for this holding of due process contravention by arguing that the Briggs instruction "invites the jury to consider speculative and impermissible factors in reaching its decision." Id. at 159, 689 P.2d at 444, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
22. 45 Cal. 3d 1189, 756 P.2d 795, 249 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1988).
23. Bunyard, 45 Cal. 3d at 1242, 756 P.2d at 831, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 107. "[W]e cannot confidently conclude that this instruction did not improperly taint the jury's decision making process." Id. at 1245, 156 P.2d at 833, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
24. Id. at 1242, 756 P.2d at 831, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 107 (citing California Jury Instructions, Criminal (CAL.JIC) No. 8.84.2 (4th ed. West 1979)) [hereinafter CALJIC]).
25. Id. at 1243, 756 P.2d at 831, 249 Cal. Rptr. 107. See supra note 20 for the proper
citations to and treatment of the Ramos case. See generally Pascucci, CapitalPunishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of Fairness and Consistency, 69 CORNELL L.
REV. 1129, 1182-86 (1984); Young, Briggs Instruction is Constitutional, 69 A.B.A. J.
1292, 1294 (Sept. 1983).
26. Bunyard, 45 Cal. 3d at 1243, 756 P.2d at 831, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 107. The
Supreme Court's decision in Ramos noted that the California judiciary would be responsible for determining whether the Briggs instruction violated the California Constitution. People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 151, 689 P.2d 430, 438-39, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800,
808-09 (1984) (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 997-98 n.7 (1982)). In response,
the California Supreme Court agreed and stated:
This conclusion ... simply reflects one of the principal tenets of our federal
system of government: just as the United States Supreme Court bears the ultimate judicial responsibility for determining matters of federal law, this court
bears the ultimate judicial responsibility for resolving questions of state law,
including the proper interpretation of provisions of the state Constitution.
Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d at 152, 689 P.2d at 439, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 809. See also Abrahamson,
CriminalLaw and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State ConstitutionalLaw, 63
TEX. L. REV. 1141 (1985).

27. Bunyard, 45 Cal. 3d at 1243, 756 P.2d at 831, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 107-08 (quoting
People v. Teresinski, 30 Cal. 3d 822, 836, 640 P.2d 753, 761, 180 Cal. Rptr. 617, 625
(1982)) For a more detailed discussion of the adequate and independent state grounds
doctrine, see E. BARRETT & W. COHEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 43-63 (6th ed. 1985);
Clayton, Ohio v. Johnson: The Continuing Demise of the Adequate and Independent

1168

[Vol. 16: 1143, 1989]

California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Attorney General's reading of the Teresinski opinion was inaccurate,
and that the defendant properly articulated that reliance on the California constitutional standard is proper if following the federal Constitution would abrogate the broader scope of rights a criminal
defendant enjoys in the state of California.28 The court rejected the
Attorney General's argument because to follow the federal rule
would work a grave injustice on twenty years of California decisional
law, effectively abridging a California defendant's rights.2 9
Finally, the Attorney General argued that the doctrine of harmless
error applies because the prosecutor's fleeting comment regarding
the commutation power of the Governor was quickly countered with
a curative instruction from the bench.0 The court maintained that
the giving of the Briggs instruction could not have been harmless error because the prosecutor dwelled on the Governor's commutation
power on two separate occasions, while the jury received only one
brief admonition from the judge.3 l
Similarly, the death penalty was reversed in People v. Griffin 32 because of prejudicial Ramos error. Opposing arguments substantially
similar to those raised in Bunyard were analyzed and rejected by the
court.3 3 The court remarked that this case belonged to a limited class
State Ground Rule, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 395 (1986); Robson & Mello, Ariadne's Provisions: A "Clue of Thread" to the Intricaciesof ProceduralDefault,Adequate and Independent State Grounds and Florida'sDeath Penalty, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 87 (1988).
28. Teresinski, 30 Cal. 3d at 837, 640 P.2d at 761, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
29. Bunyard, 45 Cal. 3d at 1243, 756 P.2d at 831-32, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 107-08.
30. Id. at 1243-44, 756 P.2d at 832, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 108. For a more expanded look
at the harmless error doctrine, see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (decision
summarized and annotated at 24 A.L.R. 3D 1065 (1969 and Supp. 1988)); Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); People v. Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d 26, 47, 753 P.2d 1, 11-12, 246
Cal. Rptr. 209, 220 (1988); People v. Odle, 45 Cal. 3d 386, 415, 754 P.2d 184, 200, 247 Cal.
Rptr. 137, 153 (1988) (holding that "under provisions of the California Constitution, reversal is required only if prejudice results from the error"). R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE
OF HARMLESS ERROR 50 (1970); Comment, Harmless Error: The Need for a Uniform
Standard,53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 541 (1979); Comment, Deadly Mistakes: Harmless Error in CapitalSentencing, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 740 (1987).
31. The court noted:
The [trial] court's admonishment of the jury to disregard the prosecutor's
statements clearly fell far short of the functional equivalent of a 'curative' instruction. Rather, the court merely advised the jury to disregard the prosecutor's argument as to their [sic] being another arbiter, but did not tell the jury
to disregard the court's ... Briggs Instruction ....
Bunyard, 45 Cal. 3d at 1224, 756 P.2d at 832, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 109 (emphasis in
original).
32. 46 Cal. 3d 1011, 761 P.2d 103, 251 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1988).
33. Id. at 1032-33, 761 P.2d at 115-16, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 655-56.

1169

in which reversible error is presumed.3 4
People v. Johnson 35 was the final case affected by the Ramos decision. Again the court rejected the People's contention that any error
in giving the Briggs instruction was cured. The court held that evidence introduced by the defendant during the penalty phase suggesting that the possibility of any sentence commutation was remote
at best did not make the error harmless.3 6 "Ramos error is generally
reversible.... Thus when the court has instructed the jury with the
unadorned Briggs Instruction and fails to ameliorate the potential for
prejudice, we have reversed the death penalty judgment." 37
In other instances of alleged Ramos error, the court refused to reverse the death penalty (1) when the jury was charged to disregard
the Briggs instruction in determining the appropriate penalty pursuant to a subsequent instruction;3 8 (2) when the sole reference to the
Governor's commutation power in the case came from a brief remark
made by the prosecutor; 39 or (3) when the instruction alluded to a
Governor's power to commute criminal sentences, but was not a
40
Briggs instruction.
Although Ramos error provides an effective means for defense attorneys to obtain penalty reversals for their clients, the cases in this
survey suggest that prejudicial error may come at a premium in the
future. By now, trial judges and prosecutors know the pitfalls of giv34. The court stated that:
The instruction creates the risk that the jury will be misled and will make its
penalty determination on the basis of speculation and misinformation. We do
not countenance such a risk. Thus we have treated cases in which the Briggs
Instruction was given without a curative instruction as belonging to the limited class of cases in which prejudice is presumed.
Id. at 1033, 761 P.2d at 115-16, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 655-56 (emphasis added).
35. 47 Cal. 3d 576, 764 P.2d 1087, 253 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1988).
36. The defendant called a former Director of Corrections, who testified that in
his eight-year term of office, he knew of no act of executive clemency for inmates sentenced to life without parole. Id. at 603, 764 P.2d at 1102, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
37. Id.
38. "[T]he court instructed the jurors not to consider 'such power by a governor to
commute or modify a sentence . . . in determining whether the defendant should be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.'" McLain,
46 Cal. 3d at 119, 757 P.2d at 582, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 643. "[T]he jury was told it should
not consider the possibility of commutation in determining the sentence.... The jury,
having been so advised, could not have been misled as to the nature and scope of the
commutation power. Viewing the two instructions together,... the Briggs Instruction
error was not prejudicial." Coleman, 46 Cal. 3d at 782, 759 P.2d at 1282, 251 Cal. Rptr.
at 105 (footnote omitted).
39. "[W]hile... (Ramos] ... makes an instructional reference to the commutation
power reversible per se, a similar result does not necessarily follow from isolated references by the prosecutor." Keenan, 46 Cal. 3d at 508, 758 P.2d at 1100, 250 Cal. Rptr.
at 569 (emphasis in original).
40. "The instruction was never given, however." Bean, 46 Cal. 3d at 955, 760 P.2d
at 1019, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 490. "[N]o instruction was given ... which could have misled
the jury with regard to defendant's future eligibility for parole or... any other modification ....
Caro, 46 Cal. 3d at 1065, 761 P.2d at 699, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 776.
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ing the Briggs instruction, or its functional equivalent, to the jury.
As long as an adequate curative instruction or clarifying argument informs the trier of fact that executive commutation must not affect
the penalty decision, Ramos error challenges will most likely fail.
B.

Brown Error

Defendants advanced a variety of Brown error claims in eighteen
of the twenty-six cases reviewed in this survey. 4 1 Significantly, on remand from the United States Supreme Court, the California
Supreme Court again considered the case for which the error was

named.42 Although the court found no Brown error on remand, the
death penalty was reversed on different grounds. 4 3 Brown error is a
combination of two concerns acknowledged by the court in Brown
L 4 4 The court feared that juries, after hearing the sentencing in41. Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d at 266-69, 763 P.2d at 940-43, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 89-91; Bean, 46
Cal. 3d at 955-56, 760 P.2d at 1019, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 490; Bonin, 46 Cal. 3d at 705-07, 758
P.2d at 1243-44, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 713-15; Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d at 252-55, 758 P.2d at 47-49,
250 Cal. Rptr. at 106-08; Brown, 46 Cal. 3d at 452, 758 P.2d at 1148, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 617;
Brown, 45 Cal. 3d at 1251-55, 756 P.2d at 206-09, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 820-24; Caro, 46 Cal.
3d at 1065, 761 P.2d at 699, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 776; Coleman, 46 Cal. 3d at 783-84, 759 P.2d
at 1283-84, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 106-07; Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d at 883, 760 P.2d at 451, 251 Cal.
Rptr. at 254; Hamilton, 46 Cal. 3d at 149-53, 756 P.2d at 1362-64, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 33436; Hernandez, 47 Cal. 3d at 367, 763 P.2d at 1321, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 230; Jennings, 46
Cal. 3d at 991, 760 P.2d at 492, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 296; Karis, 46 Cal. 3d at 645-47, 758 P.2d
at 1208-10, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 678-80; Keenan, 46 Cal. 3d at 515-17, 758 P.2d at 1105-06, 250
Cal. Rptr. at 574-75; McDowell, 46 Cal. 3d at 575, 758 P.2d at 1075, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 544;
McLain, 46 Cal. 3d at 114, 757 P.2d at 579, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 640; Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at
645-49, 765 P.2d at 93-97, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 886-90; Williams, 45 Cal. 3d at 1322, 756 P.2d
at 253, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
42. In People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 536-37, 709 P.2d 440, 452-53, 220 Cal. Rptr.
637, 649-50 (1985) [hereinafter Brown 1], a five justice majority of the California
Supreme Court reversed the defendant's death sentence because of an instruction
given at the penalty phase. The supreme court held that directing the jury not to consider sympathy was violative of the United States Constitution. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately determined by a five justice majority
that the instruction prohibiting the consideration of "mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling" did not clash with the
United States Constitution. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 539 (1987).
The procedural history of this case has been as follows: People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d
512, 709 P.2d 440, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1985), republished, 726 P.2d 516, 230 Cal. Rptr.
834, stay granted,California v. Brown, 475 U.S. 1301 (1986), cert. granted,California v.
Brown, 476 U.S. 1157 (1986), rev'd, California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987), remanded
to, People v. Brown, 45 Cal. 3d 1247, 756 P.2d 204, 248 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1988).
43. On remand .to the California judiciary, Justice Eagleson determined that the
penalty of death must be reversed because of the trial judge's failure to decide the automatic sentence modification motion. Brown, 45 Cal. 3d at 1264, 756 P.2d at 214, 248
Cal. Rptr. at 827 [hereinafter Brown II]. See infra notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
44. For a description of Brown I, see supra note 42.
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struction, would be easily confused as to the scope of their sentencing
discretion and as to the proper weighing of the evidence.45 The court
resolved many Brown issues in favor of the People because arguments from the prosecution, and the defense or additional remarks
from the court (or any combination thereof) eradicated any juror
confusion regarding the scope of their sentencing discretion or their
weighing of the evidence.46
However, in People v. Crandell,47 the court reversed the death penalty because the prosecutor intensified latent instructional ambiguities, and neither the defendant, representing himself, nor the court
provided any subsequent argument or instruction to insure that the
jury had a clear understanding of the penalty determination proce45. Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d at 253, 758 P.2d at 48, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 106. The objectionable
language came from Section 190.3 of the Penal Code:
After having heard and received all of the evidence, and after having heard
and considered the arguments of counsel, the trier of fact shall consider, take
into account and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
referred to in this section, and shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of
fact concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances. If the trier of fact determines that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances the trier of fact shall impose a
sentence of confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988) (emphasis added). Ultimately, the language
found its way into the instruction books: "If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death.
However, if you determine that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating
circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of confinement in the state prison for life
without the possibility of parole." CALJIC No. 8.84.2 (West 1979). Significantly, the
United States Supreme Court recently granted defendant Boyde's petition for certiorari, in which he challenges the instruction requiring jurors to vote for the death penalty if the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances. See Carrizosa,
Death Sentence Allowed Despite Bad Instruction, L.A. Daily J., June 9, 1989, at p. 1,
col. 2.
The Boyde court also stated that "the weighing process ... is not a mere mechanical
counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale but rather a mental balancing
process." Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d at 253, 758 P.2d at 48, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 106. Moreover, "use
of the word 'shall' might mislead the jury as to the substance of the ultimate determination it was called upon to make." Id. Therefore, to ascertain whether any reversible
Brown error exists, the court has decided "that each [case decided before Brown 1]
must be examined on its own merits to determine whether the sentencer may have
been misled to the defendant's prejudice regarding the scope of its sentencing discretion." Id. at 252, 758 P.2d at 48, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 106 (citing Brown I, 40 Cal. 3d at 544
n.17, 709 P.2d at 459 n.17, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 656 n.17). See generally Note, Constitutional Law: The Eighth Amendment and Sympathy Instructions to Juries in Death
Penalty Cases: Californiav. Brown, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 757-62 (1987); Note,
Californiav. Brown: Against the Antisympathy Instruction, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q.
669-84 (1988).
46. Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d at 266-69, 763 P.2d at 940-42, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 89-91; Bean, 46
Cal. 3d at 955-56, 760 P.2d at 1019, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 490; Caro, 46 Cal. 3d at 1065-67, 761
P.2d at 699-700, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 776-77; Hernandez, 47 Cal. 3d at 367-68, 763 P.2d at
1321-22, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 230-31; Jennings,46 Cal. 3d at 990-92, 760 P.2d at 491-93, 251
Cal. Rptr. at 295-96.
47. 46 Cal. 3d 833, 760 P.2d 423, 251 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1988).
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dure.48 The court stated:
The prosecutor's argument exploited the potential ambiguities in the instructions and may have diverted the jury from a correct understanding of the
weighing process by which the appropriate penalty is to be determined and
from a correct understanding of its responsibility to consider all relevant mitigating evidence. The jury did not have the benefit of any defense argument,
which might have restored a correct understanding of the penalty determination process. . . . In this case the court gave no other instructions which
served to clarify the nature of the weighing process, the scope of the jury's
sentencing discretion, or its obligation to consider all mitigating evidence.
Employing our case-by-case analysis of the arguments, under these circumstances it must be concluded that the prosecutor's argument exacerbated the
ambiguity in the instructions .... 49

Three cases in this survey disposed of asserted Brown error by specifically referring to "the theme of the prosecutor's argument." 0
Each time the court stressed the fact that Brown concerns are not reversible when the thrust of the prosecutor's argument only urged
that the factors of aggravation grossly outweighed those of mitigation
and, therefore, the evidence dictated the jury return a sentence of
death.S1
The dissenting opinions in People v. Boyde5 2 and People v.
Walker5 3 explained why Justices Arguelles and Broussard felt that
penalty reversals were warranted because of prejudicial Brown error.
Justice Arguelles asserted that the jury in Boyde was misinformed at
the outset of trial because "[t]hroughout the lengthy voir dire process, counsel repeatedly informed potential jurors of this erroneous
view of the jury's task at the penalty phase .... -"54 Although Justice
Arguelles found no probable juror misunderstanding as to the weighing process, he believed "the jury . . . was clearly misled as to the
scope of its discretion and the nature of its role in determining sentence. ' s s Justice Broussard believed Brown error had occurred be48. Crandell,46 Cal. 3d at 881-85, 760 P.2d at 450-53, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 253-56.
49. Id. at 882-84, 760 P.2d 450-52, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 254-55.
50. Bonin, 46 Cal. 3d at 706, 758 P.2d at 1244, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 714; Hamilton, 46
Cal. 3d at 150, 756 P.2d at 1363, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 335; McLain, 46 Cal. 3d at 116, 757
P.2d at 579, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
51. Bonin, 46 Cal. 3d at 706, 758 P.2d at 1244, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 714; Hamilton, 46
Cal. 3d at 150, 756 P.2d at 1363, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 335; McLain, 46 Cal. 3d at 116, 757
P.2d at 579, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
52. 46 Cal. 3d 212, 257, 758 P.2d 25, 51, 250 Cal. Rptr. 83, 109 (1988) (Arguelles, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
53. 47 Cal. 3d 605, 651, 765 P.2d 70, 98, 253 Cal. Rptr. 863, 891 (1988) (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
54. Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d at 260, 758 P.2d at 53, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 111 (Arguelles, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 265, 758 P.2d at 56, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 114 (Arguelles, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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cause the prosecutor's argument regarding the defendant's
background "was intended to persuade the jury that the evidence did
not fit into the statutory scheme."56 In Broussard's opinion, the net
effect of this line of argument was the creation of "a serious risk that
the jury misunderstood one of the crucial tools it was to use in determining penalty, in that it did not understand the applicability of defendant's mitigating background evidence. The case in mitigation
was truncated and the case in aggravation was enhanced ....

"57

The cases in this survey show that any juror confusion regarding
the penalty determination procedure, brought on by the language of
CALJIC No. 8.84.2,58 usually can be cleared up by further instruction, argument or comment in this regard. The sole reversal due to
59
Brown error occurred only because of an overzealous prosecutor.
The future will most likely show fewer defendants alleging Brown
error and fewer instances of penalty reversal because the problem
has been cured through legislative reform. Furthermore, once the
court has exhausted the pre-Brown I cases still awaiting review,
Brown error will become a distant memory.
I

C

Factor (7c)

Closely allied to Brown concerns are the issues associated with section 190.3(k) of the Penal Code.60 Also termed Easley6 l error, factor
(k) error was alleged in twelve of the twenty-six cases considered in
56. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 651-52, 765 P.2d at 98, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 891 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
57. Id. at 653, 765 P.2d at 99-100, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 892-93 (Broussard, J., concurring
and dissenting). For a more thorough discussion of a jury's consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, from varying points of view, see Luginbuhl & Middendorf, Death Penalty Beliefs and Jurors' Responses to Aggravating and Mitigating
Circumstances in Capital Trials, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAVIOR 263 (1988); McKay, Arizona's Death Penalty: The Eighth Amendment and Exclusion of Mitigating Circumstances, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 779 (1988);

Paduano & Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror

Misperceptions ConcerningParole and the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211 (1987); Note, Magwood v. Smith: The Effect of a Jury's Failure
to Consider Mitigating Circumstancesin a Death Penalty Case, 12 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY
REV. 151 (1988).
58. See supra notes 24, 45 and accompanying text.
59. Crandell, 46 Cal.. 3d 833, 760 P.2d 423, 251 Cal. Rptr. 227. For a discussion of
the prosecutor's misconduct, see in fra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
60. "[T]he language of factor (k) ... may have misled the jurors to [the defendant's] prejudice about the scope of their sentencing discretion and responsibility under
the Constitution and may also have misled them about the evidence they might consider in exercising that discretion and responsibility." McLain, 46 Cal. 3d at 113, 757
P.2d at 578, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
61. In 1983 the California Supreme Court decided that factor (k) of section 190.3 of
the Penal Code could mislead the jury about: (1) the scope of their sentencing discretion; and (2) what evidence was properly considered in determining the sentence. People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 881-84, 671 P.2d 813, 827-30, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 323-26
(1983).
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this article.6 2 Although alleged quite often and sometimes discussed
at length, factor (k) error brought about no reversals in the present
set of cases.
Subpoint (k) of section 190.3 of the Penal Code provides a "catchall" phrase directing juries to balance the evidence adduced at trial
with "[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the
crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime." 6 3 Every defendant claiming factor (k) error was read an instruction identical to
the language of the Penal Code. 6 4 Any problems associated with this
65
instruction have been addressed in the 1986 legislative revision.

The most persuasive claim of factor (k) error arose in People v.
Hamilton 6 6 when the court agreed "that the language of factor (k),
combined with the prosecutor's argument, may have misled the jurors to [the defendant's] prejudice about the evidence they might consider in determining penalty."67 Moreover, Justice Mosk, writing for

the majority, believed that "the prosecutor's argument did nothing to
cure, but actually exacerbated, the [factor (k)] instruction's potential
to mislead: he told the jury in essence that defendant's mitigating evidence was simply irrelevant."68 While conceding the error, the Attorney General contended that the court effectively cured the harm
62. Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d at 264-66, 763 P.2d at 938-40, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 87-89; Bonin, 46
Cal. 3d at 708-09, 758 P.2d at 1245, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16; Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d at 250-51,
758 P.2d at 46-47, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 105; Brown, 46 Cal. 3d at 451-52, 758 P.2d at 1147-58,
250 Cal. Rptr. at 617; Caro, 46 Cal. 3d at 1062-63, 761 P.2d at 696-97, 251 Cal. Rptr. at
773-74; Coleman, 46 Cal. 3d at 784-85, 759 P.2d at 1283-84, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 106-07; Hamilton, 46 Cal. 3d at 146-49, 756 P.2d at 1360-62, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 332-34; Hernandez, 47
Cal. 3d at 363-64, 763 P.2d at 1318-19, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 228; Keenan, 46 Cal. 3d at 514-15,
758 P.2d at 1104-05, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 573-74; Malone, 47 Cal. 3d at 39-43, 762 P.2d at
1271-74, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 547-50; McDowell, 46 Cal. 3d at 574-75, 758 P.2d at 1074-75, 250
Cal. Rptr. at 543-44; McLain, 46 Cal. 3d at 113-14, 757 P.2d at 578-79, 249 Cal. Rptr. at
639-40.
63. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) (West 1988). See generally 4 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE §§ 87.01, 87.02[6], 87.03[3], 87.05[1][e] (Supp. 1988); 2 B. WITKIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMES § 1034 (1963 & Supp. 1985); 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law
§§ 3342-3346 (1985 and Supp. 1988).
64. CALJIC 8.84.1(k) (West 1979).
65. The 1986 revision expanded factor (k) to read, in its entirety:
(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even
though it is not a legal excuse for the crime [and any sympathetic or other
aspect of the defendant's character or record [that the defendant offers] as a
basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for
which he is on trial. You must disregard any jury instruction given to you in
the guilt or innocence phase of this trial which conflicts with this principle].
CALJIC No. 8.85 (West 1988).
66. 46 Cal. 3d 123, 756 P.2d 1348, 249 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1988).
67. Id. at 146, 756 P.2d at 1360, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
68. Id. at 147, 756 P.2d at 1361, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
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when responding to the jury's inquiries. 69 Although a forceful claim
for prejudicial error had been made, the court, applying the Chapman standard, declared the error harmless because the evidence in
70
aggravation grossly outweighed any evidence in mitigation.
Justice Broussard, the lone dissenter in Hamilton, believed that
the prosecutor's statements to the jury "that-they could not consider
any of the defendant's mitigating character and background evidence
because it did not relate to the statutory aggravating or mitigating
factors" created prejudicial error.71 Further, he believed the court
propagated this harm while ruling on the defendant's automatic ap72
plication for modification of sentence motion.
Although factor (k)/Easley error remains a popular claim among
capital defendants, the court has indicated that it is unlikely to produce penalty reversals. Even in Hamilton, where the prosecutor admitted improperly arguing that "there was no mitigating evidence,"
and where the court subsequently recognized that this claim had
enormous "potential for misleading the jury in this crucial respect," a
73
six justice majority found no prejudice.
D.

Beeman Error/Accomplice Instructions

Claims of Beeman error arose in seven of the survey's twenty-six
cases.7 4 Not surprisingly, complaints regarding instructions on accomplice testimony or liability were voiced in all but one of these
seven; most likely because of the nature of a case in which Beeman
error may occur. 75 Whereas the court admitted the existence of
69. The court remained unpersuaded. Id. at 148, 756 P.2d at 1362, 249 Cal. Rptr. at
333-34.
70. Id. at 149, 756 P.2d at 1362, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
71. Hamilton, 46 Cal. 3d at 158, 756 P.2d at 1369, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 340 (Broussard,
J., concurring and dissenting).
72. "The trial judge repeated the prosecutor's error when, in ruling on the motion
to modify the verdict, he concluded that defendant's evidence of his unhappy upbringing was not mitigating evidence." Id. at 158, 756 P.2d at 1369, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 341
(Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
73. Id. at 147, 756 P.2d at 1361-62, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 333. Chief Justice Lucas and
Justices Panelli, Arguelles, Eagleson and Kaufman joined Justice Mosk's opinion.
74. Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d at 243-44, 763 P.2d at 924-25, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 73-74; Bean, 46
Cal. 3d at 949-50, 760 P.2d at 1015, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 486; Bunyard, 45 Cal. 3d at 1226-28,
756 P.2d at 819-21, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 95-97; Malone, 47 Cal. 3d at 48-50, 762 P.2d at 127879, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 554-55; Marks, 45 Cal. 3d at 1345, 756 P.2d at 268, 248 Cal. Rptr. at
881; Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 631-33, 765 P.2d at 84-85, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78; Williams,
45 Cal. 3d at 1315, 756 P.2d at 248-49, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
75. Beeman error concerns jury instructions which bear on the mental state of the
defendant with regard to accomplice testimony or liability. Before accomplice liability
becomes an issue in a case, at least one other individual must be allegedly involved in
the perpetration of the crime charged. Therefore, if two or more actors are potentially
liable for the same crime, accomplice liability instructions can be anticipated. The following cases alleged errors involving accomplice liability instructions: Adcox, 47 Cal.
3d at 241, 763 P.2d at 923, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 72; Bunyard, 45 Cal. 3d at 1228-30, 756 P.2d
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Beeman error in every case in which the defendant made the claim,
no reversals were predicated upon it.76 In light of two recent United
States Supreme Court decisions, the California judiciary has adopted
the harmless error standard when reviewing claims of Beeman
77
error.
at 821-22, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 97-98; Malone, 47 Cal. 3d at 50-53, 762 P.2d at 1279-82, 252
Cal. Rptr. at 555-58; Marks, 45 Cal. 3d at 1345, 756 P.2d at 268, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 881;
Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 631-33, 765 P.2d at 84-85, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78; Williams, 45
Cal. 3d at 1312-13, 756 P.2d at 247, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
76. All Beeman error in the cases of this survey was found to be harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.
In 1984 the California Supreme Court found the aiding and abetting instructions
given in a capital case did not sufficiently apprise the jury of the requisite intent essential to convict a criminal defendant as an aider and abettor. People v. Beeman, 35 Cal.
3d 547, 674 P.2d 1318, 199 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1984). The instructions given are set out
below:
PRINCIPALS-DEFINED
The persons concerned in the commission or attempted commission of a
crime who are regarded by law as principals in the crime thus committed or
attempted and equally guilty thereof include:
1. Those who directly and actively commit or attempt to commit the act
constituting the crime, or
2. Those who, with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the one who
does directly and actively commit or attempt to commit the crime, aid and
abet in its commission or attempted commission, or
3. Those who, whether present or not at the commission or attempted
commission of the crime, advise and encourage its commission or attempted
commission.
[One who aids and abets is not only guilty of the particular crime that to his
knowledge his confederates are contemplating committing, but he is also liable for the natural and reasonable or probable consequences of any act that he
knowingly aided or encouraged.]
CALJIC No. 3.00 (West 1979).
AIDING AND ABETTING-DEFINED
A person aids and abets the commission of a crime if, with knowledge of the
unlawful purpose of the perpetrator of the crime, he aids, promotes, encourages or instigates by act or advice the commission of such crime. [Mere presence at the scene of a crime and failure to take steps to prevent a crime do not
in themselves establish aiding and abetting.]
CALJIC No. 3.01 (West 1979).
Consequently, in cases tried before Beeman, in which the same instructions were
given to the jury, defendants could count on automatic reversal of their sentence because the court subscribed to a reversal-per-se standard as these instructions were subsequently determined to be constitutionally infirm. See People v. Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d 26,
59-65, 753 P.2d 1, 20-24, 246 Cal. Rptr 209, 228-32 (1988).
77. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986). For
a brief discussion of the harmless error standard, see supra note 30.
For a more detailed discussion of the effect and treatment of the Beeman case, see,
e.g., 68 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 250, 254 (1985); Carpenter, Should the Court Aid and Abet
the Unintending Accomplice: The Status of Complicity in California, 24 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 343 (1984); Comment, California Supreme Court Survey: People v.
Beeman, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 236 (1984).
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Those cases which only discussed instructional issues involving accomplice testimony fared no better than the cases raising both
Beeman and accomplice instructional errors.78 In fact, in those three
cases, the court found no error associated with accomplice testimony
79
and summarily dismissed each issue.
The few cases dealing with Beeman error provide a fairly clear indication that errors of this type rarely will furnish a defendant with a
viable basis for reversal. The court's decision to move away from a
reversal-per-se approach to the Chapman standard has rendered
claims of Beeman error obsolete.
E.

Age as an Aggravating Factor

Disputes regarding the prosecution's characterization of the defendant's age as a factor in aggravation arose in eight of this survey's
cases.8 0 Section 190.3(i) of the Penal Code permits the jury to consider the age of the defendant while considering the sentence, if such
a factor is relevant.81 Defendants maintained "that mere chronological age, a factor over which one can exercise no control, should not of
itself be deemed an aggravating factor."8 2 However, the California
Supreme Court subscribes to the theory that "[b]y the same token,
mere chronological age itself should not be deemed a mitigating
3
factor."8
In three of these cases,8 4 the court reaffirmed its earlier position:
In our view, the word 'age' in statutory sentencing factor (i) is used as a meto78. Additionally, three other cases in this survey raised issues regarding accomplice instructions but made no mention of Beeman error: Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d at 243, 758
P.2d at 41-42, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 100; McLain, 46 Cal. 3d at 106-07, 757 P.2d at 573-74, 249
Cal. Rptr. at 634-35; Moore, 47 Cal. 3d at 86-89, 762 P.2d at 1232-33, 252 Cal. Rptr. at
508-09.
79. Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d at 243, 758 P.2d at 41-42, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 100; McLain, 46
Cal. 3d at 106-07, 757 P.2d at 573-74, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 634-35; Moore, 47 Cal. 3d at 86-89,
762 P.2d at 1232-33, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 508-09.
80. Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d at 271-72, 763 P.2d at 943-44, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 92-93; Brown,
46 Cal. 3d at 456-57, 758 P.2d at 1151, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 620-21; Caro, 46 Cal. 3d at 106263, 761 P.2d at 696-97, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 773-74; Hernandez, 47 Cal. 3d at 360-62, 763 P.2d
at 1316-17, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27; Jennings, 46 Cal. 3d at 988-99, 760 P.2d at 490-91,
251 Cal. Rptr. at 294; Keenan, 46 Cal. 3d at 518, 758 P.2d at 1107, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 576;
Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 649, 765 P.2d at 97, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 890; Williams, 45 Cal. 3d at
1323, 756 P.2d at 254, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
81. The statute reads: "In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into
account any of the following factors if relevant: ... (i) The age of the defendant at the
time of the crime." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(i) (West 1988). The instructions given to
the jury in each case of this study were read verbatim. Additionally, the 1986 revision
to the death penalty instructions did not affect the language of this part of the instruction. See CALJIC No. 8.84.1(i) (West 1979); CALJIC No. 8.85(i) (West 1988).
82. People v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 789, 726 P.2d 113, 151, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667,
'05 (1986) (emphasis in original).
83. People v. Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d 259, 302, 753 P.2d 1052, 1080, 247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 28
(1988) (emphasis added).
84. Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d at 271, 763 P.2d at 943, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 92-93; Brown, 46 Cal.
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nym for any age-related matter suggested by the evidence or by common experience or morality that might reasonably inform the choice of penalty.
Accordingly,
either counsel may argue any such age-relatedinference in every
85
case.

This language shows the court's disfavor of defense complaints
stemming from a deleterious classification of something as benign as
a defendant's age. Although defense attorneys may have difficulty
preventing these age-related, court-condoned arguments, perhaps a
more effective challenge can be asserted under section 352 of the Evidence Code.8 6 Perhaps prosecutorial arguments will be tempered if
the prejudicial effect of these age-related claims substantially outweighs any probative value.
F

Court's Response to Jury Questions

Only four of the survey's cases addressed issues surrounding the
court's response to jury inquiries.8 7 No reversals were based on the
alleged improprieties, although substantial discussion was devoted to
these concerns. In People v. Keenan,8 8 the defendant alleged that the
court exercised improper coercion to sway a juror who refused to
vote in favor of the death penalty.8 9 After one night of sequestration,
two days of penalty deliberation, and additional guidance from the
3d at 456, 758 P.2d at 1151, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 621; Hernandez, 47 Cal. 3d at 361-62, 763
P.2d at 1317, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
85. Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d at 271, 763 P.2d at 943-446, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 92-93; Brown, 46
Cal. 3d at 456, 758 P.2d at 1151, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 621; Hernandez, 47 Cal. 3d at 361-62,
763 P.2d at 1317, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 227 (emphasis added). "Metonymy" is defined as:
[A] figure of speech that consists in [sic] using the name of one thing for that
of something else with which it is associated (as in 'spent the evening reading
Shakespeare,' 'lands belonging to the crown,' 'demanded action by City Hall'
.. ): use of one word for another that it may be expected to suggest.
WEBSTER'S

THIRD NEW

INTERNATIONAL

DICTIONARY-UNABRIDGED

1424 (16th ed.

1971). See also 4 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE § 87.03[3] (Supp. 1988); B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES § 1026B (Supp. 1985); 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law
§ 3344 (1985).
86. The rule states: "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." CAL. EVID. CODE § 352
(West 1989).
87. Hamilton, 46 Cal. 3d at 153-56, 756 P.2d at 1365-67, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 337-39;
Keenan, 46 Cal. 3d at 527-35, 758 P.2d at 1112-18, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 582-87; McDowell, 46
Cal. 3d at 577-79, 758 P.2d at 1076-77, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 545-46; Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 63435, 765 P.2d at 86-87, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 879-80.
88. 46 Cal. 3d 478, 758 P.2d 1081, 250 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1988).
89. Id. at 527, 758 P.2d at 112-13, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 582. The defendant maintained
that the court "expected and desired a quick verdict and improperly implied that the
alternative was an 'investigation' of the minority juror." Id.

1179

court, a note forwarded by the foreman stated: "Your Honor, we have
a juror who cannot morally vote for the death penalty."90 The judge,
commenting on the jury's failure to achieve unanimity, remarked
that he was bound to inquire about the matter and that he presumed
a verdict would have been returned by now. Considering these factors, the judge opted to give the jury the weekend to "search [their]
conscience[s] ... and recall . . .[their] duty and responsibility to fol-

low the law and judge the case." 91
The defendant claimed that "in obviously stressful circumstances,
with assertedly only a single juror holding out against the death penalty, the court's expressed preference for a quick verdict, and its
threat to 'investigate' the jury's 'problem,' unfairly coerced the minority juror." 92 However, the California Supreme Court found nothing in the trial judge's language designed to isolate the dissenting
juror from the rest of the petit jury and to extort a vote for death
from that person. The court also failed to see how the provision for
the weekend break amounted to coercion. 93 Consequently, this claim
of impropriety did not compel a penalty reversal.
In People v. McDowell,94 the trial court also received a note from
the jury indicating an eleven-to-one split among the jurors in favor of
the death penalty. 9 5 The note read: "We have an 11-to-1 vote for

death. The one juror emphatically feels the mitigating circumstances
are equal to the aggravating circumstances. The other eleven jurors
do not agree with the one juror's mitigating circumstances as all being testimony or evidence that should be considered." 96 The trial
judge feared any direction outside of that which had already been
provided for the jury would be construed later as coercion. The
90. Id. at 528, 758 P.2d at 1113, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 583 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 528, 758 P.2d at 1114, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
92. Id. at 530, 758 P.2d at 1115, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 584. See also Rosenthal & Cordell,
The Appearanceof Justice: Judges' Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in CriminalJury
Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89 (1985) [hereinafter Judges' Behavior] (co-authored by Peter

Blanck).
93. Keenan, 46 Cal. 3d at 534, 758 P.2d at 1118, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 587. "The express
purpose of the recess was to relieve the jurors of excessive stress ...." Id. (emphasis
in original).

94. 46 Cal. 3d 551, 758 P.2d 1060, 250 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1988).
95. Id. at 577, 785 P.2d at 1076, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
96. Id. The note listed eight facts adduced at trial and sought the trial court's
opinion as to the propriety of considering these facts as circumstances in mitigation.
The list included:
(1) [I]nadequate or insufficient psychiatric help; (2) love-hate relationship
with father/mother; (3) daily and extreme mental abuse by father, also witness to daily physical abuse to mother and siblings; (4) religious extremes confused defendant; (5) confusing sexual mores at home, parent incest with
mother condoning or aware of incest/abuse; (6) accused of death of favorite
sister; (7) stress of divorce from family; (8) rejection of mother's love during
teen years.
Id.
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judge, therefore, specifically indicated upon which instructions the
jury should focus to find the answer to its question. Justice Lucas,
writing for a five justice majority, held that this tactic "adequately informed the jury regarding its consideration of defendant's mitigating
97
evidence."
Justice Mosk joined Justice Broussard's dissent on the penalty affirmance solely because of the majority's analysis of the trial judge's
handling of the questions from the jury.9 8 "But the jury's very question demonstrated it did not understand these instructions. There is
no point in reiterating language which has failed to enlighten the
jury."99 The dissent maintained that the trial court's failure to explain the instructions and to inform the jury that a "defendant's
character and background evidence" are pertinent to the choice of
penalty warranted reversal.100
Although not responsible for any penalty reversals in the instant
set of cases, issues relating to the court's response to juror questions
may be fertile ground for defense counsel. On the whole, the court
devoted substantial text to framing, analyzing and passing upon these
issues. Whenever the trial court responds to a juror inquiry, concerns of defective instructions, coercion from the court, and improper
argument by counsel should be examined closely.lol
III.

JURY ISSUES

A. Jury Selection
The most consistently raised contentions by the capital defendants
in this survey dealt with Witherspoon/Wittlo2 challenges and repre97. McDowell, 46 Cal. 3d at 577-79, 758 P.2d at 1077, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
Although siding with the People because the jury had been satisfactorily advised, the
majority conceded that the trial judge could have been more explicit. Id.
98. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
99. Id. at 581, 758 P.2d at 1079, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 548 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
100. Id. at 579, 758 P.2d at 1077, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 546 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
101. See Judges' Behavior, supra note 92; see also 6 CAL. PRACTICE New Trial
§ 54:26 (1980); cf Gross, JudicialSpeech: Disciplineand the FirstAmendment, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1181 (1986).
102. In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968),the Supreme Court held that a
prospective juror must announce an affirmative disposition opposing the death penalty,
irrespective of any conceivable factual circumstances, before that venireman may be
excused for cause. Several years later, the Court modified this mandate by allowing
counsel to excuse for cause those prospective jurors whose personal views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of [their] duties as a juror in accordance
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sentative cross-section claims. In the aggregate, nineteen of the
twenty-six cases dealt either with one of these claims or with both.103
No reversals were grounded on these challenges, nor did any dissenting opinions discuss these concerns. The sheer number of claims
made, considered in conjunction with the complete lack of effectiveness or judicial interest, makes one wonder why defense attorneys
104
continue to assert an error clearly disfavored by the court.
B. JurorMisconduct
Defendants asserted instances of juror transgression in three of the
cases discussed in this survey. 105 In People v. Williams,10 6 the defendant claimed reversible error because the defendant had taken
tranquilizers and conversed with her mother about "the religious aspects of the penalty phase" during trial.107 However, citing the vast
discretion vested in the trial judge in deciding a motion for new trial,
the court rejected the defendant's claim.108
with [the] instructions and . . . oath." Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1984)
(quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
103. Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d at 250-51, 763 P.2d at 929, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78; Bean, 46
Cal. 3d at 956, 760 P.2d at 1019-20, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 491; Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d at 244-47, 758
P.2d at 42-44, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 100-02; Brown, 46 Cal. 3d at 442, 758 P.2d at 1141, 250
Cal. Rptr. at 610-11; Caro, 46 Cal. 3d at 1061, 761 P.2d at 696, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 773; Coleman, 46 Cal. 3d at 763-71, 759 P.2d at 1268-74, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 91-97; Hamilton, 46 Cal.
3d at 136, 756 P.2d at 1354, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 326; Hernandez, 47 Cal. 3d at 339-40, 763
P.2d at 1302-03, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 211-12; Jennings, 46 Cal. 3d at 974-75, 760 P.2d at 48081, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 284; Johnson, 47 Cal. 3d at 595, 764 P.2d at 1097, 253 Cal. Rptr. at
720; Karis, 46 Cal. 3d at 631-34, 758 P.2d at 1198-2000, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 668-70; Keenan,
46 Cal. 3d at 503, 758 P.2d at 1096, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 565-66; Malone, 47 Cal. 3d at 16, 762
P.2d at 1256, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 532; McDowell, 46 Cal. 3d at 561-62, 758 P.2d at 1065-66,
250 Cal. Rptr. at 535; McLain, 46 Cal. 3d at 106, 757 P.2d at 573, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 634;
Moore, 47 Cal. 3d at 86, 762 P.2d at 1231-32, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 507-08; Morris, 46 Cal. 3d
at 41, 756 P.2d at 869, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 145; Walker, 47 Cal. 3d ait 624-26, 765 P.2d at 7981, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 872-74; Williams, 45 Cal. 3d at 1309, 756 P.2d 221, at 248 Cal. Rptr.
at 857-58.
104. For a complete discourse on the treatment of Witherspoon and Witt issues,
see Krauss, The Witherspoon Doctrine at Witt's End.- Death-QualificationReexamined, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1986); Note, Sixth Amendment-Death Qualificationof
the Jury: Process Is Permissible Where Defendant Does Not Face Death Penalty:
Buchanon v. Kentucky, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 954 (1988); Comment, At Witt's
End. The Continuing Quandary of Jury Selection in Capital Cases, 39 STAN. L. REV.
427 (1987).
105. Karis, 46 Cal. 3d at 642-45, 758 P.2d at 1206-08, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 676-78; Keenan,
46 Cal. 3d at 535-42, 758 P.2d at 1118-22, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 587-92; Williams, 45 Cal. 3d at
1318-19, 756 P.2d at 249-50, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 863-64.
106. 45 Cal. 3d 1268, 756 P.2d 221, 248 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1988).
107. Id. at 1318, 756 P.2d at 250, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
108. "'The determination of a motion for a new trial rests so completely within the
court's discretion that its actions will not be disturbed unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears.' " Id. at 1318, 756 P.2d at 250, 248 Cal. Rptr. at
863-64 (quoting Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 387, 482 P.2d 681, 687,
93 Cal. Rptr. 769, 775 (1971)).
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In People v. Karis,0 9 the court upheld another denial of a motion
for new trial based upon juror misconduct. In this case, one juror
provided the entire panel with a dictionary definition of "mitigating,"
while another juror told the others that the local branch of the public library carried no books authored by Dr. Loftus, an expert witness
for the defense. 110 Initially, the court recognized that "[r]esort to
outside sources for amplification of instructions is not permitted. Jurors are not allowed to obtain information from outside sources
either as to factual matters or for guidance on the law."1' Nevertheless, the defendant provided the court with no evidence of prejudicial
harm associated with the jury's use of the dictionary. Accordingly,
the court found no error even though it realized that "the dictionary
definition of 'mitigating' may not have been particularly helpful to
the jury in understanding the use of the term in [a legal] context
"112

Finally, in People v. Keenan,ll3 the court discussed at length two
1 14
specific instances of alleged misconduct by one particular juror.
First, the court considered a note passed from Juror W. to the victim's sister.115 When questioned by the trial judge about this incident, Juror W. recounted that a stranger had asked him to deliver
the note to the victim's sister, a woman recognizable because of her
long black hair. Juror W. identified this woman as the lady "on our
side."116 The court thereupon reinforced the juror's understanding
that "a juror .

.

. [is] an objective and impartial observer .

.

. not to

pick sides in the case."1 17 The trial court denied the defense counsel's motion for mistrial grounded on Juror W.'s breach of the no
communication rule and called into question Juror W.'s ability to remain impartial. 118 The trial judge assumed, and Juror W. later con109. 46 Cal. 3d 612, 758 P.2d 1189, 250 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1988).
110. Id. at 642, 758 P.2d at 1206, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 676.
111. Id. (footnote omitted).
112. Id. at 645, 758 P.2d at 1208, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 678. See also 58 AM. JUR. 2D New
Trial § 92 (1971 & Supp. 1988); 47 CAL. JUR. 3D New Trial §§ 24-30 (1979 & Supp. 1988);
6 CAL. PRACTICE New Trial § 54:28 (1980 & Supp. 1988); Annotation, PrejudicialFffect
of Jury's Procurement or Use of Book During Deliberations in Criminal Cases, 35
A.L.R. 4TH 626 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
113. 46 Cal. 3d 478, 758 P.2d 1081, 250 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1988).
114. See supra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
115. Juror W. carried the note in his pocket for days, never bothering to read it
before he passed it to the intended recipient. Keenan, 46 Cal. 3d at 535-36, 758 P.2d at
1118-19, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 536, 758 P.2d at 1119, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
118. Id. at 538, 758 P.2d at 1120, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
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firmed, that the "on our side" comment referred only to the physical
layout of the courtroom. Therefore, "the brief communication had
no relation to the issues in the case and did not impair [Juror W.'s]
duty to serve impartially."119
Second, the defendant argued that the same juror coerced the final
vote needed to impose the death penalty by berating another juror
and threatening to kill her.12o The court found no reversible error
even though "[t]he outburst described... was particularly harsh and
inappropriate, but as the trial court suggested, no reasonable juror
could have taken it literally. Manifestly, the alleged 'death threat'
was but an expression of frustration, temper and strong conviction
2
against the contrary views of another panelist."1 1
IV.

A.

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Eight separate cases raised issues challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence in a variety of different postures. 122 Although only one penalty was reversed,123 the court devoted a significant amount of the
text to these discussions, and noted that in order to ascertain the sufficiency of the evidence adduced in the lower court, a reviewing court
is not required to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
but only that "a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt."124 The process for making this determination allows the reviewing court a presumption favoring the judg2
ment while examining the entire record.1 5
119. Id. (footnote omitted).
120. Id. at 538-42, 758 P.2d at 1120-22, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 590-92. The defendant's motion for new trial pursuant to section 657(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure was denied.
121. Id. at 540-41, 758 P.2d at 1122, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 591. See generally 75 AM. JUR.
2D Trial §§ 978-1014 (1974 & Supp. 1988); 76 AM JUR. 2D Trial §§ 1219-1232 (1975 &
Supp. 1988); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw §§ 3043-3047 (1985 & Supp. 1988); 89 C.J.S.
Trial §§ 455-461 (1955 & Supp. 1988); Annotation, Impeachment of Verdict by Juror's
Evidence That He Was Coerced or Intimidated by Fellow Juror, 39 A.L.R. 4TH 800
(1985 & Supp. 1988).
122. Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d at 239-40, 763 P.2d at 922-23, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 71-72; Bean, 46
Cal. 3d at 932-34, 760 P.2d at 1003-05, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 474-76; Caro, 46 Cal. 3d at 104951, 761 P.2d at 688-89, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 765-66; Coleman, 46 Cal. 3d at 788-95, 759 P.2d at
1286-91, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 109-14 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (Broussard, J.,
dissenting); Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d at 867-69, 760 P.2d at 440-42, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 244-45;
Hernandez, 47 Cal. 3d at 343-51, 763 P.2d at 1305-10, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 214-20; Jennings,
46 Cal. 3d at 982-87, 760 P.2d at 486-90, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 289-93; Morris, 46 Cal. 3d at 2223, 756 P.2d at 856-57, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 132-33.
123. Morris, 46 Cal. 3d at 41, 756 P.2d at 869, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
124. Hernandez, 47 Cal. 3d at 345-46, 763 P.2d at 1306, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 216; see also
People v. Johnson, 26 Cal. 3d 557, 576, 606 P.2d 738, 750, 162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 443 (1980).
125. Hernandez, 47 Cal. 3d at 345-46, 763 P.2d at 130, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 216. See also
3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE §§ 1802-1803 (3d. ed. 1986 & Supp. 1988); 5 AM.
JUR. 2D Appeal & Error §§ 882-890 (1962 & Supp. 1988); 5 CAL. JUR. 3D Appellate Review §§ 536-544 (1973 & Supp. 1988); 31 CAL. JUR. 3D Evidence §§ 711-712 (1976).
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In People v. Morris,126 the defendant was sentenced to death under
a robbery-murder special circumstance. He was charged with shooting and killing a homosexual victim in a public bathhouse.27 The
only evidence linking the defendant to the robbery of the victim was
testimony that the defendant or someone "look[ing] like" the defendant used a Sears card which had been loaned to the victim prior to
128
his death.
To find a robbery-murder special circumstance, the jury must find
"1) substantial evidence of the robbery, and 2) substantial evidence
that the murder was committed during the commission or attempted
commission of the robbery."'' 29 After reviewing the People's speculative evidence, the court could not find that the state had proven "beyond a reasonable doubt" that a robbery had been committed or that
the murder had occurred during such a robbery.130 Because the evidence did not support the special circumstance finding, the penalty
for the murder could not be death; therefore, the supreme court reversed the death penalty.13t
In People v. Coleman,132 Justices Mosk and Broussard wrote separate dissenting opinions arguing in favor of reversing the death penalty because the evidence against the defendant was "demonstrably
[too] thin"' 33 and "so weak that this error [of admitting other harmful evidence] must be held prejudicial."1 34 However, Justice Mosk's
minority opinion failed to discuss the process of determining sufficiency of the evidence. Rather, he cited to his "interest of justice and
135
... good conscience" to support his position.
Justice Broussard offered a lengthy review of the facts and the inferences he deduced
126. 46 Cal. 3d 1, 756 P.2d 843, 249 Cal. Rptr. 119.
127. Id. at 9-12, 756 P.2d at 847-49, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 123-25.

128. Id. at 19-20, 756 P.2d at 854, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 130-31. Aside from the possible
credit card, no evidence existed indicating that the victim had any items on his person
at the time of the murder. He was found clothed in only his shoes and socks. Id. at 20,
756 P.2d at 854, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
129. Id. at 19, 756 P.2d at 854, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 130 (emphasis added).

130. Id. at 21-22, 756 P.2d at 855-56, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 131-32.
131. Id. at 22, 756 P.2d at 856, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 132. The court also noted that any
further proceedings on the robbery allegation would subject the defendant to double
jeopardy. Id.; see also 20 CAL. JUR.3D Criminal Law §§ 2313, 2337 (rev. 1985 & Supp.

1988) (noting that a finding of insufficent evidence on appeal prohibits a retrial on the
same issue).
132. 46 Cal. 3d 749, 759 P.2d 1260, 251 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1988).
133. Id. at 788, 759 P.2d at 1286, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 109 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
134. Id. at 789, 759 P.2d at 1287, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 789, 759 P.2d at 1286, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 109 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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therefrom. Finally, he concluded by reviewing the entire record:
"[T]his has to be one of the weakest cases to identify [the] defendant
136
as the perpetrator of the crime that I have seen."
B.

Cumulative Error

Claims of cumulative error were seen in four of the survey's
cases. 137 In People v. Brown,138 Chief Justice Lucas announced his
adherence to the reasonable possibility test for detecting error in the
capital verdict of a penalty phase jury.139 "In deciding whether it is
'reasonably possible' that a given error or combination of errors affected a verdict, we will 'exclude the possibility of arbitrariness,
whimsy, caprice ... and the like. A defendant has no entitlement to
the luck of a lawless decisionmaker.' "140 Therefore, before any singular or aggregate error may cause a death penalty reversal, the California Supreme Court must harbor the belief that a realistic
possibility exists that the trier of fact in the lower court would have
141
arrived at a different verdict, absent the errors.
With this standard in mind, Chief Justice Lucas summarily dis142
posed of the defendant's allegation of prejudicial cumulative error.
However, Justice Broussard dissented from the affirmance of the
penalty after applying the reasonable possibility test to the cumula43
tive errors.1
C. Hypnosis
The testimony of previously hypnotized witnesses was placed in is136. Id. at 795, 759 P.2d at 1290, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 114 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
137. Brown, 46 Cal. 3d at 463, 472-77, 758 P.2d at 1155, 1161-65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 625,
631-35 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting); Bunyard, 45 Cal. 3d at 1236-37, 756
P.2d at 826-27, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 102-03; Hamilton, 46 Cal. 3d at 156, 756 P.2d at 1367,
249 Cal. Rptr. at 339; Malone, 47 Cal. 3d at 56, 762 P.2d at 1283-84, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 55960.
138. 46 Cal. 3d 432, 758 P.2d 1135, 250 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1988).
139. Id. at 446-48, 758 P.2d at 1144-45, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 613-15 (1988) (emphasis added). This test is different from the reasonable probability test announced by the
court for reviewing claims of error emanating from the guilt phase of trial. See People
v. Watson, 46 Cal, 2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243, 254 (1956) (emphasis added).
140. Brown, 46 Cal. 3d at 448, 758 P.2d at 1145, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
141. Id. (emphasis added); see also B. JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE LAW § 22.1
(1985); B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Reversible Error § 756 (1963 &
Supp. 1985); 9 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 359 (3d. ed. 1985); 5 AM.
JUR. 2D Appeal & Error § 789 (1962 & Supp. 1988); 5 CAL. JUR. 3D Appellate Review
§ 554 (1973).
142. Without indicating the reasons for this disposition, Chief Justice Lucas wrote
"that there is no reasonable possibility that these errors, singly or in combination, affected the jury's verdict." Brown, 46 Cal. 3d at 463, 758 P.2d at 1155, 250 Cal. Rptr. at
625.
143. Id. at 472-76, 758 P.2d at 1161-65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 631-34 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
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sue in two of the reviewed cases.14 4

In the 1982 case of People v.

Shirley,145 the California Supreme Court declared inadmissible any
testimony directly bearing on the issues of the case from a witness,
other than the defendant, who has undergone hypnosis to achieve
6
memory enhancement.14
In People v. Caro,147 one of the defendant's victims submitted to
hypnosis to try to enhance his memory of certain events. 148
Although the hypnosis was unsuccessful, the defendant sought suppression of the victim's testimony under the rule of Shirley. However, the court denied the motion because it appeared that the victim
was never really hypnotized, thereby eliminating any possible
taint.149
In People v. Johnson,150 the defendant's rape victim, who was successfully hypnotized, offered convincing, valuable testimony in violation of the Shirley rule.151 While the victim's testimony greatly
incriminated the defendant and "provided the strongest evidence
linking defendant with the rape,"'15 2 sufficient "evidentiary cross
linking between the murder and the rape scenes ... [tied the defendant to the crimes] even without the victim's testimony .
".."153 The
court found no harm associated with the violation of the Shirley
rule.154
D.

Probative vs. Prejudicial
An intriguing demonstrative evidence issue arose in People v.

Brown,155 wherein the prosecution dressed a mannequin in the slain
144. Caro, 46 Cal. 3d at 1047-49, 761 P.2d at 687-88, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 764-65; Johnson,
47 Cal. 3d at 599-02, 764 P.2d at 1099-1101, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 722-24.
145. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982).
146. See generally K. BROWER, HYPNOSIS AND THE SERIOUSLY CURIOUS (1976); Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68
CALIF. L. REV. 313 (1980); Comment, Hypnosis, 130 SOLIC. J. 617 (Aug. 22, 1986); Comment, Hypnosis in Court: A New Twist on the Old Memory Game, 13 U. BALT. L.
REV. 112 (1983); Comment, Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony and the BalancingPendulum, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 921.
147. 46 Cal. 3d 1035, 761 P.2d 680, 251 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1988).
148. Id. at 1047-48, 761 P.2d at 687-88, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 764-65.
149. Id. at 1048-49, 761 P.2d at 687-88, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 764-65.
150. 47 Cal. 3d 576, 764 P.2d 1087, 253 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1988).
151. Johnson, 47 Cal. 3d at 601, 764 P.2d at 1100, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
152. Id. at 600, 764 P.2d at 1100, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
153. Id. at 601, 764 P.2d at 1101, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
154. Id. Lucas relied on the reasonable probability test of Watson. See supra note
138 and accompanying text.
155. 46 Cal. 3d 432, 758 P.2d 1135, 250 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1988).
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officer's uniform to graphically depict the exact location of the fatal
bullet wound fired by the defendant.15 6 After reviewing the record,
Justice Lucas determined that the trial court gave thoughtful consideration to defendant's claim that the mannequin was unreasonably
prejudicial. The Chief Justice further stated that the "use of the
mannequin was 'a perfectly proper method of introducing highly relevant evidence.' "157
V.

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Defendants alleged prosecutorial misconduct in twenty-one of the
twenty-six death penalty cases in this survey. 58 Although the court
actually found misconduct in nine of those cases, 159 it reversed the
156. The uniform had not been washed, and the blood stains on the fabric were visible to the jury. Id. at 442-43, 758 P.2d at 1141, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 611. See generally 29
AM. JUR. 2D Evidence §§ 771, 777, 779 (1967 & Supp. 1988); Gold, Covert Advocacy: Reflections on the Use of Psychological Persuasion Techniques in the Courtroom, 65
N.C.L. REV. 481 (1987); Dombroff, Using Demonstrations, Re-creations, NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 2, 1984, at p. 15, col. 1; Bodine, Prosecution Prepared to Bite Back, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 18, 1980, at p. 35, col. 1.
157. 46 Cal. 3d at 443, 758 P.2d at 1141, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 611 (quoting People v. Robillard, 55 Cal. 2d 88, 99, 358 P.2d 295, 301, 10 Cal. Rptr. 167, 173 (1960)). See generally
Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 So. CAL. L. REV. 220 (1976); Annotation, Proprietyand PrejudicialEffect of Prosecutor'sArgument to Jury Indicating
that He has Additional Evidence of Defendant's Guilt which He did not Deem Necessary to Present, 90 A.L.R. 3D 646 (1979 & Supp. 1988); Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Prosecutor'sArgument Giving Jury Impression that Defense Counsel
Believes Accused Guilty, 89 A.L.R. 3D 263 (1979 & Supp. 1988); Annotation, Propriety,
in Trial of Criminal Case, of Use of Skeleton or Model of Human Body or Part, 83
A.L.R. 2D 1097 (1962 & Supp. 1979).
158. Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d at 235-38, 257-61, 763 P.2d at 919-21, 933-36, 253 Cal. Rptr. at
68-70, 82-86; Bean, 46 Cal. 3d at 951-53, 760 P.2d at 1016-18, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 487-89;
Bonin, 46 Cal. 3d at 680-90, 700-02, 758 P.2d at 1228-34, 1239-41, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 698704, 710-11; Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d at 255, 758 P.2d at 50, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 108; Brown, 45 Cal.
3d at 1260-63, 756 P.2d at 212-14, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 825-27; Brown, 46 Cal. 3d at 454-57,
758 P.2d at 1150-51, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 619-621; Bunyard, 45 Cal. 3d at 1220-24, 756 P.2d at
815-18, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 91-94; Caro, 46 Cal. 3d at 1063-64, 761 P.2d at 697-98, 251 Cal.
Rptr. at 774-75; Coleman, 46 Cal. 3d at 788, 759 P.2d at 1286, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 108; Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d at 877-79, 883-85, 760 P.2d at 447-48, 452-53, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 251-52, 25556; Hamilton, 46 Cal. 3d at 141-42, 150-51, 756 P.2d at 1357-58, 1363-64, 249 Cal. Rptr. at
329, 335-36; Hernandez, 47 Cal. 3d at 359-64, 763 P.2d at 1315-19, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 22528; Karis, 46 Cal. 3d at 648, 758 P.2d at 1210-11, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 680-81; Keenan, 46 Cal.
3d at 504-510, 758 P.2d at 1097-1101, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 566-571; Malone, 47 Cal. 3d at 2932, 36-39, 762 P.2d at 1265-66, 1269-71, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 541-42, 545-47; McDowell, 46 Cal.
3d at 570-74, 758 P.2d at 1071-74, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 540-43; McLain, 46 Cal. 3d at 111-13,
757 P.2d at 576-78, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 637-39; Moore, 47 Cal. 3d at 91-93, 762 P.2d at 123536, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 511-12; Morris, 46 Cal. 3d at 35-36, 756 P.2d at 865-66, 249 Cal. Rptr.
at 141-42; Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 626-27, 629-30, 643-45, 765 P.2d at 81, 83-84, 92-93, 253
Cal. Rptr. at 874, 876-77, 885-86; Williams, 45 Cal. 3d at 1325-27, 1330-31, 756 P.2d at
255-56, 258-59, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 868-69, 872.
159. Bonin, 46 Cal. 3d at 690, 758 P.2d at 1233-34, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 703-04 (eliciting
inadmissible testimony); Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d at 255, 758 P.2d at 50, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 108
(Davenporterror); Brown, 45 Cal. 3d at 1261, 1263, 756 P.2d at 213-14, 248 Cal. Rptr. at
826-27 (Davenport error and improper comment regarding scope of defendant's cross
examination); Crandell,46 Cal. 3d at 883-85, 760 P.2d at 452-53, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 255-56
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penalty in only one, 160 finding the other errors harmless.11
In reversing the sentence in People v. Crandell,162 the court focused more on the unique circumstances of the case than on the prosecutor's misconduct. In Crandell, the defendant, who appeared pro

se, refused to present any evidence in his defense at the penalty
phase as he felt it would be an admission of guilt.1

63

Because the de-

fendant did not correct or mitigate the prosecutor's improper exploitation of the ambiguities in
the trial court's sentencing
instructions, the court found that the jury was misled as to the scope
of its sentencing responsibilities.164

However, the court indicated

that had the penalty phase been less one-sided, the prosecutor's misconduct would have been harmless.165
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Lucas noted that the court
has upheld death penalty judgments in cases involving prosecutorial
6
activity "far more questionable" than that presented in Crandell.16
(improper argument at sentencing phase); Malone, 47 Cal. 3d at 30, 38-39, 762 P.2d at
1265, 1271, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 541, 547 (improper comments implying the existence of an
"uncalled adverse witness" and insinuating an additional murder); McDowell, 46 Cal.
3d at 573-74, 758 P.2d at 1073-74, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 542-43 (Davenport error); Moore, 47
Cal. 3d at 92-93, 762 P.2d at 1235-36, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 511-12 (Davenporterror); Walker,
47 Cal. 3d at 627, 644, 765 P.2d at 81, 93, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 874, 886 (misleading voir dire
of jurors and Davenport error); Williams, 45 Cal. 3d at 1326-27, 756 P.2d at 256, 248
Cal. Rptr. at 869 (improper closing argument). For a discussion of Davenport error,
see infra note 170 and accompanying text.
160. Id. at 883-85, 760 P.2d at 452-53, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 255-56.
161. The harmless error doctrine essentially broadens "the boundaries of
prosecutorial misconduct by permitting the appellate courts to justify the offensive
conduct of prosecutors in those cases where the crime or criminal is so abhorrent that
basic human nature militates against the reversal of a conviction." F. LAWLESS,
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 13.22 (1985). In deciding whether an error is reversible, the court should examine the strength of the evidence against the defendant,
whether the error extends to the whole trial, and whether the prosecutor's conduct
was intentional. Id.; see also 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2950 (1985 & Supp. 1988);
Special Project, Fifteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1984-85, 74 GEo. L. J. 499, 811-820 (1986) [hereinafter Special Project] (noting that penalties are rarely overturned for prosecutorial
misconduct if "substantial independent evidence" of the defendant's culpability exists).
162. 46 Cal. 3d 833, 760 P.2d 423, 251 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1988).
163. Id. at 881-82, 760 P.2d at 450, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
164. Id. at 885, 760 P.2d at 452-53, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 255-56. The prosecutor erred by
incorrectly depicting the balancing of the aggravating factors and the mitigating circumstances in the sentencing process and by intimating that no mitigating circumstances existed. Id. at 884-85, 760 P.2d at 452, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 255-56.
165. Id. at 885, 760 P.2d at 453, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 256; see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
166. Id. at 886, 760 P.2d at 453-54, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 257 (Lucas, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
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For example, in People v. Bonin,167 the court upheld the death penalty even though the prosecutor elicited inadmissible trial testimony
concerning fourteen additional murders allegedly committed by the
defendant. The court found that even if the prosecutor's conduct was
intentional, it was not reversible error since no "reasonable
probability [existed] that in the absence of the 'misconduct' an outcome more favorable to defendant would have resulted."168 Undoubtedly, the majority's skepticism concerning the strength of the
state's death penalty case in Crandell played a significant role in its
69
reversal.1
Following allegations of prejudicial argument, the most common
type of alleged prosecutorial misconduct was the so-called Davenport
error, which occurs when a prosecutor improperly advises the jury
during the penalty phase to consider as aggravating factors the absence of certain mitigating circumstances. 170 Although this argument
was rejected in every instance, Justice Broussard, concurring in People v. Moore,171 noted that the court's strict adherence to the curative
requirements of People v. Green 172 is inappropriate when applied to
cases tried before the Davenport decision.173 Justice Broussard noted
that expecting trial counsel to "foresee" future opinions simply "is
asking too much."174 Nevertheless, he agreed that the Davenport error in Moore was non-prejudicial as it was not reasonably possible
that the jury would have reached a different outcome in its
absence.175
167. 46 Cal. 3d 659, 758 P.2d 1217, 250 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1988).
168. Id. at 690, 758 P.2d at 1233-34, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
169. Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d at 886, 760 P.2d at 453, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 257. Although the
defendant was convicted of brutally murdering two persons with whom he lived, the
court enumerated a number of mitigating factors weighing against the imposition of
the death penalty. These included the fact that the defendant had not been involved
in any previous crimes, that he may have been intoxicated at the time of the murders,
and that he had been gainfully employed and supportive of the household prior to the
incident. Id. The court also recognized that the defendant had taken precautions after
the murders to ensure that the seven-year-old daughter of one of the victims did not
view the bodies. Id.
170. See People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 289-90, 710 P.2d 861, 888, 221 Cal. Rptr.
794, 821 (1985) (plurality opinion).
171. 47 Cal. 3d 63, 762 P.2d 1218, 252 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1988).
172. 27 Cal. 3d 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980). In Green, the court held that
in order to maintain allegations of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal, trial counsel
must place a timely objection on the record, unless such an objection would not have
corrected the harm. Id. at 27-28, 609 P.2d at 483, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 16; see also Death
Penalty Survey, supra note 3, at 469-70.
173. Moore, 47 Cal. 3d at 94, 762 P.2d at 1237, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 513 (Broussard, J.,
concurring).
174. Id. at 95, 762 P.2d at 1238, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 514 (Broussard, J., concurring).
175. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring). Justice Broussard found that the prosecutor
sufficiently mitigated the Davenport error by his "fair presentation of the law" during
the penalty phase and his explanation to the jury that it was their responsibility to
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Defendants also raised issues of prosecutorial conflict of interest, 176
intimidation of defense witnesses, 177 and improper comments to individual jurors, 78 all of which were rejected by the court, either on
their merits or through failure to preserve the issue on appeal. These
cases, as well as those decided between April and June, 1988,179 indicate the court's respect for its own procedural rules, as well as its unwillingness to disturb death penalty judgments in the absence of
egregious prosecutorial misconduct or questionable evidence supporting the penalty. With the exception of Crandell, none of the cases in
this survey presented an example of reversible prosecutorial
misconduct.18 0
VI.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Seventeen cases in this survey sought reversal based upon errors
involving defense counsel.181 The defendants alleged that certain errors committed either by the court or their counsel deprived them of
classify the evidence as either aggravating or mitigating, or neutral. Id. (Broussard, J.,
concurring).
176. Hamilton, 46 Cal. 3d at 138, 756 P.2d at 1355, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 327. The defendant alleged that the entire Fresno District Attorney's office should have been removed
from his case because one of the assistant district attorneys previously had represented
an associate of the defendant. The court rejected the argument, noting that the assistant district attorney had been screened from the case and that no evidence of improper bias existed. Id. at 138-141, 756 P.2d at 1355-57, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 327-29.
177. Id. at 141-42, 756 P.2d at 1357-58, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 329. The court did not reach
the merits of this argument as it was not properly raised at trial. The court reasoned
that if the defendant had raised the issue at trial, the prosecution could have submitted
evidence showing that it had not intimidated the witness. Id.
178. Williams, 45 Cal. 3d at 1330-31, 756 P.2d at 258-59, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
Although the defendant alleged that the prosecutor improperly gave inadmissible evidence to two jurors after the penalty phase, no evidence existed supporting the charge.
Id.
179. See Death Penalty Survey, supra note 3, at 468-70.
180. For a good discussion of how to avoid reversible misconduct, see Special Project, supra note 161, at 814-820.
181. Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d at 244-46, 763 P.2d at 925-26, 936-38, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75,
85-87; Bean, 46 Cal. 3d at 944-49, 760 P.2d at 1011-15, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 482-86; Bonin, 46
Cal. 3d at 691-95, 758 P.2d at 1234-37, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 704-07; Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d at 25556, 758 P.2d at 50, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 108; Brown, 46 Cal. 3d at 461, 758 P.2d at 1154, 250
Cal. Rptr. at 624; Bunyard, 45 Cal. 3d at 1214-17, 756 P.2d at 811-13, 249 Cal. Rptr. at
87-89; Caro, 46 Cal. 3d at 1047, 761 P.2d at 687, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 764; Coleman, 46 Cal.
3d at 772-73, 759 P.2d at 1274-76, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 98-99; Crandell,46 Cal. 3d at 851-67,
760 P.2d at 429-40, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 233-44; Easley, 46 Cal. 3d at 720-33, 759 P.2d at 494503, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 859-68; Griffin, 46 Cal. 3d at 1029, 761 P.2d at 113, 251 Cal. Rptr.
at 653; Hernandez, 47 Cal. 3d at 369-71, 763 P.2d at 1322-24, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 232-33;
Johnson, 47 Cal. 3d at 595-96, 764 P.2d at 1097, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 720; Karis, 46 Cal. 3d at
653-57, 758 P.2d at 1214-17, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 684-87; Malone, 47 Cal. 3d at 19-20, 33-34,
762 P.2d at 1257-58, 1267-68, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 533-34, 543-44; Moore, 47 Cal. 3d at 74-78,
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their constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.' 8 2
Although the court reversed only one such case,' 8 3 several of the issues raised are worthy of comment.
A.

Conflict of Interest

The only successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel occurred in People v. Easley.184 In Easley, the defendant claimed he
was denied effective assistance of counsel because the attorney who
represented him at the penalty retrial was simultaneously representing one of the prosecution's witnesses in another case. 8 5 In fact, the
attorney was in the tenuous position of arguing at the defendant's
penalty retrial that the defendant did not commit an alleged arson,
while at the same time trying to prove in a civil lawsuit that the defendant did indeed commit the arson. 186 Although the issue of a possible conflict was raised several times before the retrial, the
defendant repeatedly renewed his wish to have the attorney represent him.187
The court noted that "[i]n order to establish a violation of the Sixth
Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must
demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his
lawyer's performance."18 8 The court in Easley had little trouble recognizing such adverse performance, because the attorney failed to use
evidence concerning the pending civil lawsuit to impeach the prose762 P.2d at 1223-26, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 499-502; Williams, 45 Cal. 3d at 1305-06, 756 P.2d
at 242, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
182. The sixth amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees an accused the right
to assistance of counsel during trial. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (the right to assistance of counsel is mandatory upon the
states). See also J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED-TRIAL RIGHTS
§§ 20, 22 (1974 & Supp. 1984) [hereinafter J. COOK]. Even if the accused retains counsel, "the assistance he receives may be so lacking in competence that a denial of the
sixth amendment protection will result." Id. at § 45 (citing Hauk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271
(1945)). To determine whether an attorney's performance is ineffective, the U.S.
Supreme Court has directed that courts consider whether the lawyer's performance
descended below reasonably acceptable professional standards, and, if so, whether the
attorney's inadequate performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); see J. CARR, 1988 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE HANDBOOK
§ 3.02[5] (1988) [hereinafter J. CARR]. See generally Comment, A CoherentApproach to
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1516 (1983).
183. Easley, 46 Cal. 3d at 733, 759 P.2d at 503, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
184. 46 Cal. 3d 712, 759 P.2d 490, 250 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1988).
185. Id. at 720, 759 P.2d at 494, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 859. Furthermore, the attorney
previously had represented the defendant's sister in another matter. Id. at 724, 759
P.2d at 496, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 861-62; see also 7 CAL. JUR. 3D Attorneys at Law §§ 207208, 211 (1973 & Supp. 1988).
186. Easley, 46 Cal. 3d at 724-25, 759 P.2d at 497, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
187. Id. at 721-24, 759 P.2d at 494-96, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 859-62.
188. Id. at 724, 759 P.2d at 497, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 862 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U.S. 335, 348 (1980)); see also J. CARR, supra note 182, at § 3.02[4]; J. COOK, supra note
182, at § 46; Special Project, supra note 161, at 766-770.
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cution witness or to try to minimize the defendant's participation in
the arson.1 8 9 Furthermore, the court held that because the trial
judge never fully explained the consequences of the conflict to the
defendant, he could not have made a knowing waiver of the conflict.190

Accordingly,

the supreme court reversed the defendant's

death sentence. 1 9 1
B.

Failure to Permit Both Defense Counsel to Argue at Penalty
Phase
In Bonin, the defendant alleged that the trial court's failure to per-

mit both of his defense counsel to argue at the penalty trial deprived
him of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.192

The

supreme court ruled that the trial court abused its discretion under

California law by denying the two arguments, but that no constitutional violation requiring reversal occurred.19 3 The court noted that
both the federal and state constitutions merely guarantee "the right
to have defense counsel present closing argument, not each member
9
of the defense team."1 4
After examining the transcript of the penalty trial, the court found
that the lack of two arguments did not greatly restrict the defendant's participation during the penalty phase, and therefore did not violate the defendant's constitutional right to assistance of counsel.195
Further, because the evidence did not suggest that two arguments

would have changed the jury's verdict, the court found that the trial
court's failure to allow two defense arguments constituted harmless
189. Easley, 46 Cal. 3d at 727-29, 759 P.2d at 499-500, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 864-65.
190. Id. at 732, 759 P.2d at 502, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
191. Id. at 735, 759 P.2d at 504, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 869. The defendants in Adcox, 47
Cal. 3d at 262, 763 P.2d at 938, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 87, and Williams, 45 Cal. 3d at 1305,
756 P.2d at 242, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 855, made similar claims of conflict of interest, but
both claims were rejected as lacking merit.
192. Bonin, 46 Cal. 3d at 691, 758 P.2d at 1234, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 704. The defendant
relied on the language of section 1095 of the California Penal Code: "If the offense
charged is punishable with death, two counsel on each side may argue the cause. In
any other case the court may, in its discretion, restict the argument to one counsel on
each side." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1095 (West 1985); see Bonin, 46 Cal. 3d at 693, 758 P.2d
at 1235, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 705. See also 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2945 (1985).
193. Bonin, 46 Cal. 3d at 694-95, 758 P.2d at 1236-37, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 706-07.
194. Id. at 694-95, 758 P.2d at 1236, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 706 (emphasis in original).
195. Id. The court emphasized that the defense counsel who presented the penalty
argument gave a "full and unrestricted argument." Id. Furthermore, the defendant's
counsel even conceded at the penalty trial that the additional argument was dispensable. Id.
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error.196
C. Right to Advisory Counsel
In Crandell,the defendant alleged that the court's refusal to grant
his repeated requests for advisory counsel to assist him in the presen19 7
tation of his defense denied him effective assistance of counsel.
19 8
a court has discretion to appoint counsel
Under People v. Bigelow,
to assist a pro se indigent defendant in the presentation of his case.1 99
If the court's failure to grant such a request for advisory counsel constitutes an abuse of its discretion, the supreme court must automatically reverse the conviction due to the inherent difficulty in
200
determining prejudice.
Despite the precedent established by Bigelow, the trial judge in
Crandell "summarily" dismissed the defendant's repeated requests
for advisory counsel. 201 In fact, the trial judge expressed total ignorance of the Bigelow rule and indicated that even if advisory counsel
was permissible, he would not appoint such counsel to assist the defendant. 20 2 Notwithstanding the trial court's complete misunderstanding of the law, the supreme court found that the trial court
merely failed to exercise its discretion to grant advisory counsel, as
opposed to actually abusing its discretion. 203 Because the supreme
court could not find that the result would have been different in the
20 4
absence of the error, it declared the error harmless.
196. Id. at 695, 758 P.2d at 1237, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
197. Crandell,46 Cal. 3d at 851, 760 P.2d at 429-30, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
198. 37 Cal. 3d 731, 691 P.2d 994, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1984).
199. Id. at 742, 691 P.2d at 1000-01, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 334-35.
200. Id. at 744-46, 691 P.2d at 1001-02, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 335-36; see also J. COOK,
supra note 182, at § 37.
201. Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d at 862, 760 P.2d at 437, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
202. Id. At one point, the trial judge explained to the defendant that "there is no
such thing" as advisory counsel. Id. At another time, the judge, when informed that
the public defender would not accept appointment in an advisory capacity, said that he
"wouldn't appoint that kind of counsel anyway." Id. The court noted that the trial
court never carefully looked at the circumstances to determine if the defendant's case
warranted advisory counsel. Id. at 862, 760 P.2d at 437, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 240-41.
203. Id. The court concluded that the facts in Bigelow were far more supportive of
the appointment of advisory counsel than those presented in Crandell. Id. The court
observed that the defendant in Bigelow was much less sophisticated than the defendant in Crandell. Crandell had been born in California and had reached the eleventh
grade, while Bigelow had no knowledge of California law and had dropped out of high
school while still a freshman. Id. at 863-64, 760 P.2d at 438, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 241. Furthermore, Crandell had been charged with just one special circumstance, while Bigelow had to contend with four. Id. at 864, 760 P.2d at 438, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 241-42. The
court then stressed the outstanding performance Crandell had given in his own defense. Id. at 865-66, 760 P.2d at 439-40, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 242-43; see supra note 213.
204. Id. at 864, 760 P.2d at 440, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 243. However, in separate opinions,
both Justice Arguelles and Justice Broussard disagreed with the majority's holding.
Justice Arguelles found that the trial court's failure to appoint counsel to assist the
defendant was "prejudicial," particularly since the defendant did not offer any evi-
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D.

Marsden and Faretta Issues

The defendant in Crandell also raised Marsden and Farettaissues
on appeal. He first alleged that the he was not given ample opportunity, as required under People v. Marsden,20 5 to explain his reasons
for rejecting the deputy public defender assigned to his case. 206 In
Marsden, the court held that a defendant who wishes to discard appointed counsel for alleged inadequate representation must be given
adequate opportunity to explain the circumstances surrounding the
20 7
allegations.
The defendant next alleged that his rights under Farettav. California20 8 were violated since he never voluntarily waived his right to
counsel.209 In Faretta,the United States Supreme Court ruled that a
defendant has a constitutional right to select self-representation in
lieu of legal counsel.210

However, the defendant's request for self-

representation must be timely, and the trial court must satisfy itself
that the defendant is mentally competent to waive the right to
2 1
counsel. 1
The supreme court rejected both arguments. It found that because
the defendant had not specifically requested a change of counsel, he
was not entitled to a Marsden hearing at the municipal court stage,
and that the superior court actually had afforded him several oppordence on his own behalf at the penalty trial. Id. at 888-89, 760 P.2d at 455-56, 251 Cal.
Rptr. at 258-59 (Arguelles, J., concurring and dissenting). Not only did Justice Broussard reiterate the fact that the defendant, in essence, "had no penalty trial at all," he
emphasized the seriousness of capital trials and that even a recent law school graduate
is unlikely to be competent to handle one. Id. at 898-900, 760 P.2d at 461-63, 251 Cal.
Rptr. at 265-67 (Broussard, J., dissenting). Thus, he would have accepted the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and reversed both the guilt and penalty
phase judgments. Id. at 901, 760 P.2d at 464, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 267 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
205. 2 Cal. 3d 118, 465 P.2d 44, 84 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1970).
206. Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d at 853-55, 858-61, 760 P.2d at 431-32, 434-36, 251 Cal. Rptr.
at 234-35, 238-39.
207. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d at 124, 465 P.2d at 48, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 160; see also R.
GEORGE, 1988 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL TRIAL JUDGE'S BENCHBOOK 48.4-48.5 (1988) [hereinafter R. GEORGE] (noting that it is reversible error for a judge to refuse to appoint
substitute defense counsel without giving the defendant an opportunity to "relate specific grounds" for the substitution); B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
Trial § 368 (Supp. 1985).
208. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
209. Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d at 853-55, 858-61, 760 P.2d at 431-32, 434-36, 251 Cal. Rptr.
at 234-35, 238-39; see also J. COOK, supra note 182, at § 37; R. GEORGE, supra note 207,
at 48.2-48.3.
210. Faretta,422 U.S. at 819-21. For a discussion of Farettaand its progeny, see Special Project,supra note 161, at 772-76.
211. Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d at 854, 760 P.2d at 432, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
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tunities to state why he would not accept the assigned public defender. 212 The court also found no Farettaviolation as the defendant
"unquestionably" had the mental capacity to waive his right to
213
counsel.
Two months later the court rejected similar arguments in People v.
Moore,214 but for different reasons. In Moore, the court dismissed the
Marsden issue because the trial court conducted a proper Marsden
hearing before denying the defendant's request to substitute counsel.21 5 The supreme court also upheld the denial of the defendant's
motion for self-representation, because the defendant made the motion only a few days before his trial was scheduled to begin. The
court reasoned that the Faretta motion was in fact a delay tactic,
216
rather than a good faith request for self-representation.
VII.

A.

OTHER ALLEGED ERRORS

Improper Denial of Automatic Motion for Modification of
Verdict

Nearly half of the defendants raised issues concerning the trial
court's consideration of the automatic motion to modify a death sen2 17
tence required under section 190.4(e) of the California Penal Code.
212. Id. at 855, 858-59, 760 P.2d at 432, 435, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 235, 238. Specifically,
the defendant believed that the deputy public defender was not diligently pursuing his
defense and could not be trusted. The trial court disagreed. Id. at 858-860, 760 P.2d at
434-36, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 238-39. The defendant then stated he had "no alternative" but
to represent himself. Id. at 858, 760 P.2d at 434, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
213. Id. at 855, 861, 760 P.2d at 432, 436, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 235, 239. In fact, as to the
defendant's level of competence, the trial judge remarked:
Mr. Crandell did a job which absolutely astounded me. His level of questioning would compare to a seasoned trial lawyer with at least first degree homi[H]is performance here would put
cides under his belt by way of defense ....
many defense lawyers to shame.... He got the medical examiner in this case
to admit he was wrong in his opinions 50 percent of the time. I have never
seen a skilled lawyer be able to do that.
Id. at 865, 760 P.2d at 439-40, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
214. 47 Cal. 3d 63, 762 P.2d 1218, 252 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1988).
215. Id. at 76, 762 P.2d at 1224-25, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 500-01.
216. Id. at 80-81, 762 P.2d at 1227-28, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 503-04. Interestingly, the
supreme court also upheld the denial of the defendant's motion for the appointment of
an additional attorney. It found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because
the appointment of additional counsel is usually reserved for particularly complex capital cases. Id. at 76-78, 762 P.2d at 1225-26, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 501-02; see Keenan v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 424, 430, 434, 640 P.2d 108, 111, 113-14, 180 Cal. Rptr. 489, 492, 495
(1982) (holding that a second attorney should only be appointed in cases which are so
complex that additional counsel is necessary "as a matter of law").
217. See Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d at 273-74, 763 P.2d at 944-45, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94 (alleging trial judge's inadequate consideration of the evidence and the law in deciding motion); Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d at 256, 758 P.2d at 50, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 108 (alleging trial court's
improper finding of no mitigating evidence); Brown, 46 Cal. 3d at 462, 758 P.2d at 1155,
250 Cal. Rptr. at 624-25 (alleging trial court's improper consideration of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances); Brown, 45 Cal. 3d at 1263-64, 756 P.2d at 214, 248 Cal. Rptr.
at 827 (alleging trial court's failure to state reasons for denial of motion); Caro, 46 Cal.
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Section 190.4(e) specifically requires a trial judge to review any death
sentence returned by a jury to determine "whether the jury's findings . . . that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances [is] contrary to law or the evidence presented."218 The
statute also compels the trial judge to "state on the record the rea219
sons for his [or her] findings."
After reviewing the various defendants' claims, the supreme court
rejected all but one. In People v. Brown,22o the court reversed the defendant's death sentence because the trial court failed to comply with
the requirements of section 190.4(e). After hearing arguments on the
motion for modification, the trial judge merely reaffirmed the death
sentence without expressly ruling on the motion or stating the reasons for its denial.221 Because the judge did not make the mandatory
record of his findings, the court remanded the case to the trial court
222
for reconsideration of the motion for modification.
The supreme court's summary dismissal of section 190.4(e) claims
in the other cases suggests its faith in the trial judge's assessment of
the jury's findings. Although several defendants questioned the trial
judge's understanding of the statutory factors to be considered in rul3d at 1067-68, 761 P.2d at 700, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 777-78 (alleging trial court's improper
consideration of a nonstatutory aggravating factor-lack of remorse); Hamilton, 46
Cal. 3d at 156-57, 756 P.2d at 1367-68, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 339-40 (alleging trial court's improper consideration of mitigating evidence); Hernandez, 47 Cal. 3d at 371-75, 763 P.2d
at 1324-26, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 233-36 (alleging trial judge's failure to properly state reasons for denial of motion for modification); Jennings, 46 Cal. 3d at 992-93, 760 P.2d at
493-94, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 297-98 (alleging trial court's misunderstanding of the factors to
consider in ruling on motion); Karis, 46 Cal. 3d at 651-52, 758 P.2d at 1212-13, 250 Cal.
Rptr. at 682-83 (alleging trial court's misunderstanding of the factors to consider in ruling on motion); Malone, 47 Cal. 3d at 57-59, 762 P.2d at 1284-86, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 560-62
(alleging trial court's improper "mechanical" consideration of mitigating and aggravating circumstances); Williams, 45 Cal. 3d at 1327-30, 756 P.2d at 256-58, 248 Cal. Rptr. at
869-71 (alleging both judicial misconduct in considering modification motion and the
trial court's improper consideration of a probation report).
218. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(e) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989). In 30 of the 37 states
allowing the death penalty, the jury determines whether the penalty should be imposed. However, all states provide for judicial review of jury-imposed death sentences.
Hans, Death by Jury, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 172 n.1 (K. Haas & J. Inciardi ed. 1988).
219. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(e) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989).
220. 45 Cal. 3d 1247, 756 P.2d 204, 248 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1988).
221. Id. at 1263-64, 756 P.2d at 214, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
222. Id. at 1264, 756 P.2d at 214, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 827. But see People v. Heishman,
45 Cal. 3d 147, 753 P.2d 629, 246 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1988) (trial judge's failure to state reasons did not prejudice defendant so as to require reversal of death penalty). The
Brown court further stated that, if possible, the original trial judge should hear the
motion for modification, although another judge of the same court could hear the motion. Brown, 45 Cal. 3d at 1264 n.7, 756 P.2d at 214 n.7, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 827 n.7.
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ing on a motion for modification,223 the court refused to disturb the
trial judge's denial of the motion if the judge made some attempthowever feeble-to justify the ruling.224 Thus, the present court is
unlikely to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court unless
the trial judge wantonly disregards the requirements of section
190.4(e).
B. Failure to Hold a Competency Hearing
People v. Marks 225 was the only case in this survey to seek reversal
because the trial court failed to hold a pretrial hearing to determine
the defendant's fitness to stand trial. In Marks, the defendant was
convicted and sentenced to death for murdering a man in a murderfor-hire scheme. 226 Before trial, defense counsel informed the trial
court of the defendant's possible inability to comprehend the severity
of the charges against him and to assist in his defense. After expressing some doubt as to the defendant's ability to stand trial, the trial
judge scheduled a competency hearing, which subsequently was cancelled upon the request of defense counsel.227 The defendant was
then arraigned, and no further reference was made to his
228
competency.
Because the trial court did not follow through with a competency
hearing after it had expressed concern over the defendant's capacity
to stand trial, the supreme court reversed the defendant's sentence
and conviction. 229 The court noted that section 1368(c) of the Penal
Code mandates that once a competency hearing has been ordered,
"all proceedings in the criminal prosecution shall be suspended until
the question of the present mental competence of the defendant has
223. See supra note 217. In considering a modification motion, the trial judge must
"review the evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating

and mitigating circumstances referred to in Section 190.3." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.4(e) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989).
224. For example, in Hernandez, 47 Cal. 3d 315, 763 P.2d 1289, 253 Cal. Rptr. 199,
the supreme court upheld the trial judge's denial of the modification motion even
though the trial judge's explanation of the denial was somewhat sketchy. The
supreme court noted that the judge's statements, "taken in the context of the immediately preceding hearing, [were] not so inadequate as to require a new hearing." Id. at

372, 763 P.2d at 1324, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 234 (emphasis added). The court further noted
that even if the trial court did err in failing to explain fully the reasons for the denial,
the error undoubtedly was harmless. Id.
225. 45 Cal. 3d 1335, 756 P.2d 260, 248 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1988).

226. Id. at 1338-39, 756 P.2d at 263-64, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 876-77.
227. Id. at 1338-1339, 756 P.2d at 263, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 876-77. Defense counsel explained to the trial court that the matter of the defendant's competency had been resolved because two psychiatrists had examined the defendant and determined that he

was able to assist in his defense. Defense counsel then asked that the defendant be
arraigned, and the trial court responded, "All right." Id. at 1339, 756 P.2d at 263, 248
Cal. Rptr. at 877.

228. Id.
229. Id. at 1347, 756 P.2d at 269, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
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been determined."230 Since the trial court did not actually determine
whether the defendant was competent to stand trial, the supreme
court found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction under section
1368(c) to proceed with the defendant's trial. 23 1 The court also found
that the defendant's apparent "waiver" of his right to the competency
hearing was ineffective since "the matter is jurisdictional, and cannot
be waived

by

counsel."232

The significance of Marks as a death penalty case is limited. The
court merely affirmed its established rule that once the trial court acknowledges doubt as to the defendant's competence, it must formally
resolve the issue on the record or risk losing jurisdiction over the
2 33
matter.
C.

ProportionalityReview

The defendants in ten cases alleged that their death sentences
were disproportionate to their individual culpability for the crimes
committed.2 3 4 Each defendant claimed either that his sentence was
disproportionate to his own culpability for the crime, especially when
compared to sentences received by his co-conspirators (intracase proportionality),235 or that his sentence was disproportionate to
sentences received by persons convicted of similar crimes in other
230. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1368(c) (West 1982 & Supp. 1989); see also 21 CAL. JUR. 3D
CriminalLaw § 2888 (1985); Special Project, supra note 158, at 711-18.
231. Marks, 45 Cal. 3d at 1340, 756 P.2d at 264, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
232. Id. (quoting People v. Hale, 44 Cal. 3d 531, 541, 749 P.2d 769, 775, 244 Cal. Rptr.
114, 120 (1988)); see People v. Pennington, 66 Cal. 2d 508, 521, 426 P.2d 942, 951, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 374, 383 (1967) (noting that under section 1368 of the Penal Code, the court has
no authority to proceed with trial once it has questioned the defendant's competency).
See also 21 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw § 2889 (1985).
233. The supreme court's prior holdings clearly indicate that the trial court must,
"at a minimum ... expressly and unmistakably state on the record, either orally or in
writing, its determination as to whether the defendant is mentally competent to stand
trial." Id. at 1343, 756 P.2d at 266, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 879; see also People v. Hale, 44 Cal.
3d 531, 749 P.2d 769, 244 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1988).
234. Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d at 274-75, 763 P.2d at 945-46, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 94-95; Bean, 46
Cal. 3d at 956-58, 760 P.2d at 1020-21, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 491-92; Caro, 46 Cal. 3d at 1068,
761 P.2d at 701, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 778; Hamilton, 46 Cal. 3d at 158, 756 P.2d at 1368, 249
Cal. Rptr. at 340; Jennings, 46 Cal. 3d at 995, 760 P.2d at 495, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 298;
Karis, 46 Cal. 3d at 649, 758 P.2d at 1211-12, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 681-82; Keenan, 46 Cal. 3d
at 544, 758 P.2d at 1124, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 593-94; McLain, 46 Cal. 3d at 121, 757 P.2d at
583, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 644; Moore, 47 Cal. 3d at 93, 762 P.2d at 1236-37, 252 Cal. Rptr. at
512-13; Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at 650-51, 765 P.2d at 98, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
235. Bean, 46 Cal. 3d at 956-58, 760 P.2d at 1020-21, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 491-92; Jennings, 46 Cal. 3d at 995, 760 P.2d at 495, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 298; McLain, 46 Cal. 3d at 121,
757 P.2d at 583, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 644; Moore, 47 Cal. 3d at 93, 762 P.2d at 1236-37, 252
Cal. Rptr. at 512-13.
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cases (intercase proportionality), 236 or both.237 The court rejected all
ten claims.
In each case, the supreme court consistently noted that the eighth
amendment of the United States Constitution 238 does not require
that courts assess proportionality by comparing their sentences with
sentences previously imposed in similar situations. 239 The court conceded, however, that death sentences are subject to review under the
California Constitution240 to "ensure that the penalty is not dispro1
portionate to the defendant's individual culpability."24
Applying the above law, the supreme court in People v. Adcox242
found that the defendant's death sentence was proportionate to his
individual culpability. 243 In Adcox, the defendant embarked on a
camping trip with his girlfriend and another friend. When the three
campers ran out of money, they devised a plan to kill and to rob a
nearby fisherman. While the girlfriend waited at the campsite, the
defendant and his friend stalked the fisherman until the defendant
was able to shoot him. 244 After all three were convicted, the defendant complained that his accomplices received disproportionately light
sentences.245 The girlfriend entered a plea in juvenile court to robbery, while the friend received life imprisonment for his participation
2
in the murder. 46
Given the evidence of premeditation, the court was unwilling to
236. Hamilton, 46 Cal. 3d at 158, 756 P.2d at 1368, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 340; Walker, 47
Cal. 3d at 650-51, 765 P.2d at 98, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
237. Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d at 274-75, 763 P.2d at 945-46, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 94-95; Caro, 46
Cal. 3d at 1068, 761 P.2d at 701, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 778; Karis, 46 Cal. 3d at 649, 758 P.2d
at 1211-12, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 681-82; Keenan, 46 Cal. 3d at 544, 758 P.2d at 1124, 250 Cal.
Rptr. at 593-94.
238. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII (emphasis added).
239. See, e.g., Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d at 274, 763 P.2d at 945, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 94; see also
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). For a discussion of proportionality and the eighth
amendment, see Bradley, Proportionalityin Capitaland Non-Capital Sentencing: An
Eighth Amendment Enigma, 23 IDAHO L. REV. 195 (1987); Liebman, Appellate Review
of Death Sentences: A Critique of ProportionalityReview, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1433,
1435-37 (1985) (analyzing the Pulley decision).
240. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17 (cruel or unusual punishment may not be
inflicted).
241. Karis, 46 Cal. 3d at 649, 758 P.2d at 1211-12, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 681-82; see also
People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 477-84, 668 P.2d 697, 719-724, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 412-17
(1983) (holding that life imprisonment was an excessive penalty for a 17-year-old juvenile who panicked and killed his victim).
242. 47 Cal. 3d 207, 763 P.2d 906, 253 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1988).
243. Id. at 274-75, 763 P.2d at 946, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
244. Id. at 226-27, 763 P.2d at 913-14, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 62-63.
245. Id. at 274, 763 P.2d at 946, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
246. Id. The girlfriend was 16 at the time of the incident, while the defendant was
20 and his friend was 18. Id. at 226, 763 P.2d at 913, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
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overturn the jury's death sentence. 2 47 Justice Broussard, in his concurring opinion, stated that he did "not believe it [was] unconstitutionally disproportionate to impose a more severe sentence upon [the]
defendant, the actual killer, than upon his accomplices."248 However,
Justice Broussard speculated that whether a defendant receives a
death sentence may depend more upon the resources available in the
county where he is prosecuted than upon his actual culpability.
Thus, the defendant in Adcox likely would have received a lesser
penalty in an urban area, where the prosecutors, constrained by the
sheer volume of cases, must be more selective in choosing those in
which to pursue capital punishment. 249
Justice Mosk, on the other hand, disagreed with both the majority
and Justice Broussard.250 He felt that the actions of the two accomplices were no less culpable than those of the defendant, because
they all intended to kill the fisherman. 25 ' Thus, he would have declared the defendant's death sentence unconstitutionally disproportionate and remanded the case with instructions to impose a term of
52
life imprisonment.
Excepting Adcox, the court was unwilling to give more than cursory treatment to the defendants' proportionality arguments, which
usually were addressed in the final paragraph of each opinion. However, the Adcox decision suggests that if the facts show clear intracase or intercase disproportionality, the court may be willing to reexamine the jury's findings.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The California Supreme Court reversed eight of the twenty-six
death sentences it considered during the latter half of 1988.
Although the number of reversals appears significant, it probably
247. Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d at 275, 763 P.2d at 946, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
248. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring).
249. Id. at 275-76, 763 P.2d at 946-47, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 95-96 (Broussard, J., concurring). The defendant was tried and convicted in the Superior Court of Tuolumne
County, which had a population of approximately 36,555 at the time of the killing. Id
at 233, 763 P.2d at 917, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 66. See generally Hubbard, "ReasonableLevels
of Arbitrariness"in Death Sentencing Patterns: A Tragic Perspectiveon CapitalPunishment, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1113 (1985) (arguing that the death penalty is applied
in an arbitrary, disproportionate manner).
250. Adcox, 47 Cal. 3d at 276, 763 P.2d at 947, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 96 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
251. Id. at 277, 763 P.2d at 947, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 96 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
252. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
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does not suggest a major change in the court's conservative view of
capital punishment. Each of the reversals involved well-established
principles of law clearly mandating a finding of reversible error.
The court's affirmance of the remaining eighteen death sentences
raises some interesting and practical issues. Although the court
treats each capital case as though a person's life truly hangs in the
balance, one wonders if the public recognizes the actual impact of the
court's decisions. For the past twenty-two years, no executions have
occurred in California,25 3 even though the state's death rows are
overflowing with inmates whose executions have been placed on
hold.254 This suggests that, in California, a contemporary death sentence is the equivalent of a life sentence. In fact, at the present rate,
death row inmates are likely to die of natural causes before the State
receives permission to execute. In sharp contrast, the state of Louisiana has been labelled "Death Mill, USA" because of its exceptionally
high "kill ratio" of death row prisoners; 25 5 but at least one expert has
hypothesized that Louisiana's commitment to emptying its death
rows has quelled the number of death penalty judgments in its trial
256

courts.

California taxpayers also continue to protest spending millions of
dollars to house the growing number of death row inmates.257 Not
only must the State dedicate substantial resources to obtaining death
penalty judgments, 258 but it also must expand and improve the facilities to house those presently condemned to die. In fact, eight years
ago, when California's death row was sparsely populated, the State
promised to upgrade the conditions on San Quentin's death row. 259
Now that the population has multiplied, the State, citing the substan260
tial increase in cost, is trying to renege.
As long as death row populations keep growing, and the execution
253. Cox, 8 Years Later, Calif Wants Out of Prison Pact, Nat'l Law J., Feb. 6, 1989,
at 3, col. 1. The last person to be executed in California died in the gas chamber on
April 12, 1967. Witt, The 'HauntingEffect'of the Death Penalty, L.A. Daily J., March

30, 1988, at 7, col. 6.
254. Cox, supra note 253, at 16.
255. Kaplan, Death Mill, USA, Nat'l Law J., May 8, 1989, at 38, col. 1. More than

30% of the death row population has been executed. Id. This efficiency ratio dwarfs
those of Texas and Florida-the two states most often associated with capital punishment. Id.

256. Kaplan, Are La. Juries Now Chicken?, Nat'l Law J., May 8, 1989, at 39, col. 1.
"Now that it's clear that a death sentence actually means death, jurors have lost their
nerve." Id. (quoting Rebecca Hudsmith of the Death Penalty Resource Center at

Loyola University School of Law in New Orleans).
257. Cox, supra note 253, at 16.

258. Magagnini, Death-Penalty Trials Burden Sierra County, L.A. Daily J., March
30, 1988, at 7, col. 1. In fact, Sierra County alone spends $1.2 million annually to prosecute homicide cases. Id.
259. Cox, supra note 253, at 16.
260. Id.
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hiatus continues, such problems can only grow worse. Conservative
treatment of capital cases exacerbates this problem and begs the
question: "0 death, where is thy sting?"261 However, perhaps the
present court hopes that upholding death sentences as if "there is no
tomorrow" means that eventually there won't be a tomorrow for the
many inmates on death row.
JOHN A. MAYERS
SUSAN SIMMONS SEEMILLER
261. 1 Cor. 15:55.
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APPENDIX

The following six charts visually depict the number and types of
issues that arose in the cases of this survey. The purpose of these diagrams is to equip the reader with a useful reference guide and to
provide a simple and efficient means of issue comparison between all
of the twenty-six cases at the same time.
Each of the charts is titled according to the type of issues it displays. Titles can be found in the top left-hand corner of each chart.
Chart topics include: counsel issues, evidentiary issues, instructional
issues, jury issues, prosecutorial issues and a final table of miscellaneous issues entitled "other issues."
The top row of each chart briefly describes the type of issue discussed by the supreme court. The column of names on the left-hand
side is an abbreviation of each case name. The column of numbers
directly to the right of these names contains the volume number of
the official reporter.in which each case may be found. The remaining
numbers within the charts represent the page numbers in the official
California reporter where the corresponding issues are discussed.
The following legend explains the signals which accompany the page
numbers:
No designation

No error.

h
i
r
m
c
d
+

Harmless error.
If error existed, it was harmless.
Reversible error.
Dissent clashes with majority.
Issue expanded by concurrence.
Discussed in dicta.
Issue discussed either at length or in
a variety of spots within the opinion.
Affirmed.
Reversed.
Reversed and remanded.

A
R
R&R
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V.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Under the CaliforniaEnvironmental Quality Act, an
environmental impact report must contain an analysis
of project alternatives and the effects of reasonably
forseeablefuture activities. Laurel Heights Improvement
Association of San Francisco, Inc. v. Regents of the
University of California.

In Laurel Heights Improvement Association of San Francisco,Inc.
v. Regents of the University of California,47 Cal. 3d 376, 764 P.2d
278, 253 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1988), the supreme court reviewed the adequacy of an environmental impact report (EIR) prepared pursuant to
the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE §§ 21000-21176 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989). The EIR was challenged by the Laurel Heights Improvement Association of San Francisco, Inc. (Association). The court unanimously found that the EIR
was inadequate because it failed to sufficiently analyze the environmental effects of reasonably forseeable future activities and discuss
possible alternatives to the proposed project.
The cause of action arose as a result of the University of California
Regents' purchase of a Laurel Heights building and the subsequent
decision to relocate the University of California, San Francisco
(UCSF) School of Pharmacy's biomedical research units to the building. Pursuant to the requirements of CEQA, UCSF prepared an EIR
detailing the proposed move and its possible effects on the environment. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989); see
generally 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Property

§§ 58-60, 62 (9th ed. 1987); 61A AM. JUR. 2D Pollution Control § 47
(1981 & Supp. 1989); 50 CAL. JUR. 3D Pollution & Conservation Laws
§§ 367-396 (1979 & Supp. 1989); Hildreth, Environmental Impact Reports Under the California Environmental Quality Act: The New
Legal Framework, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805 (1977); Comment,
California'sEnvironmental Quality Act-A Significant Effect or Paper Pollution?,5 PAC. L.J. 26 (1974); Comment, EnvironmentalDecision Making Under CEQA: A Quest for Uniformity, 24 UCLA L.
REV. 838 (1977). The EIR revealed several possible environmental effects, including the research units' use of "possibly toxic chemicals,
possible carcinogens, and radioactive substances." Laurel Heights, 47
Cal. 3d at 389, 764 P.2d at 280-81, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 428-29.
The resultant controversy surrounded the possible impact of these
effects on the nearby Laurel Heights, a mixed residential and commercial neighborhood. After a public review and comment on the
EIR, UCSF proposed ways to mitigate the possible environmental impact of the proposed move. The Regents then certified the EIR.
The Association petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate
1210
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to set aside the certification. The superior court upheld the certification as being consistent with CEQA. The court of appeal reversed,
finding that the EIR insufficiently discussed possible cumulative effects and alternatives regarding the proposed move.
The supreme court began its discussion by describing EIRs in general and their use as a part of CEQA. The court noted that CEQA is
intended by the legislature to protect the environment from damage
by regulating public agency actions. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 21000(g) (West 1986 & Supp. 1989). EIRs are required prior to public agency projects which "may have a significant effect on the environment." See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21100, 21065, 21068 (West
1986 & Supp. 1989); 50 CAL. JUR. 3D Pollution & Conversation Laws
§§ 380-384 (1979 & Supp. 1989). EIRs thereby serve as public notice
of potential environmental impacts, of possible impacts which may be
mitigated, and of alternatives to the project in question. CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE § 21061 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989). In addressing the standard of review when assessing the adequacy of EIRs, the court found
the appropriate test to be the "substantial evidence" standard. This
test does not require the court to weigh the evidence on either side,
but requires the court only to find substantial evidence in support of
the agency's decision. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15384(a)
(1988).
The court additionally held that the EIR inadequatly analyzed the
probable future uses of the research facility and the resultant environmental impact. The court applied a two-part test for determining
when an EIR must include an analysis of future action: "(1) [if] it is a
reasonably forseeable consequence of the initial project; and (2) the
future expansion or action will be significant in that it will likely
change the scope or nature of the initial project or its environmental
effects." Laurel Heights, 47 Cal. 3d at 396, 764 P.2d at 285, 253 Cal.
Rptr. at 433. Because the future uses of the facility were reasonably
forseeable and would significantly change the environmental effects,
the court held that the EIR was inadequate in its discussion of anticipated future uses.
The adequacy of the EIR's discussion of alternatives was also found
to be faulty. The court observed that only one and one-half pages out
of the EIR's 250 total pages identified any alternatives. The court
emphasized that the public needed to be informed of the analytical
steps taken in arriving at the proposed project, as that is one of the
purposes of CEQA. Because the EIR failed to adequately discuss the
1211

possible future uses and alternatives, UCSF was required to provide a
new EIR.
The court next addressed the Regents' contention that substantial
evidence supported their conclusion that the probable environmental
effects identified in the present EIR would be mitigated. The evidence included two environmental studies performed at the existing
research unit's location, the absence of studies involving the harmful
effects of laboratory hood emissions, the absence of regulations on
laboratory emissions, and the commitment by the Regents to monitor
the air quality at the new research site. The court found that these
steps combined to provide the substantial evidence of mitigation.
Although the Association challenged the Regents' finding of mitigation, the court found that the Regents presented substantial evidence that the environmental effects resulting from the proposed
move would be mitigated. Nonetheless, the EIR was deemed inadequate; CEQA, however, was allowed to continue its existing activities
at the site until a new EIR was certified.
By requiring the Regents to make public their analysis regarding
future effects and alternatives, the court reaffirms the goal of CEQA:
to bring public agency decisions involving potentially environmentally dangerous projects into the open. The court's analysis of both
CEQA and the administrative guidelines involving CEQA should be
encouraging to the public and public agencies. Forcing greater disclosure will encourage more public participation in the decision-making
process of public agencies, thereby fostering greater concern for the
environment and hopefully creating environmentally efficient
decisions.
MICHAEL J. GAINER

VI.

GOVERNMENT
Although police officers must be informed that
statements they make regardingany internal
investigations cannot be used against them in criminal
proceedings, remedies grantedfor violation of this right
must be reasonable: Williams v. City of Los Angeles.

In Williams v. City of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. 3d 195, 763 P.2d 480, 252
Cal. Rptr. 817 (1988), the court considered what remedies a trial court
may order when a public officer's rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights (the Act) are violated. CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 3300-3311 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989). Although the court
found that Officer Williams' rights were violated, it held that the relief granted was not appropriate when it did not further the policies
of the Act. See 42 CAL. JUR. 3D Law Enforcement Officers § 33 (1978
1212
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& Supp. 1988); see generally 70 AM. JUR. 2D Sheriffs, Police,and Constables § 38 (1987).
Williams was a police officer for the City of Los Angeles. He and
his partner, Officer Lybarger, were questioned during an internal investigation regarding arrests they had made for bookmaking. Both
officers were informed that if they remained silent their silence
could be interpreted as insubordination and provide a basis for
termination.
However, neither officer was informed that their comments could
not be used against them in any criminal proceeding. Lybarger re-

fused to cooperate and was dismissed; the supreme court ordered his
reinstatement in Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 3d 822, 710
P.2d 329, 221 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1985). Williams cooperated with the investigation, and the testimony he gave led to his dismissal. The trial
court granted Williams' requests for reinstatement and for an injunction against the use of any of his earlier comments in further disciplinary actions.
A provision in the Act requires that if it appears that an officer
may be subject to criminal charges before or during interrogation,
then he must be apprised of his constitutional rights. CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 3303(g) (West 1980 & Supp. 1989). The court discussed its application of this provision in its Lybarger decision, where it stated
that the disclosure mandated by section 3303(g) must inform the officer that he may remain silent, but that his silence may be used as a
basis for termination. This result is permissible because there is no
constitutional or statutory protection for the refusal of an officer to
cooperate in an internal investigation. See CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 3303(e) (West 1980 & Supp. 1989); see generally Note, Application
of the Constitutional Privacy Right to Exclusions and Dismissals
from Public Employment, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1037; Note, The Privacy
Plight of Public Employees, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 189 (1984); Annotation, Assertion of Immunity as Groundfor Removing or Discharging
Public Officer or Employee, 44 A.L.R. 2D 789 (1955 & Supp. 1989).
The court in Lybarger also required that the department give a description of the immunity which would protect the officer's statements from being used against the officer in criminal proceedings.
The court contrasted Williams' situation with Lybarger's. The
court's holding in Lybarger was premised on the fact that Lybarger
might have chosen to cooperate with the investigation in an attempt
to exonerate himself had he been aware that his testimony was protected by limited immunity. Without the benefit of this information,
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Lybarger remained silent and was dismissed. Although Williams was
not told of this limited immunity, he nonetheless chose to cooperate.
The court reasoned that, unlike Lybarger, Williams could not possibly have been affected by the disclosure. Limited immunity serves
as an incentive to cooperate, not to remain silent. Since Williams
chose to cooperate without the knowledge that his testimony was
protected, the required disclosure could have only served as an additional reason to cooperate with the investigation. Therefore, the
court concluded that although his rights were violated by the incomplete disclosure, the violation had no impact on Williams' cooperation
and subsequent termination.
The court then addressed the relief granted by the superior court.
The trial court has discretion in handling claims under the Act. CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 3309.5(b) (West 1980 & Supp. 1989). Since the Act
gives broad discretion to the courts in determining what remedies are
appropriate, the court refused to hold that excluding an officer's testimony in further disciplinary proceedings is an improper remedy in
any situation.
However, the court reasoned that the relief granted Williams was
inappropriate because neither remedy substantively affected the parties. See Barber v. State Personnel Board., 18 Cal. 3d 395, 556 P.2d
306, 134 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1976). The trial court ordered that Williams
be reinstated and that his previous testimony be excluded in subsequent proceedings by the department. Excluding Williams' statements would simply require the department to make the proper
disclosure to Williams, at which point he could remain silent, or give
the same testimony. The court asserted that regardless of which option he chose, Williams would be terminated.
The court concluded that ordering Williams' reinstatement was
also inappropriate. The ultimate resolution still would be Williams'
dismissal. Nor would his reinstatement serve to deter the department from conducting interrogations without the proper disclosure.
The court saw no deterrent value in reinstating an officer who chose
to cooperate without knowing that his statements had become
privileged.
In analyzing the improper disclosure and its impact on Williams,
the court's approach was similar to the harmless error rule it employs in criminal trials. Although error is found, reversal is not necessary unless the error was sufficiently harmful. In Williams, the
flawed disclosure did not cause the officer to testify; therefore, the
error was harmless and could not justify the remedies of exclusion of
testimony and reinstatement.
MARK G. KISICKI
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VII.

LABOR LAW
A. Section 351 of the Labor Code prohibitsany dual level
minimum wage system that requires a lower wage for
employees who regularly receive tips: Henning v.
Industrial Welfare Commission.

In Henning v. Industrial Welfare Commission, 46 Cal. 3d 1262, 762
P.2d 442, 252 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1988), the court found that section 351 of
the Labor Code barred an Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) order calling for a lower minimum wage for those employees who ordinarily receive tips of $60 or more per month. See CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 351 (West Supp. 1989). While the court noted that the IWC is not
limited to fixing only a single level minimum wage scale, it concluded
that the language and legislative history of section 351 prohibits a tipbased separate wage system.
The order, IWC Order No. MW-88, was adopted by the IWC in December 1987 and became effective in July 1988. It called for a ninety
cent increase in the minimum wage for non-tip receiving employees,
and a fifteen cent increase in the minimum wage for employees collecting more than $60 per month in tips. The dual classification represented a reversal of an earlier position advocated by the IWC in a
1980 California Supreme Court decision. See Industrial Welfare
Commission v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 690, 729-31, 613 P.2d 579,
602-03, 166 Cal. Rptr. 331, 353-55 (1980) (minimum wage scales are
not to be voided for "fail[ure] .

.

. to provide [for] a differentiated

minimum wage for tipped and nontipped employees").
The court began its analysis with a historical discussion of the role
and authority of the IWC. The court confirmed that this "quasi-legislative" body of five members has the power to regulate minimum
wages, hours of employment, and working conditions for all employees in California. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 70-74, 1173 (West Supp.
1989); 41 CAL. JUR. 3D Labor § 36 (1978 & Supp. 1988); see generally
48A AM. JUR. 2D Labor & Labor Relations § 2555 (1979). Historically,
the IWC had construed section 315 as prohibitive of a separate, lower
minimum wage for tipped employees. See Uelmen, Will 'JudicialRestraint' Court Defer on Minimum Wage?, L.A. Times, Sept. 7, 1988,
at 7, col. 2. However, in adopting Order MW-88, the IWC specifically
rejected this previous construction. While justification for this reversal was not clearly specified in the court's opinion, the court noted
that in 1976 and 1979 the hotel and restaurant industry persuaded the
IWC to review the current minimum wage system, and consider a
1215

lower scale for those employees receiving tips. The California Restaurant Association and the California Hotel and Motel Association
successfully petitioned to intervene in the court of appeal action.
The court stated that the standard of judicial review of IWC decisions is confined to an inquiry of whether the IWC's actions were "arbitrary[,] ...entirely lacking in evidentiary support[,] or... violat[ive
of] .. .procedure required by law." Henning, 46 Cal. 3d at 1269, 762
P.2d at 446, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 282. The court further concluded that
this deferential standard was inappropriate only when an administrative agency decision reverses a previous statutory interpretation by
the agency, and the previous interpretation was accepted in a past judicial decision. See Crounse Corp. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 781 F.2d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 1983).
Section 351 states in part:
No employer or agent shall collect, take or receive any gratuity or a part
thereof, paid, given to or left for an employee by a patron, or deduct any
amount from wages due an employee.... Every such gratuity is hereby declared to be the sole property of the employee.. .to whom it was paid, given,
or left for [sic].

CAL. LAB. CODE § 351 (West Supp. 1989). The court noted that the
current version of this statute evolved through a long history of attempted and successful amendments, beginning in 1917. This evolution was a result of pressure on the legislature to conclusively affirm
that tips are the exclusive property of employees.
The court acknowledged that the specific language of section 351
does not "expressly bar" this dual wage scale, but after examining
the legislative history of section 351, the court concluded that the ultimate intent of this law was to ban any form of "tip credit" that allows an employer to subtract tip amounts from total wages. See 2 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Agency and Employment
§ 337 (9th ed. 1987); 41 CAL. JUR. 3D Labor §§ 30, 35 (1978 & Supp.
1988); see generally 48A AM. JUR. Labor & Labor Relations § 2566
(1979). In rejecting Order MW-88 as violative of section 351, the
court held that "in establishing the [dual level] system under review,,
the Commission has attempted to do the very thing the Legislature
has prohibited." Henning,46 Cal. 3d at 1279, 762 P.2d at 452, 252 Cal.
Rptr. at 288.
In reaching its conclusion in this case, the court painstakingly recited an exhaustive history to support its conclusion that it was the
legislature's intent to prevent such a two-tiered system. Nevertheless, it is clear that the powerful hotel and restaurant lobby will continue to push for a lower minimum wage for those employees
receiving tips; however, to be effective, that pressure must be applied
not on the IWC but on the legislature itself. Section 351 will continue to frustrate this attempted intrusion into the pockets of tipped
1216

[Vol. 16: 1143, 1989]

California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

employees. See generally Bercussion, Minimum Wage Objectives
and Standards,6 COMP. LAB. L. 67 (1984).
MARGARET LISA WILSON
B.

Unions have a statutory, but limited, right of access to
agriculturallabor camps to exchange information: Sam
Andrews' Sons v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board.

In Sam Andrews' Sons v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board, 47
Cal. 3d 157, 763 P.2d 881, 253 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1988), the court held that
the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB) does not have express statutory authority to award attorney's fees and costs; that unions have a statutory right of access to agricultural labor camps for
organizational purposes, although this right is not unrestricted as the
employer has the right to make reasonable restrictions on the time,
place, and manner of access; and that the ALRB can require the employer to allow one hour union meetings, on company time, to be
paid for by the employer.
Sam Andrews' Sons (the grower) is an agricultural employer as defined under the Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975, and therefore is subject to the provisions of the Act. CAL. LABOR CODE
§ 1140.4(c) (West Supp. 1989); see generally 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Agency & Employment §§ 481-496 (9th ed. 1987); 41
CAL. JUR. 3D Labor §§ 214-225 (1978). The action arose out of allegations by the United Farm Workers of America (UFW) regarding the
grower's unfair labor practices. See generally 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Agency & Employment § 485 (9th ed. 1987); 48A
AM. JUR. 2D Labor & Labor Relations §§ 1735-1742 (1979); 41 CAL.
JUR. 3D Labor §§ 219-223 (1978). Specifically, the UFW alleged, and
the administrative law judge found, that the grower had repeatedly
denied UFW representatives access to his fields and labor camps.
The ALRB accepted the findings of the administrative law judge
and issued a cease and desist order barring the grower from future
denials of access, and added the possibility of contempt sanctions for
future violations. In addition, the ALRB ordered the grower to pay
employees who attend one-hour meetings scheduled during working
hours for talks with the UFW. Further, the ALRB required the
grower to pay the UFW's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing the action.
The court of appeal vacated the order requiring access, stating that
unlimited access was overbroad. The court of appeal instructed the
1217

ALRB to change the order to create reasonable access instead of unlimited access. The court of appeal also held that the required payment of UFW's attorney's fees and costs by the grower was invalid.
Finally, the court of appeal disallowed the portion of the order requiring the grower to pay for workers to attend meetings, labeling it
as punitive because there was a limit on the number of meetings
which could be held.
The California Supreme Court began by addressing the ALRB's
award of attorney's fees and costs to the UFW. The court held that
the award was statutorily contradicted because section 1021 of the
Civil Procedure Code states that "[e]xcept as attorney's fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys ... is left to the agreement ... of the parties .... .
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1021 (West Supp. 1989). Since the Act does

not expressly provide for the payment of costs, the ALRB does not
have the authority to award attorney's fees and costs.
The court next addressed the unfair labor practice issues.
Although agreeing with the appellate court's affirmation, the court
disapproved of its application of NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351
U.S. 105 (1956). Babcock & Wilcox provided that "when the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by
non-employees to communicate with them through the usual channels, the right to exclude from property has been required to yield to
the extent needed to permit communication of information on the
right to organize." Id. at 112; see generally 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Agency & Employment § 496 (9th ed. 1987); 41
CAL. JUR. 3D Labor § 217 (1978); Comment, Access to Farms as Mandated by the United States Constitution and by Action of the California Board of Agricultural Labor Relations, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 165
(1976). The court found that the Babcock & Wilcox rule, which applied to the workplace, was not fully applicable to labor camp access,
but held:
[t]hat the right of agricultural employees and union representatives to exchange information at an agricultural labor camp is guaranteed under Labor
Code Section 1152 [which provides the right to effectively participate in labor
unions] and does not depend upon the proof in each case of the inadequacy of
alternative means of communication.

Sam Andrews' Sons, 47 Cal. 3d at 175, 763 P.2d at 893, 253 Cal. Rptr.
at 42. Since the grower repeatedly denied access of the UFW to the
workers, the court upheld the unfair labor practice finding. However, the court did note that the "inadequacy of alternative means"
standard would apply to questions of reasonable access regarding a
"time, place and manner regulation," but that the grower would have
the burden of showing alternative means and their relation to "reasonableness." Id. at 175-76, 763 P.2d at 893, 253 Cal. Rptr at 42.
1218
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The reasonableness standard arose in the court's finding that the
ALRB's order requiring the grower to allow unlimited and unrestricted access was overbroad. After noting that the order was "explicitly unrestricted," "in stark contrast to the field access order
[calling for] . . . access at reasonable times," and allowed contempt
sanctions for any violations, the court held that the ALRB intended
the order to restrict the grower's ability to set any reasonable time,
place or manner restrictions. Id. at 176-77, 763 P.2d at 894, 253 Cal.
Rptr. at 43. The court held that the order was overbroad and affirmed the court of appeal's decision requiring the ALRB to reword
the order requiring the grower to allow reasonable, but not unlimited, access.
In its final discussion, the court reversed the court of appeal by
holding that the one hour of field access was not punitive in nature,
because the order provided for only one hour on an agreed upon day
and therefore was not overbroad. The order was justified based on
the grower's repeated denial of field access.
By prohibiting the ALRB from awarding attorney's fees and costs,
as well as allowing the growers to set the reasonable restrictions on
access, the court gives little assistance to the already downtrodden
farm worker who is trying to deal with an unresponsive and abusive
employer. Although the court notes that the ALRB may order the
grower to promulgate reasonable rules of access, without the ALRB
being able to set reasonable standards, the door of continued abuse
swings wide open.
The only consolation for workers at Sam Andrews' Sons is, contrary to the court's opinion, that the order allowing company-paid
one-hour meeting time appears to allow such meetings on a daily basis. Therefore, workers will be paid for a one-hour break everyday.
MICHAEL

VIII.

J.

GAINER

PROPERTY LAW
An inverse condemnation suit for flood damages caused
by the failure of a flood control levee cannot lie unless
the public entity responsiblefor the levee acted
unreasonably: Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control
District.

In Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control District,47 Cal. 3d 550,
764 P.2d 1070, 253 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1988), the court addressed the issue
1219

of whether inverse condemnation damages can be recovered from a
public entity when the failure of the public improvement causing the
damage was not a result of any "unreasonable conduct" on the part
of the operating public entity. While acknowledging that the flood
levee in this case failed to function up to its expected capacity, the
court held that proof of unreasonable conduct "in the design, construction, or maintenance" of the levee was required for recovery.
The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that absolute liability
was the appropriate standard in flood damage cases.
The flooding at issue occurred in February 1980, after strong
storms caused a flood control levee near the city of San Jacinto to
break apart. Evidence at trial revealed that the levee collapse was
the result of heavy water pressure that completely undermined the
levee's foundation. The trial court noted that the levee was designed
to accommodate over three times the amount of water flow that actually caused the levee's failure. Numerous downstream property owners suffered damage due to the flooding.
The trial court found in favor of the defendants. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment, concluding that liability could not lie
since the plaintiffs' damages were not proximately caused by the
levee, and that the defendant's participation in the design and the
construction of the levee was insignificant. The supreme court
granted review to examine the court of appeal's dual holding.
Inverse condemnation is defined as "[a] cause of action against a
government agency to recover the value of property taken by the
agency, though no formal exercise of... eminent domain had been
completed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 740 (5th ed. 1979). The California Constitution specifically provides for this cause of action. See
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 ("Private property may be taken or damaged
for public use only when just compensation... has first been paid to
... the owner."). See also 29 CAL. JUR. 3D Eminent Domain §§ 302340 (1986 & Supp. 1988); see generally Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1970); Comment, Inverse Condemnation
and the Alchemist's Lesson: You Can't Turn Regulations into Gold,
21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 171 (1981).
The court first discussed the proximate cause requirement necessary for inverse condemnation recovery. See Albers v. County of Los
Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 263-64, 398 P.2d 129, 137, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89, 97
(1965) (actual physical injury to real property proximately caused by
the improvement is compensable). The court noted that this requirement is satisfied "where the public improvement constitutes a substantialconcurring cause of the [property damage]." Belair, 47 Cal.
3d at 559-60, 764 P.2d at 1075, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 698 (emphasis in origi1220
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nal). See also Van Alstyne, Inverse Condemnation: Unintended
Physical Damage, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 436 (1969). The court thus
rejected the court of appeal's holding, and concluded that the levee's
failure to function as expected fulfilled the proximate cause requirement. The court stressed the existence of good faith reliance and expenditures on the part of the plaintiffs who believed that the levee
could accommodate the increase in water due to a heavy storm.
However, the court rejected the plaintiffs' allegation that the existence of proximate cause alone is sufficient for recovery. The court
balanced the important public policy of encouraging construction of
public flood control improvements, with the huge potential for flood
damage should a public improvement fail, and held that an additional
element of unreasonable conduct was necessary for inverse condemnation recovery. The court concluded that inverse condemnation liability applies "where the public agency's design, construction or
maintenance of a flood control is shown to have posed an unreasonable risk of harm.., and such unreasonable [conduct] ... constitutes a
substantial cause of the [plaintiffs'] damages." Belair, 47 Cal. 3d at
565, 764 P.2d at 1079, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 702. The court distinguished
the cases cited by the plaintiffs by noting that absolute liability is appropriate when the flooding was caused by a public entity that,
through its improvement, failed to properly divert water from its naturally flowing path. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Sausalito, 141 Cal. App.
3d 917, 190 Cal. Rptr. 595 (1983) (absolute liability imposed when diverted water from a collapsed storm drainage scheme caused property damage); Imperial Cattle Co. v. Imperial IrrigationDistrict,167
Cal. App. 3d 263, 213 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1985) (absolute liability imposed
when an irrigation drainage system flooded due to unexpectedly
heavy rainfall).
Regarding the reasonableness of behavior of the public entities, the
court endorsed a case-by-case factual analysis. The majority opinion
did not specifically refer to examples of unreasonable conduct, but
the court noted that the failure of the levee in this case to function
up to its expected capacity did not, in itself, establish unreasonable
conduct on the part of the defendants.
Finally, the court disregarded the court of appeal's holding that
proximate cause did not exist, and affirmed the judgment in favor of
the defendants based on the lack of an "unreasonable act or omission." Belair, 47 Cal. 3d at 568, 764 P.2d at 1081, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
The court noted that this resolution precluded an examination of
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whether the defendants were "a 'substantial participant' in the levee
project." Id. at 568 n.10, 764 P.2d at 1081 n.10, 253 Cal. Rptr. 704 n.10.
The majority clearly recognized that the imposition of liability
would only serve to deter or delay the future construction of California's much-needed public improvements. The added requirement of
unreasonable conduct will serve to appropriately distribute the cost
of these improvements between the public as beneficiaries, and the
public entities as they are proved negligent. See generally Bacich v.
Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 350, 144 P.2d 818, 823 (1943) (a purpose of inverse condemnation is "to distribute throughout the community the loss inflicted upon the individual by the making of a
public improvement"); Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 3
(1966). However, since the levee's failure was due to water flow at
less than a third of the levee's expected capacity, the court's assumption that this did not give rise to an issue of unreasonable conduct
must have truly left a bitter taste in the plaintiffs' wallets.
MARGARET LISA WILSON

Ix. TAx LAW
County auditors should consider executory contracts as
"indebtedness"when distributingtax increment
revenues to community redevelopment agencies: Marek
v. Napa Community Redevelopment Agency.
In Marek v. Napa Community Redevelopment Agency, 46 Cal. 3d
1070, 761 P.2d 701, 251 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1988), the court held that executory contracts qualify as "indebtedness" for the purpose of determining how tax increment revenues are allocated to redevelopment
agencies by county auditors. Although "indebtedness" is not defined
in the relevant statutes, the court determined that redevelopment
policies mandate a liberal interpretation of the term. See generally 4
B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Property § 55 (9th

ed. 1987)(discussing the genesis and evolution of community redemption law); 51 CAL. JUR. 3D Public Housing §§ 37-48 (1979 & Supp.
1988); see also 8 D. HAGMAN & R. VOLPERT, CALIFORNIA REAL EsTATE LAW & PRACTICE ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROL § 250.02
(1973 & Supp. 1988); Comment, Tax Increment Financingfor Redevelopment in Missouri: Beauty and the Beast, 54 UMKC L. REV. 77,
78 (1985) (history of California Community Redevelopment Law).
This case arose when the Napa County Auditor, James H. Marek,
refused to disburse funds to the Napa Community Redevelopment
Agency (Agency). The Agency complied with section 33675 of the
Health & Safety Code by filing an "annual statement of indebted1222
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ness" in order to receive funds under the tax increment financing
scheme. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 33670, 33675 (West 1973 &
Supp. 1989). Marek refused to consider as indebtedness the Agency's
inclusion of estimated future expenditures under a disposition and
development agreement.
The court first addressed the fact that because the term "indebtedness" was not defined in the pertinent statutes, legislative intent
must be ascertained from the circumstances surrounding its passage.
See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 145 (1974 & Supp. 1988); 58 CAL. JUR.
3D Statutes § 83 (1980). The intent of the Community Redevelopment Law was to revitalize depressed areas by providing a source of
income whereby local agencies could finance urban renewal. See
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33334.6(a) (West Supp. 1989); Jacobs
& Levine, Redevelopment: Making Misused and Disused Land Available and Usable, 8 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 250-53 (1957). Tax increment
financing provides an agency with necessary funds. See Comment,
Tax Increment Financing: MunicipalitiesAvoiding Voter Accountability, 1987 DET. C.L. REV. 89, 92 (1987). Section 33670(b) provides
that an agency qualifies for these funds to the full extent of its "indebtedness." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33670(b) (West 1973 &
Supp. 1989). Because tax increment financing is the chief source of
revenue for redevelopment agencies, "indebtedness" must be construed to promote the goals of the redevelopment scheme. This
scheme, the court maintained, would be frustrated unless the Agency
had the fiscal integrity necessary to enter into contracts which required future performance.
The court considered specific language of article XVI, section 16 of
the California Constitution, and various sections of the Community
Redevelopment Law as compelling a broad interpretation of "indebtedness." See CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 16; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 33603, 33670 (West 1973 & Supp. 1989). These provisions refer to a "special fund" where tax increment revenues are placed, and
which is controlled by the particular redevelopment agency. The
court believed that the legislature intended this "special fund" to be
utilized by the agency to ensure its ability to meet future obligations.
Other provisions of the Community Redevelopment Law also indicated the legislature's desire to allow redevlopment agencies to exercise discretion over the use of the incremental funds. Sections 33433
and 33447 allow agencies to use incremental funds to purchase and
improve property, among other things. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 33433, 33447 (West 1973 & Supp. 1989). The court argued
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that these sections indicated the legislature intended agencies to
qualify for incremental funds based upon future actions.
The court also noted that the legislature had defined "indebtedness" (in an unrelated context) to include "[a] contractual obligation
which, if breached, could subject the agency to damages or other liabilities." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33801(c) (West Supp. 1989).
Using this definition as a guide, the court demonstrated that the disposition and development agreement between the Agency and developer was such an obligation. For example, the court noted that it
provided the developer various legal remedies if breached by the
Agency, including rescission and the right of specific performance.
Finally, the court reflected Marek's claims that including executory contracts as "indebtedness" undermined the auditor's role. The
court pointed to evidence which indicated that a broad interpretation
of "indebtedness" was standard among county auditors throughout
the state. Also, the court denied that the "annual statement of indebtedness" was required by the legislature as a means to protect the
availability of tax increment funds for other entities. Rather, the
court maintained that these tax entities were provided for through
other statutory measures.
In articulating a broad definition of "indebtedness," the court has
enhanced the ability of redevelopment agencies to engage in long
term commitments without first issuing interest bearing bonds. An
expansive definition is both fiscally sound and in accord with the purpose of redevelopment law. The narrow interpretation of "indebtedness" subscribed to by Marek in this case would have circumscribed
an agency's ability to collect the necessary funds for early acquisition
and development; it would also have increased an agency's reliance
upon debt financing, with an added cost to taxpayers for every redevelopment project.
MARK G. KISICKI

x.

TORTS

A.

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act preempts
bad faith actions brought under section 790.03(h) of the
Insurance Code: Commercial Life Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court.

In Commercial Life Insurance Co. v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d
473, 764 P.2d 1059, 253 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1988), the court considered
whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act's (ERISA)
comprehensive regulatory scheme left room for states to provide additional statutory remedies for protected employees. See 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. 1987). The court recognized that the "sav-
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ings clause" in the ERISA allows states to impose substantive requirements on insurance companies. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)
(1982 & Supp. 1987). However, the court held that section 790.03(h)
of the Insurance Code is preempted regardless of whether it "regulates" the insurance industry because section 790.03(h) provides remedies which conflict with the exclusive remedies articulated in the
ERISA. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 (West 1972 & Supp. 1989). See generally 60A AM. JUR. 2D Pensions and Retirement Funds §§ 115-118,
123-124 (1988); 49 CAL. JUR. 3D Pensions and Retirement Systems § 3
(1979 & Supp. 1988); Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of
State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 427
(1987); Comment, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act and
Preemption of State FairEmployment Laws, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 583
(1986); Annotation, Construction and Application of Preemption Exemption, Under Employee Retirement Income Security Act (29 USCS
§§ 1001 Et Seq.), for State Laws Regulating Insurance, Banking, or
Securities (29 USCS § 1144(b)(2)), 87 A.L.R. FED. 797 (1988).
Joseph Juliano, an employee covered by an employer-provided insurance plan, was denied benefits by the insurer, Commercial Life
Insurance Company and Automatic Data Processing (Commercial).
Juliano filed suit against Commercial to compel payments. Although
Juliano agreed that the policy was regulated by the ERISA, his complaint did not include a request for any ERISA remedy; rather, he
complained of a violation of section 790.03(h) of the Insurance Code.
The trial court refused to grant Commercial's motion for summary
judgment. The appellate court affirmed.
The ERISA is a legislative scheme which regulates employee insurance plans. See 60A AM. JUR. 2D Pensions and Retirement Funds § 1
(1988); Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A
Study in Effective Federalism, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 427, 432 (1987).
The court indicated that the remedies and enforcement provisions
contained within the ERISA were both extensive and detailed. The
court quoted the ERISA's "broad" statement of preemption, noting,
however, that state laws which "regulate insurance" are not preempted. See 60A AM. JUR. 2D Pensions and Retirement Funds § 115
(1988).
A state law is considered to regulate insurance when the law: 1)
furthers the policy of spreading risks; 2) is a basic part of the insurance policy; and 3) is aimed at the insurance industry. See Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 743 (1985);
Union Labor Life Ins. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982); Gregory,
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The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective
Federalism, U. PiTT. L. REV. 427, 467-70 (1987). Arguably, section
790.03(h) of the Insurance Code meets the requirements of this test,
and could therefore be considered a law regulating insurance and beyond the scope of ERISA preemption. But see Roberson v. Equitable
Life Assurance Society of the United States, 661 F. Supp. 416 (C.D.
Cal. 1987) (interpreting California law, holding section 790.03(h) did
not qualify under the Metropolitan Life test).
However, the California Supreme Court did not address the issue
of whether section 790.03(h) regulated insurance. Instead, it argued
that regardless of whether section 790.03 fell within the "savings
clause," it was preempted by the remedies provided in the ERISA,
because Congress intended these remedies to be exclusive. See Pilot
Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987). Because the ERISA remedies are exclusive, state granted rights which conflict are
necessarily preempted. See Kanne v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 859 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1987) (interpreting California law,
holding that section 790.03(h) was preempted by the ERISA remedies). The court stated that allowing ERISA plaintiffs a remedy
under section 790.03(h) would undermine an important policy of the
act, namely, to provide that all protected employees receive similar
treatment.
In determining that the ERISA preempted section 790.03(h), the
court rendered a decision which affects important rights in a limited
manner. The decision is meaningful because preemption affects the
relationship between the federal and state governments. The court
handled the preemption issue with proper deference to a significant
federal scheme, recognizing the important federal policy in providing
uniform remedies under the ERISA. Yet, as the court noted in conclusion, this holding is limited by its earlier determination in MoradiShalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 116, 758 P.2d 58 (1988). See Cal. Practicum, The Overruling Of
Royal Globe: A "Royal Bonanza" For Insurance Companies, But
What Happens Now? 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 763 (1989). In MoradiShalal the court ruled that section 790.03(h) did not provide a private
cause of action. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 304, 250 Cal. Rptr. at
126, 758 P.2d at 68. The court indicated that the case at bar would
only affect those cases which were filed prior to Moradi-Shalal.
Thus, while the Commercial Life Insurance Co. decision affects important rights, Moradi-Shalalsignificantly minimizes its impact.
MARK G. KISICKI
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B.

Tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is not a viable cause of action in a wrongful
terminationsuit. Remedies for bad faith dischargeare
founded in contract, not tort, law: Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The long-awaited' supreme court decision on the scope and viability of wrongful discharge claims was rendered by a narrowly-divided
court in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. 2 Most significantly, the court
refused to extend a cause of action based on tortious breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the employment
contract situation. 3 The court determined that a breach of an implied
or oral contract of employment is the most viable and appropriate
cause of action for bad faith discharge. Citing overriding policy concerns, the court restricted plaintiff's remedies to those which are
available under contract, rather than tort: "The expansion of tort
remedies in the employment context has potentially enormous consequences for the stability of the business community." 4 Thus, recovery is limited to lost income and related economic loss stemming
5
from the contract claim.
Additionally, the court reaffirmed its 1980 decision in Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Co.,6 which allows employees terminated in violation of public policy to recover damage awards. However, the court
stressed that the violation must relate to a policy which involves a
clear public benefit and not one which merely relates to an em1. The California Supreme Court first heard arguments in June 1986, during the
tenure of former Chief Justice Rose Bird. Following a reconstitution of the court, reargument was heard in April 1987. The decision, was rendered in December 1988, 20
months after reargument. See L.A. Times, Dec. 30, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 2.

2. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988). Chief Justice Lucas rendered the opinion for the majority, joined by Justices Panelli, Arguelles, and Eagleson.
All are appointees of California Governor George Deukmejian. Justices Broussard and
Kaufman each authored separate concurring and dissenting opinions. Justice Mosk
dissented in a separate opinion.

3. For the last major enunciation of this cause of action by the Bird court, see
Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158,
206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984) (cause of action for breach of implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing as it relates to standard commercial contract).

4. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 699, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
5. See generally L.A. Times, Jan. 8, 1989, § 5, at 3, col. 1.

6. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
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ployer's private interest. 7
II.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

When hired in 1976 by Interactive Data Corporation (IDC), Daniel
D. Foley was required to sign an employment agreement precluding
his disclosure of confidential or proprietary information for a oneyear period following his termination. Notably, nothing in the agreement limited the bases upon which Foley could be discharged. However, IDC did maintain "Termination Guidelines" which included a
mandatory seven-step pre-termination procedure.
Throughout his nearly seven years of employment with IDC, Foley
received excellent performance appraisals, together with regular
raises and bonuses. By the time of his discharge in March 1983, he
was the branch manager of the firm's Los Angeles office, receiving
an annual salary in excess of $56,000. Two days prior to his discharge, Foley was given a merit bonus of $6,762.
Foley indicated that IDC orally assured him that his employment
with IDC was secure providing his performance continued to be satisfactory. He asserted that his discharge was prompted when he informed management personnel in early 1983 that his new immediate
supervisor was under an FBI investigation for embezzlement. Thereafter, Foley was offered the opportunity to transfer to Massachusetts
or be demoted. Two weeks later, he was offered a second set of options-resign or be fired.
Foley's complaint alleged three causes of action: (1) tortious discharge in violation of public policy; (2) breach of oral employment
contract; and (3) tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. The trial court sustained IDC's demurrer on all
three causes of action. The court of appeal affirmed.
III.
A.

THE MAJORITY'S OPINION

Termination in Violation of Public Policy

The court initially addressed the alleged public policy violation.
Noting an employer has the right to discharge at-will employees with
or without good cause,8 the court emphasized that public policy concerns limit the employer's conduct. 9 The foundation for a public-policy claim rests in the "disparagement of a basic public policy,"
7. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 669, 765 P.2d at 379, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 217. See also L.A.
Times, Dec. 30, 1988, pt. 1, at 1, col 2.
8. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 2922 (West Supp. 1989) ("[an employment, having no
specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party").
9. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 665, 765 P.2d at 376, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 214; see generally
Note, Defining Public Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REV. 153 (1981).
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whether linked to a statutory or constitutional provision.' 0
Declining to find a fundamental and substantial public policy violation, the court noted:
The absence of a distinctly "public" interest in this case is apparent when we
consider that if an employer and employee were expressly to agree that the
employee has no obligation to, and should not, inform the employer of any adverse information the employee learns about a fellow employee's background,
nothing in the state's public policy would render such an agreement void. By
contrast, in the previous cases asserting a discharge in violation of public policy, the public interest at stake was invariably
one which could not properly
11
be circumvented by agreement of the parties.

Thus, the court concluded that the employee's duty of disclosure to
his employer does not invoke the Tameny rationale; rather, such a
'' 2
duty is designed to benefit the employer's "private interest. 1
B.

Implied-in-FactEmployment Contract

Two issues were considered by the court under the breach of the
employment contract cause of action: (1) whether IDC's course of
conduct and policies resulted in an oral contract to discharge only for
good cause; and (2) whether the statute of frauds barred enforcement
thereof.13 Relying on the rationale of White Lightning Co. v. Wolfson,14 that the statute of frauds'5 does not apply to contracts performable within one year, the court reiterated that "an employment
contract of indefinite duration" is thereby precluded since performance within the year is feasible.16 Citing decisions from California
and other states, the court maintained that agreements to discharge
10. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 669, 765 P.2d at 379, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 217. The landmark
California decision which validated this cause of action was Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). See generally Note,
ProtectingAt Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983). For restrictions on this cause of action, see Gray v.
Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 813, 222 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1986); Tyco Indus., Inc. v. Superior Court, 164 Cal. App. 3d 148, 211 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1985); Shapiro v. Wells Fargo
Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984); Note, Public Policy
Limitations to the Employment At-Will Doctrine Since Geary v. United States Steel
Corporation,44 U. Pirr. L. REV. 1115 (1983). See also Dabbs v. Cardiopulmonary Management Serv., 188 Cal. App. 3d 1437, 234 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1987) (public policy exception
need not be based on statutory or constitutional provision); Koehrer v. Superior Court,
181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986).
11. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 670 n.12, 765 P.2d at 380 n.12, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 218 n.12
(emphasis in original).
12. Id. at 671, 765 P.2d at 380, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
13. Id.
14. 68 Cal. 2d 336, 438 P.2d 345, 66 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1968).
15. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1624(2) (West 1985).
16. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 672, 765 P.2d at 381, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 219 (citing White
Lightning, 68 Cal. 2d at 344, 438 P.2d at 349, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 701).
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only for good cause are not within the statute of frauds.17 Consequently, since either Foley or IDC could have terminated the employment relationship within one year, the statute of frauds was not
8
applicable.1
The court then reviewed whether IDC's course of conduct, including oral representations to Foley that he would not be discharged
without good cause, was sufficient to constitute an implied contract.
Refusing to distinguish the holding in Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.19
and its progeny which validated implied employment contracts, the
court explained that basic contract principles may be supplemented
by considerations of personnel policies and practices, length of service, and course of conduct to overcome the general at-will presumption.2 0 Thus, Foley's allegations were sufficient to establish an
implied contract based on his six-year nine-month length of service,
IDC's stated termination policy and procedure, and the non-compete
22
agreement 21 signed by Foley.
C. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing
"The covenant of good faith and fair dealing was developed in the
contract arena and is aimed at making effective the agreement's
promises." 23 The court analyzed the viability of the covenant in the
employment context, together with the appropriateness of various
remedies. Noting that the covenant is implied in every contract, the
court stated as a general rule that the breach of the covenant invokes
17. Id. at 673, 765 P.2d at 382, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 220. See, e.g., Plumlee v. Poag, 150
Cal. App. 3d 541, 198 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1984); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d
458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982); see generally 1 B. WITKIN, 'SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 282 (9th ed. 1987).
18. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 675, 765 P.2d at 383, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
19. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
20. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 680, 765 P.2d at 387, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 225; see also R.
Abrams & D. Nolan, Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in Employee Discipline Cases,
1985 DUKE L.J. 594 (1985); Note, Employee Handbooks and Employment At-Will Contracts, 1985 DUKE L.J. 196 (1985).
21. See generally J. Leibman & R. Nathan, The Enforceability of Post-Employment Noncompetition Agreements Formed After At-Will Employment Has Commenced: The Afterthought Agreement, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1465 (1987).
22. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 681-82, 765 P.2d at 387-88, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26.
23. Id. at 683, 765 P.2d at 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227. See generally Comment, Reconstructing Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as a
Tort, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1291 (1985); Note, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The
Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing
into the Commercial Realm, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 377 (1986); Note, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Examining Employees' Good Faith Duties, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 483 (1988); Note, "Contort:" Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and FairDealing in Noninsurance, Commercial Contracts-ItsExistence
and Desirability,60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 510 (1985).
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contract, rather than tort remedies. 24
However, the court acknowledged the exception to this rule in insurance contracts, where overriding policy considerations have encouraged California courts to allow recovery in tort for an insurer's
bad faith breach of contract. 25 Distinguishing the insurer-insured relationship, the court'criticized prior decisions which justified extending such tort-based liability to the employment context:
[T]he underlying problem.., lies in the decisions' uncritical incorporation of
the insurance model into the employment context, without careful consideration of the fundamental policies underlying the development of tort and contract law in general or of significant differences between the insurer/insured
and employer/employee relationships. [Footnote omitted] ... The covenant of
good faith is read into contracts in order to protect the express covenants or
promises of the contract, not to protect some general public policy interest not
directly tied to the contract's purposes. The insurance cases
thus were a ma26
jor departure from traditional principles of contract law.

The court reasoned that while an insurer's interests are financially at
odds with clients', an employer stands to benefit from retaining good
employees. Thus, the relationship between the insured/insurer was
not deemed sufficiently analogous to that of an employer/employee.
Consequently, the court refused to justify an extension of the tor27
tious breach of the implied covenant to employment contracts.
In further reliance on policy considerations, the court indicated
that any extension of tort remedies in this context "is better suited
for legislative decision making." 28 Reviewing various approaches suggested by commentators, the court emphasized that the "fundamentally contractual" nature of the employment relationship mandated
the application of contract remedies: "In order to achieve [commercial] stability, it is also important that employers not be unduly deprived of discretion to dismiss an employee by the fear that doing so
will give rise to potential tort recovery in every case."' 29
24. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 684, 765 P.2d at 389-90, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227-28.
25. Id.; see, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480 (1973); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198
(1958).
26. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 689-90, 765 P.2d at 393-94, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 231-32.
27. Id. at 692-93, 765 P.2d at 395-96, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 233-34. In making this finding, the court specifically disapproved of a contrary holding in Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980), and its progeny. Foley, 47
Cal. 3d at 700 n.42, 765 P.2d at 401 n.42, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239 n.42. Further, the court
declined to adopt the dictum from Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard
Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984) (suggesting extension of
the doctrine would be proper in employment situations). Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 687, 765
P.2d at 392, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
28. Id at 694, 765 P.2d at 397, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
29. Id. at 696, 765 P.2d at 398-99, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 236-37. See generally J. Sebert,
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IV.
A.

THE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS

Justice Broussard's Opinion

Although he concurred with the other portions of the majority's
opinion, Justice Broussard dissented from the court's analysis of the
cause of action for tortious breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. The Justice viewed the majority's findings as
an improper attempt at judicial legislation, which left the wronged
employee without a suitable recourse. 30 Further, the majority's abolition of the tortious breach of the implied covenant stemming from a
bad faith discharge was unwarranted--especially considering that the
well-established precedent which originated in the insurance cases,
was adopted in Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc. in the employment
context, and further expanded in Seaman's Direct Buying Service,
Inc. v. Standard Oil C0.31
B. Justice Kaufman's Opinion
Justice Kaufman concurred with the majority in part, but expressed his dissent to the disposition of the implied covenant claim.
While not as adamant as Justice Broussard that the tort cause of action was proper, Justice Kaufman argued that a bad faith discharge
"may give rise to tort remedies."3 2 Attacking the majority's unwillingness to recognize the special nature of the employment relationship, Justice Kaufman commented that "no relationship . . .places
more reliance upon the other, is more dependent upon the other, or
is more vulnerable to abuse by the other, than the relationship between employer and employee." 33 Additionally, the Justice viewed
the majority's reluctance as an unusual abdication of "their responsibility for the upkeep of the common law,"34 particularly considering
the court's judicial activism in other areas.
Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based Upon Contract: Toward
Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1565 (1986); Comment, Formulating Standardsfor Awards of Punitive Damages in the Borderland of
Contractand Tort, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 2033 (1986); Note, Workers' Compensation Exclu-

sivity and Wrongful Termination Tort Damages: An Injurious Tug of War, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1229 (1988); Note, DamageMeasurementsfor Bad Faith Breach of Contract:
An Economic Analysis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 161 (1986).

30. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 701, 765 P.2d at 402, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 240 (Broussard, J.,
concurring & dissenting).
31. See id. at 703-15, 765 P.2d at 402-12, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 240-50 (Broussard, J., con-

curring & dissenting).
32. Id. at 715, 765 P.2d at 412, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 250 (Kaufman, J., concurring &
dissenting) (emphasis in original).

33. Id. at 718, 765 P.2d at 415, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 253 (Kaufman, J., concurring &
dissenting).

34. Id. at 719, 765 P.2d at 415, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 253 (Kaufman, J., concurring &
dissenting) (quoting People v. Pearce, 61 Cal. 2d 879, 882, 395 P.2d 893, 895, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 845, 847 (1964)).
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C. Justice Mosk's Opinion
While generally agreeing with the comments of Justices Broussard
and Kaufman, Justice Mosk's dissent focused on the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine. 35 Noting Labor Code section
1102.5(b),36 which prohibits retaliation for "whistleblowing" to law
enforcement agencies, Justice Mosk contended that to condone retaliatory discharge for disclosures to one's employer produced an "incon37
gruous" result.
V.

IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION

A recent study indicates that more than one thousand wrongful
discharge claims are filed annually in California.38 Although most
cases are resolved prior to trial for an average settlement to plaintiff
of $20,000, the average jury award between 1980 and 1986 was
39
$208,000.
Nonetheless, Foley is not expected to significantly reduce the
number of wrongful discharge claims.40 Mistreated employees can
still assert claims based on discrimination, privacy issues, defamation,
fraud, and false imprisonment. However, compensatory damages for
emotional suffering and punitive damages for willful conduct-both
associated with the manner in which the employee was dischargedare now essentially foreclosed under a bad faith theory.41 In fact,
some legal commentators view Foley as indicative of the court's hostility to "efforts by employees to regulate arbitrary behavior by an
2
employer through substantial monetary awards."4
35. See id. at 723-24, 765 P.2d at 418, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 256 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
36. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 1102.5 (West Supp. 1989).
37. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 724, 765 P.2d at 418, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 256 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
38. See L.A. Times, Sept. 16, 1988, § 4, at 1, col. 1 (citing a study by the Rand 3 lnstitute for Civil Justice completed in September 1988).
39. N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1988, § D, at 1, col. 1 (citing the September 1988 survey by
the Rand Institute for Civil Justice). However, in 1987, the average settlement was
over $916,000, an increase of 64% from 1986. 2 S.F. Bus. Times No. 24, Feb. 15, 1988,
§ 1, at 1.
40. See L.A. Times, Jan. 8, 1989, § 5, at 3, col. 1 (opinion by William B. Gould, IV,
professor of law, Stanford University School of Law); see also 11 Nat'l L.J. No. 30, at
20-21; Daily Rep. Executives (BNA), Jan. 18, 1989; L.A. Times, Jan. 8, 1989, § 4, at 3,
col. 1; L.A. Times, Dec. 30, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
41. See supra note 40. Also note that by basing the implied covenant claim in contract, plaintiffs can take advantage of the four-year statute of limitations, rather than
the shorter tort period. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337(1) (West 1982) (statute of limitations for contract claims).
42. L.A. Times, Jan. 8, 1989, § 5, at 3, col. 1 (opinion by Professor Gould).
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The impact of Foley is not, however, likely to be limited to employment situations, but is anticipated to be far-reaching. Speculation exists that lenders will utilize Foley to avoid tort claims and associated
punitive damage awards in bad faith claims initiated by disgruntled
borrowers.43 These efforts will be buttressed by the court's refusal to
adopt the Seaman's rationale which approved tort remedies in stan44
dard commercial contract interpretation.
45
The court's opinion did not address the issue of retroactivity.
Although the court is expected to resolve this question in Newman v.
6
Emerson Radio Corporation,4
a recent decision by the Court of Ap47
peal for the Second District held that Foley is not applicable to
cases filed before the supreme court handed down its decision in December, 1988.
VI.

CONCLUSION

California now joins the vast majority of states which have expressly or impliedly rejected tort damages in employment at will contracts.48 The California Supreme Court, now dominated by Governor
Deukmejian's conservative appointees, continues to dismantle the expansive development of common law doctrines which were the hallmark of the Bird era.
Stemming the tide of wrongful discharge litigation will require
more, however, than judicial fiat. Long overdue is action by the legislature to contain the barrage of employment litigation for which California has been so well known. As Professor Gould suggests, perhaps
the answer lies in an arbitration system specially designed to resolve
49
these complicated and emotional disputes.
BARBARA

A.

BAYLISS

43. Banking Rep. (BNA), Jan. 16, 1989 (comments by William Burke, Esq.,
Shearman & Sterling, Los Angeles, noting that lender liability cases typically involve

claims based on tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
44. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
45. See Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 700 n.43, 765 P.2d 402 n.43, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 240 n.43.
46. No. LA 32284 (review granted Dec. 11, 1986).
47. See Rodie v. Max Factor & Co., 1989 Cal. App. Lexis 125, 12 (Feb. 24, 1989).
48. See Prout v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1989 Mont. Lexis 43, 18 (Feb. 16, 1989)
(Weber, J., dissenting). Montana is one of only a few states which allows a claim in
tort for breach of implied covenant. Id.; see also Wrongful Discharge in Employment
Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1987).

49. Compare W. Gould, IV, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for
Arbitration, 13 EMPL. REL. L.J. 404 (1988) with Wrongful Discharge in Employment

Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1987) (allows employees to sue for bad faith
discharge).
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C.

Religious organizations using coercive persuasion to
recruit members may be subject to tort liability based on

acts of fraudulentdeception and cannot rely on the free
exercise clause to protect this tortious conduct: Molko v.
Holy Spirit Association.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Molko v. Holy Spirit Association,' the court held that causes of
action for fraud,2 intentional infliction of emotional distress, 3 and restitution 4 were available to former church members initially recruited
through the use of fraudulent misconceptions regarding the true
identity of the religious organization. The court based liability on the
theory that the coercive and deceptive nature of the Church's recruitment activities removed the first amendment protection regularly
given to religious activity. 5 Refusing to extend a cause of action
based on false imprisonment, the court held that there was no physical restraint and that the imprisonment in the instant case was mani-

fested through constitutionally protected religious speech.6

The

court additionally noted that indemnity claims made by religious organizations against deprogrammers must include the element of concurrent liability.7

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

David Molko and Tracy Leal were young adults uncertain of their
future when they were initially approached by members of the Unification Church.8 Both were separately befriended by church mem1. 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 762 P.2d 46, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1988). Justice Mosk wrote the
majority opinion with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Broussard, Arguelles, Eagleson,
and Kaufman concurring. Justice Anderson, Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal,
First Appellate District, filed a concurring and dissenting opinion.
2. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1119-20, 762 P.2d at 61, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
3. Id. at 1123, 762 P.2d at 63, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
4. Id. at 1125, 762 P.2d at 65, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
5. Id. at 112-20, 762 P.2d at 56-61, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 132-37; see U.S. CONST. amend.
I. See generally Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under
the First Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1977)(religious organization recruitment
techniques and their impact on various groups).
6. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1123-24, 762 P.2d at 64, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
7. Id. at 1127-28, 762 P.2d at 66-67, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 142-43.
8. This religious organization, founded by the Reverend Sun Myung Moon in
1954, claims over three million members. Its goal is to "unify the human family in
'eternal happiness, completely liberated from ignorance and directed toward goodness.'"

RUDIN & RUDIN, PRISON OR PARADISE?

THE NEW RELIGIOUS CULTS 31-32

(1980).
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bers while waiting at San Francisco bus stops-Molko in 1978 and
Leal in 1979. The pattern of the church recruiters was the same with
both. Molko and Leal were first invited to share a meal with the
recruiters and after conversation with other group members and'a
slide show, both agreed to visit a group-owned "farm" a few hours
away. At no time did the recruiters or the other group members reveal that they were affiliated with the Unification Church, even
though Molko and Leal asked, before accepting the dinner invitation,
whether the members were part of a religious organization. At the
farm, Molko and Leal were both subjected to a rigorous schedule of
exercise, lectures, group discussions, and "testimonials," and encouraged to stay at the facility. Still oblivious to the true nature of
the group's affiliation and continuing to question the members about
it, both were experiencing uncertainty and disorientation. However,
Molko and Leal agreed to attend another camp where they were further indoctrinated and finally told of the affiliation with the Unification Church. 9 Both eventually became formal Church members and
Molko was persuaded to give the Church $6000. Molko and Leal
were later successfully "abducted" and convinced to abandon the
Church by deprogrammers hired by their parents.
Molko and Leal sued the Church, claiming fraud and deceit, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment. Additionally, based on an allegation of undue influence, Molko sought
restitution of the $6000 he had given to the Church. In a cross-complaint, the Church claimed that its civil rights were violated by
Molko and the deprogrammer. The Church also sought from the
deprogrammer full or partial indemnity regarding Molko's alleged
injuries.
A summary judgment was granted in favor of the Church by the
trial court on the issues of fraud, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and false imprisonment. The cross-complaint was dismissed.
After consolidation of the appeals, the court of appeal reversed the
dismissal of the Church's cross-complaint, but upheld the summary
judgment granted in its favor.
III.

A.

MAJORITY OPINION

Cause of Action Based on Fraud

Molko and Leal asserted that they had "justifiably relied" on the
Church's deliberate deceptions and subsequently were emotionally
and monetarily injured from this coercion into Church membership.
9. Leal was not told of the group's true identity until 22 days after her first encounter with the recruiters; Molko was told after approximately two weeks. Molko, 46
Cal. 3d at 1102-12, 762 P.2d at 49-52, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 125-28.
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Molko and Leal based this assertion on the theory that the Church
had "brainwashed" them through systematic psychological indoctrination at the camps. In reversing the court of appeal and allowing
the fraud action, the court determined that the existence of covert
"coercive persuasion" on the part of a religious organization may subject that organization to possible fraud liability.' 0 The court additionally held that no constitutional protection was available to shield
deceptive recruitment conduct even though these practices were considered religiously motivated activity.' 1
The court first discussed whether triable issues of fact remained regarding Molko and Leal's justifiable reliance on the Church's intentional misrepresentation of its identity. The Church conceded all the
necessary elements of the fraud claim12 except one-maintaining
that no justifiable reliance existed because the recruiters revealed
the affiliation with the Church prior to Molko and Leal formally
joining the organization. Molko and Leal, however, asserted that justifiable reliance was established when the Church "subject[ed] them,
without their knowledge or consent, to an intense program of coercive persuasion," which subsequently "rendered them incapable of
deciding not to join the Church" once its true affiliation was
3
revealed.'
Citing numerous past decisions involving religious organizations
and brainwashing,' 4 the court reasoned that since a controversy currently exists over the existence and effects of brainwashing techniques, triable issues of fact remained to prevent a granting of
summary judgment in favor of the Church by the lower court.' 5 The
10. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1108-11, 762 P.2d at 52-56, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 129-32. See generally Annotation, Liability of Religious Associations for Damagesfor Intentionally
Tortious Conduct in Recruitment, Indoctrination,or Related Activity, 40 A.L.R. 4TH
1062 (1985).
11. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1112-20, 762 P.2d at 56-61, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 132-37. See generally Delgado, When Religious Exercise is Not Free: Deprogrammingand the Constitutional Status of Coercively Induced Belief, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1071 (1984).
12. The Church conceded that the elements of misrepresentation, knowledge of
falsity, intent to defraud, and damages were present per the five-part test articulated
in Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal. 2d 409, 414, 115 P.2d 977, 980 (1941).
13. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1108, 762 P.2d at 54, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 130 (emphasis in
original).
14. See, e.g., Lewis v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 589 F. Supp. 10 (D. Mass. 1983) (absent
certain specified circumstances, brainwashing and indoctrination by religious organizations are not actionable in tort); Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 125 Misc. 2d 1061, 480
N.Y.S.2d 706 (1984) (father allowed to bring action for intentional infliction of emotional distress after the Church allegedly brainwashed his son, who later committed
suicide).
15. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1110, 762 P.2d at 55, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
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court further held that testimony by Molko and Leal's expert witnesses regarding coercive persuasion was admissible, thus rejecting
the Church's assertion that this testimony was precluded by the free
exercise clause of the first amendment.16
In analyzing the constitutional issues inherent within the regulation of religious activity, the court emphasized that "while religious
belief is absolutely protected [by the free exercise clause], religiously
motivated conduct is not.' 17 The court stressed that religious conduct "remains subject to regulation for the protection of society" and
may be judicially restricted or banned.' 8 The court found the balancing test articulated in Wisconsin v. Yoder 19 to be the appropriate
standard for analyzing the Church's recruiting practices. In applying
this test, "the importance of the state's interest is weighed against
the severity of the burden imposed on religion."20 Additionally, the
court held that any government regulation must be both non-discriminatory and not create a greater burden than necessary to achieve its
2
purpose. 1
The Church relied on Katz v. Superior Court22 for its assertion
that judicial scrutiny into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs and
any accompanying coercive persuasion, is prohibited by the first
amendment. The court, however, in distinguishing Katz, held that
the issue in the immediate case involved the examination of misleading and coercive religious conduct and not an inquiry into religious
belief, i.e., the validity of the Church's religious teachings, or the validity of the member's faith.23
In applying the Yoder balancing test to the Church's recruitment
actions, the court acknowledged that a burden on the free exercise of
16. Id. at 1110-11, 762 P.2d at 55, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
17. Id. at 1112, 762 P.2d at 56, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 132 (quoting Sherberr v. Vernor,
374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963) (emphasis in original)); see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) ("[T]he [f]irst [a]mendment embraces two concepts- freedom to
believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.").
18. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1113, 762 P.2d at 56-57, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 132-33 (quoting
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940)); see, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944) (law prohibiting children under 18 from distributing literature in public
places challenged by Jehovah's Witnesses); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878) (polygamy ban upheld even though the practice was a cornerstone of the Mormon religion).
19. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
20. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1113, 762 P.2d at 56, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 132 (citing Yoder, 406
U.S. at 214).
21. Id. at 1118, 762 P.2d at 57, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 136; see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 606 (1961) (Sunday closing law valid as only an "indirect burden on the exercise of religion").
22. 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1977) (parental conservatorship action
denied as too extreme a remedy where gullible adult children had been subjected to
coercive persuasion by religious organization).
23. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1115, 762 P.2d at 59, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
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religion would result if religious organizations were subject to fraud
liability.24 Calling this burden insignificant, the court recognized that

this liability would merely act as deterrent to "recruiting through deception." 25 The court found that the compelling state interest in protecting society from the threat to public safety posed by the use of
coercive persuasion warranted this slight burden on the Church. 26
The court further noted that the availability of a cause of action for
fraud is both nondiscriminatory and the least burdensome method
for ensuring that the public is shielded from the "harmful effects of
fraudulent recruitment."27

B.

Cause of Action Based on Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress

In assessing the viability of Molko and Leal's cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court first confirmed
that first amendment protection would shield the Church if the basis
of the claim consisted solely of "threats of divine retribution."28
However, because Molko and Leal's assertion that the fraudulent
misrepresentations and brainwashing techniques used by the Church
composed the heart of their claim, the court held that further analy29
sis was appropriate.
In establishing the necessary elements within this cause of action,
the court noted that the Church challenged only the allegation that
the recruiting practices were "extreme and outrageous" within the
test enunciated in Cole v. FairOaks FireProtection District.30

In de-

fending its practices, the Church first claimed that its conduct was
similar to actions taken by other religious organizations, and alterna24. Id. at 1117, 762 P.2d at 59, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
25. Id The court emphasized that:
Being subject to liability for fraud does not in any way or degree prevent or
inhibit Church members from operating their religious communities, worshiping as they see fit, freely associating with one another, selling or distributing
literature, proselytizing on the street, soliciting funds, or generally spreading
the Reverend Moon's message among the population.
Id. at 1117, 762 P.2d at 60, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
26. Id. at 1117-18, 762 P.2d at 60-61, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 136-37.
27. Id. at 1119, 762 P.2d at 61, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
28. Id. at 1120, 762 P.2d at 61, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
29. Id. at 1120, 762 P.2d at 62, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
30. 43 Cal. 3d 148, 155 n.7, 729 P.2d 743, 746 n.7, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308, 312 n.7 (1987)
(citing Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 603 P.2d 58, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1979)). The
other three elements are "intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of
causing emotional distress," "severe emotional suffering," and "actual and proximate
causation of the emotional distress." Id.
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tively, contended that any injury resulting was "self inflicted." The
court summarily rejected these assertions stating that the Church
practices were arguably outrageous based on "an abuse of 'a relation
or position which gives [the Church] power to damage the plaintiff's
interest.' "31 The court concluded that the lower court's granting of a
32
summary judgment in favor of the Church on this claim was error.
C. False Imprisonment Claim
Though conceding that she was not physically prevented from leaving the camps, Leal asserted that the Church falsely imprisoned her
through threats that "her family 'would be damned in Hell forever'"33 should she depart the Church. In rejecting Leal's challenge
to the summary judgment granted in favor of the Church, the court
again stressed the constitutional protection given to religious speech.
The court confirmed that tort liability cannot lie for mere threats of
34
"divine retribution. "
D.

Restitution Claim

Based on an allegation of undue influence caused by Church brainwashing, Molko sued for restitution of the $6000 donation he made to
the Church. The court rejected the court of appeal assertion that judicial review of the gift was constitutionally prohibited by the free
exercise clause, and instead, held that Molko's restitution claim was
merely "a natural extension of his fraud theory." 35 The court concluded that it was error for the appellate court to have affirmed the
3
trial court's summary judgment in favor of the Church. 6
E.

Cross-ComplaintBased on Civil Rights Violations &
Indemnification

The
ducted
rights
should

Church cross-complained against the deprogrammer that abMolko, asserting that the Church's federal and state civil
were violated by his actions, and that the deprogrammer
be subject to full or partial indemnity regarding the alleged

31. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1122-23, 762 P.2d at 63, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 139. See generally
Note, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Spiritual Counselors: Can Outrageous Conduct Be Free Exercise?, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1296 (1986) (case-by-case factual

analysis in light of free exercise clause defense is appropriate where spiritual counseling allegedly causes emotional distress).
32. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1123, 762 P.2d at 63, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
33. Id. at 1123, 762 P.2d at 64, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
34. Id. at 1124, 762 P.2d at 64, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 140. See generally Fowler v. Rhode
Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953). It is not "in the competence of the courts under our constitutional scheme to approve, disapprove, classify, regulate or in any manner control sermons delivered at religious meetings." Id.

35. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1124, 762 P.2d at 64, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
36. Id. at 1125, 762 P.2d at 65, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
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injuries to Molko. The Church based its civil rights claim on the assertion that "it had representational standing to sue for a violation of
its members' constitutionally guaranteed right to travel." 37 The
court upheld the court of appeal's reinstatement of the cross-complaint and rejected the deprogrammer's arguments, holding that issues of fact remained which made the granting of the demurrer
38
inappropriate.
The court lastly examined whether an indemnification action may
lie in this case and concluded that the Church's claim against the
deprogrammer for indemnity lacked the necessary element of concurrent liability for Molko's injuries.39 This determination prevented
the court from directly resolving the issue of whether comparative
fault applies to indemnity actions by concurrent intentional
tortfeasors.
IV.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

Justice Carl Anderson, Presiding Justice of the First Appellate
District, filed a lengthy concurring and dissenting opinion proclaiming the belief that the majority erred in allowing judicial scrutiny of
the Church's recruitment practices and that "religious conversion is
simply not subject to judicial review." 40 Anderson continually
stressed his concern that the imposition of tort liability necessarily
will lead courts into constitutionally forbidden scrutiny of the verity
of religious beliefs.41 In citing numerous cases supporting the position that church indoctrination practices are not actionable due to
first amendment protection, Justice Anderson strongly emphasized
the inherent inseparable entanglement of religious belief and religiously motivated conduct.42
Justice Anderson further sought to establish as analogous the conversion methods used by the Church, and similar methods used by
37. Id. at 1126, 762 P.2d at 65, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
38. Id. at 1126-27, 762 P.2d at 66, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
39. Id. at 1127-28, 762 P.2d at 66-67, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 142-43.
40. Id. at 1129, 762 P.2d at 68, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 144 (Anderson, J., concurring and
dissenting).
41. For further discussion regarding judicial inquiry into religious beliefs, see Shapiro, Of Robots, Persons, and the Protection of Religious Beliefs, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.

1277 (1983).
42. See generally United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); Founding Church of
Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (1969), cert denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969);
Lewis v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 589 F. Supp. 10 (D. Mass. 1983).
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more traditional religious groups. 43 He additionally questioned the
majority's determination that the Church's conduct was outrageous.
Noting that Molko's $6000 gift was "a product of free will,"44 Justice
Anderson stressed early in his opinion that "both before and after
the disclosure of the group's true identity, both appellants retained
their ability to think, to evaluate the events and to exercise their independent judgment."45
V.

CONCLUSION

The California Supreme Court's extension of tort liability to the
recruitment practices of religious organizations is the proper deterrent needed to curtail the coercive brainwashing techniques used to
indoctrinate unknowing persons unwillingly into these churches.
Justice Anderson's well-meaning concern is groundless. The majority properly enunciated the bright line separating the Church's unprotected tortious conduct and its constitutionally protected religious
beliefs.
In attempting to justify the Church's questionable method of
proselytization through isolation from family, Justice Anderson's
opinion noted that the Bible quotes Jesus as stating: "He who loves
father or mother more than me is not worthy of me." 46 However, the
Bible also clearly speaks of "putting away lying," 47 and letting "no
corrupt communication proceed out of your mouth."48 Outright deception and exploitation of gullible young people has no place within
any religion that seeks the protection of the free exercise clause. Regarding tort liability, it appears that in California, at least, the
Church and other religious organizations like it will finally be answerable to a higher authority-the civil law.
MARGARET LISA WILSON
43. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1137-38, 762 P.2d at 73-74, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 149-50 (Anderson, J., concurring and dissenting).

44. 1& at 1144, 762 P.2d at 78, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 154 (Anderson, J., concurring and
dissenting).

45. Id. at 1131, 762 P.2d at 69, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (Anderson, J., concurring and
dissenting).

46. Id,at 1138, 762 P.2d at 74, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 150 (Anderson, J., concurring and
dissenting) (citing Matthew 10:37 (King James version)).
47. Ephesians 4:25 (King James version).
48. Id. at 4:29.
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D. Nontherapistcounselors have no legally recognizable duty
to refer suicidal persons to professional mental health
experts, even if a future suicide attempt is foreseeable:
Nally v. Grace Community Church.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Nally v. Grace Community Church,1 the court held that religious counselors who provide guidance to potentially suicidal persons
have no duty to refer those persons to licensed practitioners. 2 Citing
public policy considerations, the court rejected the sweeping duty to
refer imposed by the court of appeaL 3 The court further denied the
plaintiff's claim for wrongful death based on intentional infliction of
emotional distress, since no facts existed that sufficiently proved outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant church.4
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Twenty-four year old Kenneth Nally was found dead in a friend's
apartment on April 1, 1979, due to a self-inflicted gunshot wound.
His suicide culminated a long bout with depression regarding family
and girlfriend problems. Nally joined the Grace Community Church
of the Valley ("the Church") as a student in 1974, when he was first
experiencing depression. As "the largest Protestant church in Los
Angeles County,"5 the Church employed thirty counselors to administer "pastoral counseling" to those needing spiritual guidance regarding numerous kinds of problems. This pastoral counseling was
primarily effectuated through prayer and one-on-one religious study;
6
it was not "professional or clinical" in nature.
Between 1975 and his death, Nally shared his personal problems
with three Church pastors, through both formal and informal reli1. 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988). The plaintiffs have petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review of this decision. L.A. Times, Feb.
23, 1989, § 2,at 10, col. 1.
2. Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 299-300, 763 P.2d at 960-61, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 109-110. But
see Note, Toward a JudicialRecognition of a Duty of Reasonable Care Owed Children
by Religious FaithHealers, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 165 (1987).
3. Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 300, 763 P.2d at 961, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
4. Id. at 300-04, 763 P.2d at 961-64, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 110-13.
5. Id. at 284, 763 P.2d at 950, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 99. The court noted that the
Church's congregation numbered "more than 10,000." Id.
6. Id. Justice Kaufman disputes this in his separate opinion. He asserts that the
counseling offered by the Church was much broader in scope and more sophisticated
than what was portrayed by the majority. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying
text.
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gious counseling. Nally's depression worsened late in 1978, and he received treatment under the care of several physicians, but no
psychiatrists. Nally evidenced suicidal tendencies, and in March 1979,
was hospitalized for a deliberate overdose of a prescription drug.
Nally was later released after he and his family strongly rejected the
Church pastors' and physicians' suggestion of commitment to a psychiatric facility. Two weeks later, after two more physical examinations, more informal pastoral counseling, and a marriage proposal
rejection, Nally took his own life.
A wrongful death action was brought against the Church and four
of its pastors. The plaintiff parents based their claim on three theories: first, "clergyman malpractice," 7 asserting that the defendant
Church and pastors breached a duty to prevent their son's suicide;
second, negligence in the "training, selection and hiring of
[the].. .spiritual counselors" 8 and in the counseling Nally received after his first suicide attempt; and third, wrongful death based on intentional infliction of emotional distress.9
III.
A.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Nally I

The trial court initially granted a summary judgment for the defendants.10 The court of appeal reversed, stressing the existence of
triable issues of fact regarding the plaintiff's allegation that intentional infliction of emotional distress played a role in their son's suicide." The supreme court denied defendants' petition for review,
12
depublished the Nally I opinion, and remanded to the trial court.
7. Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 287, 763 P.2d at 952, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 101. Nally's parents
are apparently the first plaintiffs ever to assert this cause of action. See Ericsson, C/ergyman Malpractice:Ramifcations of a New Theory, 16 VAL. U.L. REV. 163, 164 & n.4
(1981). This article points to many of the difficulties courts will encounter in analyzing
this cause of action, including lack of existing objective standards, and difficulty in analyzing the different counseling methods and objectives between the numerous different religious faiths. Id. at 166-73.
8. Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 287, 763 P.2d at 952, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
9. Id. at 287-88, 763 P.2d at 952-53, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 101-02.
10. Id. at 288, 763 P.2d at 953, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 102.

11. Id. The court of appeal cited three episodes that indicated outrageous conduct
on the part of the defendant pastors: an incident where the plaintiff father discovered
Nally "on his knees crying" in Pastor Cory's office, deposition evidence that severe depression may be caused by pastoral counseling, and taped remarks by Pastor Thomson
indicating that those who commit suicide can still enter heaven if they remain true to
their faith. Id

Additionally, the defendants' first amendment defenses were disal-

lowed regarding Pastor Thomson's taped statements. Id. at 288-89, 763 P.2d at 953, 253
Cal. Rptr. at 102.
12. Id. at 289, 763 P.2d at 953, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
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B. Nally II
On remand, the trial court found that the defendants' were enti-

tled to a nonsuit,13 since there was insufficient justification for regulation of the Church's pastoral counseling, and no proof of any
breach of duty by the Church and its pastors. 14 The trial court also
excluded Pastor Thomson's taped remark from evidence.15
The court of appeal reversed the nonsuit, 16 stating that by combining the plaintiff's cause of action for "clergyman malpractice" with
the plaintiff's cause of action for negligence, a cause of action existed
for the "'negligent failure to prevent suicide' by 'nontherapist counselors.' "17 It further held that this duty mandated nontherapist
counselors to refer persons with suicidal tendencies to professionals
trained to handle this specific problem.18 The court of appeal stated
that this duty was constitutional under the free exercise of religion
clause within the first amendment to the United States
Constitution.19
Additionally, the court of appeal held that the trial court's exclusion of Pastor Thomson's taped remarks was error.20 The supreme
court granted review to resolve the conflicts within the Nally I and
Nally 11 decisions.
13. Id. at 289-90, 763 P.2d at 954, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 103. If the court finds that "as a
matter of law, the evidence presented by [the] plaintiff is insufficient to permit a jury
to find in his favor," then a nonsuit may be granted to the defendant. Id. at 291, 763
P.2d at 955, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 104 (citing Cambell v. General Motors Corp., 32 Cal. 3d
112, 117-18, 649 P.2d 224, 227, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891, 894 (1982)); see also 7 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Trial §§ 409-410 (3d ed. 1985) (plaintiff needs to put forth "substantial evidence").
14. Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 289, 763 P.2d at 954, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
15. Id. at 289-90, 763 P.2d at 954, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 103. The trial court based this
exclusion on the discretionary provision within Evidence Code section 352 allowing a
court to bar certain evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b)
create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading
the jury." CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966 & Supp. 1989); see also Nally, 47 Cal. 3d
at 289-90 n.5, 763 P.2d at 954 n.5, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 103 n.5.
16. Justice Cole filed a dissent with the court of appeal opinion that rejected both
the majority's imposition of a duty of care and the allowing of the wrongful death
cause of action that rested on intentional infliction of emotional distress. Nally, 47 Cal.
3d at 290-91, 763 P.2d at 954, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
17. Id. at 290, 763 P.2d at 954, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
18. Id.
19. The free exercise clause states that laws cannot "prohibit the free exercise of
[religion] .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20. Nally, 47 Cal.3d at 290, 763 P.2d at 954, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
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IV.

A.

MAJORITY OPINION

Duty of Care Analysis

The court addressed the sweeping "duty to refer" imposed by the
court of appeal on all nonprofessional counselors2l by analyzing
whether this broad imposition genuinely created a viable legal duty
which, if breached, gives rise to a cause of action in tort. The court
noted the general rule that a special relationship "of custody or control" must exist between parties in order for a duty to protect to
arise. 22 The court further identified numerous other factors that
must be examined before imposing a duty of care: foreseeability and
certainty of injury, proximity between the plaintiff's injury and the
defendant's actions, culpability of the defendant, the burdens involved with imposition of liability, and the existence of insurance
23
coverage.
In examining the requirement of a special relationship, the court
referred to two California Supreme Court cases, Meier v. Ross General Hospital,24 and Vistica v. PresbyterianHospital,25 which both
imposed a "duty to prevent a foreseeable suicide." 26 The court rejected the court of appeal and plaintiff's contention that the Meier
and Vistica duty of care should be extended to pastoral and other
nonprofessional counselors.27 The court emphasized that these two
cases specifically delineate a duty to prevent a suicide only when a
specific relationship between the hospital and the deceased exists,
namely, a "supervised medical relationship."28
The court similarly disapproved of the reliance by the court of appeal and the plaintiff on dictum expressed in Bellah v. Greenson.29 In
distinguishing Bellah, the court noted the dictum in that case merely
expressed the opinion that a traditional "professional malpractice"
21. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
22. Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 293, 763 P.2d at 956, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 105; see, e.g., Davidson v. City of Westminister, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 649 P.2d 894, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1982) (a
special relationship did not arise between police officers and a crime victim when the
victim was attacked in an area under police surveillance).
23. Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 293, 763 P.2d at 956, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 105 (citing Rowland v.
Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112-13, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 90, 100 (1968)).
24. 69 Cal. 2d 420, 445 P.2d 519, 71 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1968).
25. 67 Cal. 2d 465, 432 P.2d 193, 62 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1967).
26. Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 293, 763 P.2d at 956, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 105. The two defendant hospitals in Meier and Vistica accepted suicidal patients who later took their own
lives while under the hospital's care.
27. Id. at 293-94, 763 P.2d at 956-57, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 105-06.
28. Id. at 294, 763 P.2d at 957, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
29. 81 Cal. App. 3d 614, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1978). In Bellah, the California Court
of Appeal indicated that a cause of action for medical malpractice may be brought
against a psychiatrist who, while in a non-hospital setting, knows of a patient's suicidal
tendencies and fails to prevent the suicide of the patient. Id. at 620-23, 146 Cal. Rptr.
at 538-39.
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action may be brought against professional counselors who fail to adequately treat suicidal patients. 30 The court emphasized that the
aforementioned cases all involved the existence of a certain special
relationship that is not present in the case at bar3--a licensed psychiatrist-patient or hospital-patient relationship.
B. Defendant's Conduct and Foreseeabilityof Harm
The court next examined whether the defendants' knowledge of
Nally's continuing suicidal tendencies after his unsuccessful suicide
attempt was sufficient to warrant levying a duty to refer upon professional therapists. The court held that the mere awareness of a person's suicidal tendencies and the foreseeability of a future successful
32
suicide attempt will not give rise to a comprehensive duty to refer.
The court reasoned that ruling otherwise could lead to a chilling effect on the giving of altruistic counseling. 33
C. Public Policy
In rejecting the plaintiff's causes of action, the court discussed several other policy considerations in addition to this chilling effect.
The court remarked that troubled persons may be reluctant to seek
any kind of counseling, for fear of the possibility of "involuntary
commitment" by counselors obliged to take action once a duty to re3
fer is applicable. 4
The court further noted evidence of indirect legislative support for
the denial of the imposition of the duty to refer. The court specifically referred to the existence of "Good Samaritan" laws designed to
inspire volunteer assistance to those in need,35 and to the clergy exemption from the licensing laws that regularly apply to professional
counselors and psychiatrists. 36 The court emphasized that the legislature "has recognized that access to the clergy for counseling should
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 295-96, 763 P.2d at 958, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
Id. at 296, 763 P.2d at 958, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
Id. at 297, 763 P.2d at 959, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
Id.
Id,
Id. at 298, 763 P.2d at 960, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 109; see, e.g., CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1799.102 (West Supp. 1989) (persons who "render emergency care at
the scene of an emergency" may escape civil liability if they acted "in good faith and
not for compensation").
36. Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 298, 763 P.2d at 959, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 108; see CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §§ 4980-4981, 2900-2918 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
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be free from state-imposed counseling standards." 37
D.

Wrongful Death Based on IntentionalInfliction of Emotional
Distress

The court next addressed whether the conduct of the defendants in
counseling Nally rose to the level of a legitimate claim for wrongful
death based on intentional infliction of emotional distress. 38 The
court cited Tate v. Canonica3 9 as the correct standard for imposing
liability, stating that a plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to show
that defendant's conduct was outrageous and a substantial factor in
the ...

suicide."4

0

The court focused on the trial court's exclusion of a taped lecture
given by Pastor Thomson eighteen months after Nally's suicide. The
taped statements allegedly confirmed the plaintiff's belief that the
Church actively counsels that persons committing suicide will enter
heaven so long as they remain faithful believers in God.41 The court
of appeal overturned this exclusion, after determining that this evidence was crucial to plaintiff's proof that the defendant's counseling
42
methods were outrageous, and held that the tape was admissable.
In upholding the trial court's exclusion, the supreme court held
that the exclusion was proper under Evidence Code section 352, since
this tape did not demonstrate that the defendants abetted Nally's suicide in any way, and the taped statement was "simply too temporally
3
remote to establish any causal connection with Nally's suicide."4
The court explained that the pastoral counseling received by Nally
would have been individualized, and any general statements about
suicide made eighteen months later by the defendant pastor is only
"at best marginally relevant."44
IV.

JUSTICE KAUFMAN'S SEPARATE OPINION

Justice Kaufman agreed that the nonsuit was correct; however, he
filed a separate opinion to assert that the defendants owed at least a
37. Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 298, 763 P.2d at 959-60, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 108-09.
38. For additional analysis regarding church liability and the tort claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, see generally Note, Intentional Infliction of

Emotional Distress by Spiritual Counselors: Can Outrageous Conduct Be "FreeExercise"?, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1296 (1986) (a case-by-case factual analysis in light of the free
exercise clause defense is appropriate where spiritual counseling allegedly causes emotional distress).
39. 180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1960).
40. Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 301, 763 P.2d at 961, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (citing Tate, 180
Cal. App. 2d at 909, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 36).
41. Id. at 288, 302-03, 763 P.2d at 952-53, 962-63, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 101-02, 111-12.
42. Id. at 301, 763 P.2d at 961-62, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 110-11.
43. Id. at 303-04, 763 P.2d at 963, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
44. Id. at 304, 763 P.2d at 963, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
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"minimal" duty of care to Nally.45

Kaufman first focused on evi-

dence indicating that the Church's counseling services were more
comprehensive than that portrayed by the majority, 46 and the counselors were fully competent to deal with serious mental health
problems.47 Kaufman then argued that the defendants specifically
"undertook" the treatment of Nally's psychological problems.48
However, Justice Kaufman concluded that a minimally adequate
duty of care was met by the defendant pastors when they encouraged
medical treatmentfor Nally.49

VI.

CONCLUSION

The majority's rejection of a clergyman's duty to refer clearly demonstrates a strong reluctance to interfere in the sensitive area of spiritual counseling. The court recognized the inherent difficulties that
would arise in enforcement of this duty, and the important public
policy of encouraging the altruistic counseling of those deeply troubled persons who seek either formal or informal religious guidance.5 0
Apart from a forced commitment to a psychiatric hospital, only
Nally himself could have prevented his tragic suicide. If a duty to refer is extended to nonexperts like pastors, priests, and ministers, this
begs the question of where this duty really ends under the broad
standards espoused by the plaintiffs and the court of appeal. Where
should the line be drawn? After all, if such a sweeping duty is imposed, cannot it then be argued that it would also apply to the plaintiff parents, since they had the requisite knowledge that their son's
45. Id. at 305, 763 P.2d at 964, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 113 (Kaufman, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
46. Kaufman notes that the Church's annual report refers to its pastoral counseling as "a very important part of the ministry," and that the Church counseled a large
number of outsiders that were not Church members. Id.
47. Id. at 306-07, 763 P.2d at 965, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 114 (Kaufman, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Kaufman cites testimony by the pastors regarding this
expertise, and refers to counseling details within a Church publication called "A Guide
For Biblical Counselors." Id.
48. Id. at 307, 763 P.2d at 965-66, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 114-15 (Kaufman, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
49. Id. at 313, 763 P.2d at 970, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 119 (Kaufman, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
50. See Dickson, Caring Shouldn't Put C7ergy at Risk, The Christian Sci. Monitor,
Feb. 17, 1989, at 19.
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suicide was foreseeable, and also had a custodial-like, parental counseling relationship with him?
MARGARET LISA WILSON
XI.

WELFARE & INSTITUTIONS CODE

Requiring parents whose children are wards of the court
to reimburse AFDC-FCexpenditures to support these
children does not violate the equal protection clause,
provided the reimbursementdoes not include any
amounts spent on rehabilitationor societal protection:

County of San Mateo v. Dell.
In County of San Mateo v. Dell, 46 Cal. 3d 1236, 762 P.2d 1202, 252
Cal. Rptr. 478 (1988), the court considered whether California can require parents to contribute to their children's support after their children are declared wards of the court. The court held that section
11350 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which imposes this responsibility upon parents, does not violate the equal protection
clause, even when protection of society is a consideration in a court's
decision. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11350 (West 1980); Annotation, Liability of Parentfor Support of Child Institutionalized by Juvenile Court, 59 A.L.R. 3D 636 (1974).
After Dell, Jr., committed two serious crimes, the County of San
Mateo removed him from his parents' custody and declared him a
ward of the court under section 602 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1980 &
Supp. 1989). Although the county was concerned with protecting society, this was not the primary motivation for seeking such a declaration. Dell, Jr., was placed in a nonsecure group foster home.
Throughout this period, Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Foster Care (AFDC-FC) funds were used to support Dell, Jr.
The county brought suit to compel the minor's parents to reimburse
the portion of these funds relating to the support and maintenance of
the youth pursuant to section 11350. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 11350 (West 1980). The trial court granted the county's request for
reimbursement. The court of appeal reversed, holding that equal
protection prohibited the state from placing a financial burden on an
individual when one of the purposes of the removal was the protection of society.
In its decision, the supreme court first reviewed the nature of
AFDC and its relation to state law. Through AFDC, the federal government provides states with funds which are distributed to needy
families. One of the requirements of the federal program is that the
state must seek reimbursement from parents when AFDC-FC funds
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are utilized to support children who are removed from their parents'
home by the state. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1982).
In order to qualify for AFDC funds, California enacted the Family
Economic Security Act of 1982. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§ 11200-11492.1 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989). Section 11401 specifically.
provides that AFDC-FC payments shall be permitted when the child
is declared a ward of the court pursuant to section 602. CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 11401 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989). Section 11350 grants
counties the right to obtain reimbursement for these payments from
non-custodial parents, as required by federal law. CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 11350 (West 1980); see CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW SER-

VICE § 44:15 (Bancroft-Whitney 1986 & Supp. 1988).
The court considered its earlier decision in the case of In re Jerald
C., 36 Cal. 3d 1, 678 P.2d 917, 201 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1984). Jerald C. involved the question of forced parental contributions for a child declared a ward of the court under section 602. The court unanimously
held that equal protection prohibited placing the burden of supporting a public program upon a few individuals. The court was divided,
however, on whether the parents could be required to reimburse the
county for the reasonable amounts expended on basic support of minors removed from parental custody. The lead opinion garnered the
support of three members of the court; whereas, four justices signed
the separate concurrence. Thus, the concurrence actually represented a majority decision, and was so labeled by the court in Dell.
See 16 CAL. JUR. 3D Courts §§ 207, 208 (1983). The supreme court
reasoned that because the court of appeals in the present case had relied upon the analysis of the lead opinion in Jerald C, its holding was
flawed.
The court then reviewed the decision of Jerald C. Although the
lead opinion maintained that the statutory requirement was not
drawn narrowly enough to pass constitutional muster, the majority of
the justices in Jerald C. believed that a parent could be required to
pay the state "whatever he saves by not having to support" the child
himself. Jerald C., 36 Cal. 3d at 11, 678 P.2d at 923, 201 Cal. Rptr. at
348 (Kaus, J., concurring).
Having reviewed its prior holdings, the court in Dell then focused
on the nature and reasons for the removal of Dell, Jr., from his parents. Although Dell, Jr., was not placed in a secure facility, the court
opined that confinement for the protection of society is anticipated to
some degree in all such removals. However, the court reasoned that
the nature of the facility or the reasons for the wardship did not af1251

fect the legal obligations of support a parent owes to a child. Thus,
the parent can be compelled to reimburse the county for such support. The court enunciated the standard by stating that "the county
must bear the burden of demonstrating that the costs it seeks to impose are limited to the reasonable costs of support, and exclude any
costs of incarceration, treatment, or supervision for the protection of
society and the minor and the rehabilitation of the minor." Dell, 46
Cal. 3d at 1254, 762 P.2d at 1213, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
The court stated that equal protection principles forbid forcing any
individual to bear a disproportionate amount of the costs of actions
taken to protect society. See Departmentof Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d 720, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1964); 8 B. WITKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law §§ 593-594 (9th

ed. 1988); 16A AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw §§ 784, 786-787 (1979);
13 CAL. JUR. 3D ConstitutionalLaw §§ 303-341 (1974); Annotation, Liability of Parentfor Support of Child Institutionalized by Juvenile
Court, 59 A.L.R. 3D 636 (1974 & Supp. 1988). In asserting this principle, the court maintained that parents cannot be required to reimburse counties for funds expended to maintain state institutions
which house their minor children.
However, the funds for which reimbursement is allowed under section 11350 are to be used to support the minor child to whom the parents are legally obligated. Thus, a legal duty to support minor
children justifies a law which, like section 11350, limits the amount of
parental obligation to support of the child, rather than support of the
institution. Equal protection principles may prohibit placing the
costs of protecting society upon the shoulders of nonresponsible parties, but parents should at least be required to reimburse the county
for expenses which they otherwise would have incurred. By recognizing this fact, the court indicates that it will approach equal protection questions pragmatically.
MARK G. KISICKI
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